Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization

• Decision Date: 27 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. S060145,S060145
• Citation: 19 Cal.4th 1,78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1,960 P.2d 1031
• Parties: , 960 P.2d 1031, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6683, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9211 YAMAHA CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Defendant and Appellant
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 1

78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1

19 Cal.4th 1, 960 P.2d 1031, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6683,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9211

YAMAHA CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S060145.

Supreme Court of California

Aug. 27, 1998.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Carol H. Rehm, Jr., David S. Chaney and Philip C. Griffin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bewley, Lassleben & Miller, Jeffrey S. Baird, Joseph A. Vinatieri and Kevin P. Duthoy, Whittier, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Daniel Kostenbauder, Lawrence V. Brookes, Berkeley, Wm. Gregory Turner and Dean F. Andal as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

BROWN, Justice.

For more than 40 years, the State Board of Equalization (Board) has made available for publication as the Business Taxes Law Guide summaries of opinions by its attorneys of the business tax effects of a wide range of transactions. Known as "annotations," the summaries are prompted by actual requests for legal opinions by the Board, its field auditors, and businesses subject to statutes within its jurisdiction. The annotations are brief statements -- often only a sentence or two -- purporting to state definitively the tax consequences of specific hypothetical business transactions. ¹ More extensive analyses, called "back-ups," are available to those who request them.

FACTS

The taxpayer here, Yamaha Corporation of America (Yamaha), sells musical instruments nationwide. It purchased a quantity of these outside California without paying tax ("extax"), stored them in its resale inventory in a California warehouse, and eventually gave them away to artists, musical equipment dealers and media representatives as promotional gifts. Delivery was made by shipping the instruments via common carrier, either inside or outside California. Yamaha made similar gifts of brochures and other advertising material. Following an audit, the Board determined Yamaha had used the musical instruments and promotional materials in California and was thus subject to the state's use tax, an impost levied as a percentage of the property's purchase price. (See Rev. & Tax.Code, § 6008 et seq.) Yamaha paid the taxes determined by the Board to be due (about $700,000) under protest and then brought this refund suit. Although it did not contest the tax assessed on property given to California residents, Yamaha contended no tax was due on the gifts to out-of-state recipients.

The superior court decided Yamaha's out-of-state gifts were excluded from California's use tax, and ordered a refund. That disposition, however, was overturned by the Court of Appeal. Casting the issue as whether Yamaha's promotional gifts had occurred in California or in the state of the donee, the Court of Appeal looked to an annotation in the Business Taxes Law Guide. According to the guide, gifts are subject to California's use tax "[w]hen the donor divests itself of control over the property in this state ..." ²

                (2A State Bd. of Equalization, Bus.  Taxes Law Guide, Sales & Use Tax Annots., supra, Annot.  No. 280.0040, p. 3731.)   [960 P.2d 1033] Adopting that annotation as dispositive, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the superior court and reinstated the Board's tax assessment.  We granted Yamaha's petition for review and now reverse the Court of Appeal's judgment and order the matter returned to that court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion
                

DISCUSSION

I

The question is what legal effect courts must give to the Board's annotations when they are relied on as supporting its position in taxpayer litigation. In the broader context of administrative law generally, the question is what standard courts apply when reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute. In effect, the Court of Appeal held the annotations were entitled to the same "weight" or "deference" as "quasi-legislative" rules. ³ The Court of Appeal adopted the following formulation: "[A] long-standing and consistent administrative construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight unless it is either 'arbitrary, capricious or without rational basis' [citations], or is 'clearly erroneous or unauthorized.' [Citation.] Opinions of the administrative agency's counsel construing the statute," the court went on to say, "are likewise entitled to consideration. [Citations.] Especially where there has been acquiescence by persons having an interest in the matter," the court added, "courts will generally not depart from such an interpretation unless it is unreasonable or clearly erroneous." As this extract from the Court of Appeal opinion indicates, the court relied on a skein of cases as supporting these several, somewhat inconsistent, propositions of administrative law.

We reach a different conclusion. An agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts; however, unlike quasi-legislative regulations adopted by an agency to which the Legislature has confided the power to "make law," and which, if authorized by the enabling legislation, bind this and other courts as firmly as statutes themselves, the binding power of an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual: Its power to persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that support the merit of the interpretation. Justice Mosk may have provided the best description when he wrote in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th 559, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268, that " 'The appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny in any particular case is perhaps not susceptible of precise formulation, but lies somewhere along a continuum with nonreviewability at one end and independent judgment at the other.' [Citation.] Quasi-legislative administrative decisions are properly placed at that point of the continuum at which judicial review is more deferential; ministerial and informal actions do not merit such deference, and therefore lie toward the opposite end of the continuum." (Id. at pp.

[960 P.2d 1034] 575-576, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268; see also Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 325-326, 109 P.2d 935 [An "administrative interpretation ... will be accorded great respect by the courts and will be followed if not clearly erroneous. [Citations.] But such a tentative ... interpretation makes no pretense at finality and it is the duty of this court ... to state the true meaning of the statute finally and conclusively, even though this requires the overthrow of an earlier erroneous administrative construction. [Citations.] The ultimate interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power ... conferred upon the courts by the Constitution and, in the absence of a constitutional provision, cannot be exercised by any other body."].)

Courts must, in short, independently judge the text of the statute, taking into account and respecting the agency's interpretation of its meaning, of course, whether embodied in a formal rule or less formal representation. Where the meaning and legal effect of a statute is the issue, an agency's interpretation is one among several tools available to the court. Depending on the context, it may be helpful, enlightening, even convincing. It may sometimes be of little worth. (See Traverso v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1206, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 434.) Considered alone and apart from the context and circumstances that produce them, agency interpretations are not binding or necessarily even authoritative. To quote the statement of the Law Revision Commission in a recent report, "The standard for judicial review of agency interpretation of law is the independent judgment of the court, giving deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances of the agency action." (Judicial Review of Agency Action (Feb.1997) 27 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1997) p. 81, italics added.)

II

Here, the Court of Appeal relied on language from its prior cases suggesting broadly that an agency interpretation of a statute carries the same weight -- that is, is reviewed under the same standard -- as a quasi-legislative regulation. Unlike the annotations here, however, quasi-legislative rules are the substantive product of a delegated legislative power conferred on the agency. The formulation on which the Court of Appeal relied is thus apt to lead a court (as it led here) to abdicate a quintessential judicial duty -- applying its independent judgment de novo to the merits of the legal issue before it. The fact that in this case the Court of Appeal determined Yamaha's tax liability by giving the Board's annotation a weight amounting to unquestioning acceptance only compounded the error.

We derive these conclusions from long-standing administrative law decisions of this court. Although the web making up that jurisprudence is not seamless, on the whole it is both logical and coherent. In Culligan Water Conditioning v. State Bd. of Equalization (1976) 17 Cal.3d 86, 130 Cal.Rptr. 321, 550 P.2d 593 (Culligan ), the taxpayer sued for a refund of sales and use taxes paid under protest on ion-exchange equipment used to condition water and leased to residential subscribers: Because it came from a service business rather than the rental of property, the taxpayer contended, the income was not subject to the Sales and Use Tax Law. In refund litigation, the Board relied on an affidavit of its assistant chief counsel characterizing the transactions as leases taxable under the Sales and Use Tax Law. The trial court rejected the Board's position, calling it an unwarranted extension of the words of the statute, and awarded judgment to the taxpayer. (17 Cal.3d at p. 92, 130 Cal.Rptr. 321, 550 P.2d 593.)

Justice Su...