Yancy v. McDevitt, 85-2365

• Citation: 802 F.2d 1025
• Decision Date: 02 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-2365,85-2365
• Parties: 46 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 260, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,576, 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,749, 35 Ed. Law Rep. 379 S. Edward YANCY, Jr., Appellant, v. Leon P. McDEVITT; Tighe L. and Denise Hollowell; Robert and Irene Wegehoft; Richard G. and Diana Heller; Michael D. and Diana Hennley; Ronald V. and Charlotte Jasper; Glen H. and Kathy Levetzow; Sharon Lopshire; Dallas L. and Nancy McWilliams; Merle D. and Patricia Vastine; Jerry L. and Yvonne Zier, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 1025

802 F.2d 1025

46 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 260,

41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,576,

42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,749, 35 Ed. Law Rep. 379

S. Edward YANCY, Jr., Appellant, v. Leon P. McDEVITT; Tighe L. and Denise Hollowell; Robert and Irene Wegehoft; Richard G. and Diana Heller; Michael D. and Diana Hennley; Ronald V. and Charlotte Jasper; Glen H. and Kathy Levetzow; Sharon Lopshire; Dallas L. and Nancy McWilliams; Merle D. and Patricia Vastine; Jerry L and Yvonne Zier, Appellees.

No. 85-2365.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 10, 1986.

Decided Oct. 2, 1986.

Kent A. Simmons, Davenport, Iowa, for appellant.

Rand S. Wonio, Davenport, Iowa, for appellees.

Before JOHN R. GIBSON and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and REGAN, ^* Senior District Judge.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

S. Edward Yancy, Jr., appeals from the district court's ¹ order granting summary judgment against him on his racial discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983 and the thirteenth amendment. Yancy was discharged from his teaching position in the Davenport, Iowa, elementary school. A hearing before the school board resulted in a determination that racial prejudice or discrimination was not involved in the decision to terminate him. An appeal to an arbitrator and to the district court for Scott County, Iowa, followed. Both approved his termination. On Yancy's federal claim, the district court held that the issues raised had been determined in the state administrative proceedings and appeal and that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred relief. It further dismissed his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. On appeal Yancy argues that the proceedings before the school board were not adequate to provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional issue of racial discrimination and that the parties and issues were not the same as those in his federal claim. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Yancy, a tenured teacher, taught fifth and sixth graders at Hayes Elementary School in Davenport. Complaints were received from parents concerning Yancy's conduct. The superintendent of the Davenport Community School District finally served on Yancy a notice and recommendation to terminate his continuing employment contract. The school board held a hearing on Yancy's termination. At this hearing, the superintendent documented fifty-eight meetings aimed at correcting Yancy's behavior with respect to accusations of intimidation, ridicule, and the demeaning of children, insubordination, and use of inappropriate language. The board made findings on these issues and concluded that his use of ridicule and intimidation in a demeaning manner was sufficiently outside the bounds of proper teaching practices so as to be unreasonable. The board acknowledged that several teachers testified that they believed the termination had racial overtones and that racial slurs against Yancy had been heard. Several teachers also testified that they believed Yancy was the subject of a parental conspiracy that was racially prompted. Yancy stated that he did not want to believe the proposed termination was racially prompted, and the chief school administrator indicated that he did not believe the action was race related. The board found, based on credible and probative evidence, that the proposed termination was not based on race. Designated Record at 68.

After Yancy was terminated by the board, he filed an appeal with an adjudicator as provided by Iowa Code Ann. Sec. 279.17 (West Supp.1986). The adjudicator affirmed the termination, and Yancy appealed to the state district court pursuant to Iowa Code Ann. Sec. 279.18. In both of these proceedings Yancy raised the argument that he had been terminated for unconstitutional reasons, specifically his race. Neither the adjudicator nor the district court mentioned this issue in the order of affirmance. After the ruling in the district court, Yancy filed a notice of appeal with the Iowa Supreme Court, which he later dismissed.

