Yarnell v. Hillsborough Packing Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1934
• Docket Number: No. 7309.,7309.
• Citation: 70 F.2d 435
• Parties: YARNELL et al., Florida Control Committee, v. HILLSBOROUGH PACKING CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

70 F.2d 435 (1934)

YARNELL et al., Florida Control Committee, v. HILLSBOROUGH PACKING CO. et al.

No. 7309.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 14, 1934.

James Lawrence Fly and Ashley Sellers, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., and Francis P. Whitehair, of De Land, Fla., for appellants.

R. W. Withers, of Tampa, Fla., for appellees.

Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.

BRYAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellants are here complaining of an interlocutory injunction issued against them at the instance of appellees, and of the denial of their motion to dismiss the bill of complaint.

Appellees are two Florida corporations; one, the Hillsborough Packing Company, being engaged in buying and packing citrus fruit, shipping it out of Florida and selling it at points in other states; and the other, the Lake Fern Groves, in growing citrus fruit on its own grove and shipping it into other states through an agent other than its co-complainant. Appellants, likewise citizens of Florida, constitute what is known as the Florida Control Committee. This committee was selected in the manner provided in a marketing agreement entered into and a license issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, under section 8 (2) and (3) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.¹ The Secretary was also named a party defendant, but declined to appear voluntarily; and upon motion the bill was dismissed as to him. The order appealed from specifically enjoins appellants from in any manner interfering with shipments of citrus fruit by appellees; from revoking the license of any licensee who may handle citrus fruit for appellees, or either of them; from imposing on either appellee, or on any grower, shipper, or packer, who may aid it in the handling of citrus fruit, any penalty, fine, or forfeiture; and, in most general terms, from enforcing against appellees or either of them any regulation or supposed agreement prescribed or entered into pursuant to any provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It was entered on the case made by the bill and exhibits thereto. Attached to the bill are the following exhibits:

(1) The Marketing Agreement. It applies to citrus fruit grown in and shipped out of the state. It was signed by numerous individual growers and shippers and many associations and exchanges interested in the citrus industry, and also by the Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to section 8 (2) of the act. It provides for the selection by growers and shippers of a control committee, and authorizes that committee to make "prorate" orders and allotments covering shipments out of the State; to "eliminate" from trade channels all fruit not prorated or allotted, or sold in intrastate commerce; to investigate any suspected violation of the agreement by any shipper and order him to discontinue any violation found to exist, and, "in the event of non-compliance by the shipper with said order," the committee "shall report such non-compliance to the Secretary."

In addition, the committee is authorized to make assessments to defray expenses incurred in carrying out the agreement and in taking steps necessary to enforce collection. The expenses are to be proportionately levied on the basis of fruit shipped, and any funds remaining in excess of expenditures are to be refunded pro rata at the end of each season.

(2) The License. It was issued by the Secretary pursuant to section 8 (3) of the act. Its provisions are identical with those of the marketing agreement, except that it undertakes to bind all shippers of citrus fruit whether they are parties to the marketing agreement or not.

(3) Orders Issued by the Control Committee. That committee issued several orders in December, 1933, and January, 1934, restricting shipments in interstate commerce of certain late varieties of grapefruit and oranges, and other fruit of certain grades and size; and also restricting shipments to markets where citrus fruit is sold at auction. In addition, it made an assessment of 1 cent per box to defray its expenses. From time to time it also issued bulletins and notices to shippers.

Incorporated in the marketing agreement and the license is an elaborate "National Stabilization Plan" for marketing citrus fruit grown not only in Florida but also in other states and in Puerto Rico.

The Hillsborough Packing Company is a party to and signed the marketing agreement. The bill alleges that it became a party thereto through coercion and under duress, in that it was not advised and did not know that the act was invalid, or that the committee would issue such drastic orders, or assume to prevent it from shipping fruit to meet its usual requirements; and because it was induced to believe that its failure to sign up would be of no benefit to it, since the requirements and exactions contained in the agreement would in any event be applied to it.

The Lake Fern Groves did not become a party to or sign the marketing agreement. The bill alleges that it has left on the trees in its grove approximately 10,000 boxes of fruit; that the control committee "has forbidden all interstate shipment of certain small sized oranges, and approximately seventy-five (75%) per cent. of said plaintiff's mid-season oranges on its said grove are of these prohibited small sizes, though all of the said oranges are matured, wholesome, marketable, and similar sizes and grades of oranges have always been heretofore disposed of by plaintiff's said agent at a profit. That said Florida Control Committee threatens and will, unless enjoined by this court, continue to threaten said plaintiff and its agent with penalties, prohibitions, injunctions and confiscation of its said fruit if it attempts to have same put in the channels of interstate commerce, and that the entire value of the said seventy-five (75%) per cent. of said crop will be totally lost to said plaintiff unless immediate relief is given said plaintiff by the injunction of this court; that said oranges will drop on the ground, rot and perish, and that said plaintiff's loss will be irremediable unless a temporary restraining order is granted said plaintiff as hereinafter prayed, and followed by injunction both temporary and permanent." The record discloses that appellants, having been served with notice of the application for temporary injunction, on the day before the bill was filed revoked the prorate orders of which complaint is made, but they said nothing about whether it was their intention to reinstate those orders or make others of similar import.

The interlocutory injunction was granted on the broad ground, as stated by the District Judge in an oral opinion which appears in the record, that the sections of the act involved and the means adopted for their enforcement by marketing agreement, license, orders and penalties, were unconstitutional and therefore void. On the question of jurisdiction, appellants argue that the Secretary of Agriculture is an indispensable party, that, because the prorate orders complained of have been revoked, the case is moot, and that in any event appellees had no right to come into court seeking an injunction without...