Yamada v. Kuramoto

• Citation: 744 F.Supp.2d 1075
• Decision Date: 07 October 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–00497 JMS/LEK.
• Parties: Jimmy YAMADA, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Paul KURAMOTO, in his Official Capacity as Chair and Member of the Hawaii Campaign Spending Commission, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

744 F.Supp.2d 1075

Jimmy YAMADA, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Paul KURAMOTO, in his Official Capacity as Chair and Member of the Hawaii Campaign Spending Commission, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 10–00497 JMS/LEK.

United States District Court, D. Hawai‘i.

Oct. 7, 2010.

[744 F.Supp.2d 1077]

Randy Elf, James Madison Center for Free Speech, Terre Haute, IN, Lloyd James Hochberg, Jr., Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (ONLY AS TO ACT 211 § 11–KK) J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, District Judge.I. INTRODUCTION

In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), the Supreme Court invalidated limitations on the amount of corporate independent campaign expenditures. Such restrictions violate the First Amendment. In the wake of Citizens United, Plaintiffs Jimmy Yamada (“Yamada”), Russell Stewart (“Stewart”), and A–1 A–Electrician, Inc. (“A–1”) filed this action on August 27, 2010, challenging the constitutionality of several Hawaii campaign spending laws.

A–1 is a contractor ¹ that (1) does not want to continue to face burdens such as registration and record-keeping associated with classification as a “noncandidate committee” under Hawaii campaign spending laws, (2) wants to make contributions to legislative candidates, and (3) wants to run advertisements that identify candidates, but without a disclaimer otherwise required by Hawaii law. Yamada and Stewart want to contribute to Aloha Family Alliance–Political Action Committee (“AFA–PAC”) (a political committee that makes only independent expenditures) and each wants to exceed a statutory contribution limit of $1,000 per election set forth in Hawaii law.² Plaintiffs' September 3, 2010 First Amended Verified Complaint (“FAC”) seeks injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of five Hawaii statutes, or sets of statutes, that purport to regulate Plaintiffs' proposed activities.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on September 3, 2010, asking

[744 F.Supp.2d 1078]

this court to enjoin Hawaii Campaign Spending Commission (“CSC”) officials from enforcing those five statutes or sets of statutes. The day before the scheduled hearing, Plaintiffs withdrew the request for a preliminary injunction as to the statute concerning a ban on contributions by government contractors. The court then held an evidentiary hearing on October 1, 2010 as to the remaining four statutory areas.

This Order addresses only the claim challenging Act 211, 2010 Haw. Sess. L. (“Act 211”), § 11–KK (Limits on Contributions to Noncandidate Committees). ³ The court will issue a separate order in due course addressing the other issues raised at the October 1, 2010 hearing.⁴ For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS the Motion for Preliminary Injunction in part (the as applied challenge to § 11–KK), and DENIES the Motion for Preliminary Injunction in part (the facial challenge to § 11–KK). Defendants are enjoined from enforcing § 11–KK as to Yamada's and Stewart's proposed campaign donations to AFA–PAC, as long as AFA–PAC makes only independent campaign expenditures.

II. BACKGROUND

The FAC was verified by Yamada and Stewart, and by Andrew Gerakas (who is chairman of AFA–PAC). The court thus treats relevant portions of the FAC as an affidavit. See, e.g., Cal. Pro–Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.2007). Yamada, Stewart, and Gerakas were also cross-examined regarding their statements in the FAC. Based upon the FAC's factual allegations, and testimony at the hearing, the court finds the following facts are established for purposes of preliminary injunctive relief relating to § 11–KK.

Plaintiffs Yamada and Stewart are Hawaii residents. As individuals, they each want to contribute $2,500 to AFA–PAC before the 2010 general election. FAC ¶ 7. By doing so, they would exceed the $1,000 limit allowed “per election” under § 11–KK. The primary election (which occurred on September 18, 2010) is considered to be a distinct “election” from the general election (set for November 2, 2010). See Defs.' Opp'n, filed Sept. 13, 2010, at 24. Thus, under existing law, Yamada and Stewart could contribute $2,000 for the 2010 election cycle by donating $1,000 before September 18, 2010 and donating another $1,000 between September 18, 2010 and November 2, 2010. By seeking to contribute a total of $2,500, they would thus exceed the limit by $500. Both Yamada and Stewart, however, testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that they have yet to make any individual contributions to AFA–PAC for 2010. Nevertheless, they still both want to contribute $2,500, and would do so if not for § 11–KK's limitations. Because the September 18, 2010 primary election has passed, Yamada and Stewart are now limited by § 11–KK to contributing only $1,000 to AFA–PAC for the 2010 election cycle. As a result, their proposed contribution would exceed the limit by $1,500.

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AFA–PAC is a Hawaii registered noncandidate committee ⁵ that makes only “independent expenditures.” ⁶ That is, it does not contribute directly to candidates, and does not coordinate spending for political speech with candidates or political parties. FAC ¶ 8. Garakas confirmed at the preliminary injunction hearing that he is chairman of AFA–PAC, and that it “operates like any other independent political action committee.” Garakas also testified that AFA–PAC was created in July 2010, and was formed “to influence passage of legislation that supports traditional marriage, the right to life, physician assisted suicide and promoting the issue of life in our community.” According to AFA–PAC's website, it is “committed to endorsing and financially supporting candidates, no matter what their party affiliation, who will stand up in the public square for Hawaii's families.” FAC, Ex. 1. Its goal is to “identify, endorse and elect county, state, and federal officials who favor policies that strengthen and nourish Hawaii's families.” Id. It asks people to “register to vote” and make contributions to AFA–PAC so that “[m]onies will be used to support candidates who share and reflect our values.” Id. Defendants did not challenge his claim that AFA–PAC makes only independent expenditures.

Defendant Paul Kuramoto is the CSC chairperson. Defendant Steven Olbrich is the CSC vice-chairperson. Defendants Gino Gabrio, Dean Robb, and Michael Weaver are CSC members. All Defendants are sued in their official capacities as CSC members. FAC ¶ 23.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy [that] is never awarded as of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (citation and quotation signals omitted). In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), the Supreme Court explained that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” So long as all four parts of the Winter test are applied, “a preliminary injunction [may] issue where the likelihood of success is such that ‘serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [plaintiff's] favor.’ ” Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir.2010)

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(quoting Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir.2003)). “In other words, ‘serious questions going to the merits' and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id.

IV. DISCUSSION A. Standing

Defendants have not specifically challenged Plaintiffs' standing to challenge § 11–KK. Nevertheless, the court has an independent duty to address jurisdiction (and thus standing) “even when not otherwise suggested.” See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (citation omitted); see also Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir.2002) (“[F]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.”) (citations omitted).

“Article III restricts federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2768, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (citation omitted). “To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’ ” Id. (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997)). “[A] claimant must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). “[T]he injury required for standing need not be actualized.... A party facing prospective injury has standing to sue where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.” Id. at 2769 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). “Courts have long recognized that ‘[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.’ ” Cal. Pro–Life Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted).

Constitutional challenges alleging freedom of speech violations require a less exacting review of standing. “In an effort to avoid the chilling effect of sweeping restrictions, the Supreme Court has endorsed...