Yancy then brought this action against the principal of the grade school and a group of parents who testified against him in the termination hearing. The district court concluded that issue preclusion applied as he had a full and fair hearing in an administrative forum. It rejected his argument that the claims of racial discrimination were not litigated in the hearing before the board and on administrative appeal. It pointed to the finding of the school board that racial prejudice or discrimination was not involved in the decision to terminate Yancy and, although the arbitrator or district court did not make a specific finding on these issues, their action in affirming the discharge. Yancy v. McDevitt, No. 84-70-D-1, slip op. at 3 (S.D.Iowa Oct. 11, 1985). The court determined that the racial discrimination issue urged before it was identical to the issue raised in the earlier proceedings and that it had been litigated and determined. It opined that Yancy had a full and fair opportunity to present the issue of racial discrimination before the school board and it recited the chain of administrative and judicial proceedings that we have already described.

Yancy makes the same arguments before us that he made in the district court. He argues that the procedures before the school board were not adequate to provide a full and fair opportunity to raise and litigate the constitutional issues of racial discrimination and that the parties and issues were not identical to those before the district court.

As the district court correctly recognized, a federal court must give a state court judgment the same issue preclusive effect as would the courts of the state in which it was rendered. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-16, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Iowa law therefore governs our decision. The Iowa courts have established four prerequisites to the application of issue preclusion:

(1) the issue concluded must be identical; (2) the issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.

Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981); accord Brown v. Monticello State Bank, 360 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Iowa 1984).

The parties have not drawn to our attention, however, nor have we found, any Iowa cases addressing directly the preclusive effect of a school board hearing. Because we review the district court's entry of summary judgment against Yancy, we give him the benefit of every doubt and allow him every favorable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. Buford v. Tremayne, 747 F.2d 445, 447 (8th Cir.1984).

Yancy first argues that the school board hearing was not an adequate forum and did not afford him adequate procedures to litigate his claims of racial discrimination. He relies on Village Supply Co. v. Iowa Fund, Inc., 312 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1981). In Village Supply, the Iowa Supreme Court declined to give preclusive effect to a small claims court judgment. Id. at 554. Yancy contends that the school board termination hearing is analogous to a hearing before the small claims court.

We conclude the district court, however, did not err in finding a "considerable difference" between the procedures in small claims court and those afforded Yancy before the school board. The procedures for terminating a teaching contract are found in Iowa Code Ann. Secs. 279.15-.18 (West Supp.1986). Yancy emphasizes and relies on a single paragraph that states: "The board shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure * * *. Process and procedure * * * shall be as summary as reasonably may be." Id. at Sec. 279.16. He argues that this paragraph renders the teacher termination procedures the equivalent of small claims court procedures, which are to be conducted "without regard to technicalities of procedure." Iowa Code Ann. Sec. 631.11(1) (West Supp.1986). However, sections 279.15-.18 provide for a fairly elaborate scheme of notice, subpoenas, presentation of evidence, cross-examination, decision, and administrative and judicial review. In contrast to the procedures specified for small claims court, see id. at Secs. 631.11-.13, the parties to a school board hearing are required to exchange lists of witnesses and any documentary evidence they intend to present. Id. at Sec. 279.15(2). The parties are permitted to submit written briefs and argument. Id. at Sec. 279.16. The board is required to file written findings of fact and conclusions of law "supported by cited authority or by reasoned opinion." Id. The board's decision is potentially subject to three levels of review: by an adjudicator agreed upon by the parties, id. at Sec. 279.17; by the district court for the county wherein the school district's administrative offices are located, id. at Sec. 279.18; and by the Iowa Supreme Court. Id. We reject Yancy's contention that the Iowa courts would extend the holding in Village Supply to teacher termination proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 279.

Nor does the fact that Yancy's termination was litigated before what amounts to an administrative tribunal rather than a court prevent the application of issue preclusion. "A final adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency * * * is entitled to res judicata effect as if it were a judgment of a court." City of Des Moines v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 343 N.W.2d 836, 839 (Iowa 1984); Toomer v. Iowa Department of Job...