Yarrington v. Delaware & Hudson Co.
| Decision Date | 29 January 1906 |
| Docket Number | 31. |
| Citation | 143 F. 565 |
| Parties | YARRINGTON v. DELAWARE & HUDSON CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Syllabus by the Court
The construction given by the highest court of a state to the local statute law regulating the liability of railroad carriers is binding upon the federal courts.
By reason of the local Pennsylvania act of April 4, 1868 (P.L 58), as construed in Railroad v. Price, 96 Pa. 256 although contrary to the great weight of authority elsewhere a railway mail clerk is not a passenger, and according to the provisions of the statute, in case of personal injury while engaged in the performance of his duties on or about the road, works, depots, or premises of a railroad, or any train or car thereon, can only recover of such company the same as one of its own employes.
Where, however, two railroads have joint trackage rights over the same track, and an employe of one of them in injured thereon by the negligence of the other company, the following rules of construction of the statute have been established:
Hence, where the plaintiff, a railway mail clerk, was injured in a collision between a passenger train of the Erie Railway, on which he was engaged in the performance of his duties, and the rear end of a freight train of the defendant company, having joint trackage rights at that point over the tracks of the Erie Railway, whose road it was, which freight train was running on the time of the passenger train and had failed to properly flag it, held, that Act April 4, 1868 (P.L. 58), did not apply, and that the defendant company was liable; the place where the accident occurred not being by right the premises of the company at the time, nor the plaintiff engaged in work ordinarily performed by its employes.
(a) The track, for the application of Act Pa. April 4, 1868 (P.L. 58), must be regarded as the property of each road, while using it, whether the use be by virtue of joint or several ownership, charter rights, lease, license, or traffic agreement.
(b) Where the place of the accident is clearly and for general purposes the road, works, depots, or premises of the railroad company defendant, it is sufficient for the application of the act, if the person injured is engaged or employed in and about such road, works, depots, or premises, and is not a passenger.
(c) Where, however, the accident occurs in a place which is not exclusively and for general purposes, but only within a limited and statutory sense, the premises of the defendant railroad, the nature of the employment at which the party was engaged at the time of the injury becomes material; and if it was so connected with the railroad that it is ordinarily the duty of railroad employes, then while engaged at it the statute treats the party as a quasi employe and puts his right to recover on that basis. But if the work has no relation to railroad work as such, and is only connected with it by the circumstance of locality, the case is not within the statute at all.
(d) In case of joint trackage rights, therefore, to bring the case within the statute, the persons injured must not only be employed in and about the premises of the railroad by whose negligence he is injured, as so defined, but engaged at work which is ordinarily the work of the employes of that company.
Hence, where the plaintiff, a railway mail clerk, was injured in a collision between a passenger train of the Erie Railway, on which he was engaged in the performance of his duties, and the rear end of a freight train of the defendant company, having joint trackage rights at that point over the tracks of the Erie Railway, whose road it was, which freight train was running on the time of the passenger train and had failed to properly flag it, held, that Act April 4, 1868 (P.L. 58), did not apply, and that the defendant company was liable; the place where the accident occurred not being by right the premises of the company at the time, nor the plaintiff engaged in work ordinarily performed by its employes.
W. D. B. Ainey, for plaintiff.
Lewis E. Carr and James H. Torrey, for defendant.
The plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant while engaged in the performance of his duties as a railroad mail clerk, in the employ of the general government. His run was from Susquehanna to Wilkes-Barre, both in Pennsylvania; the first half of it to Carbondale being on the trains of the Erie Railroad, over the Jefferson branch of that company; and it was while riding on one of its trains, south-bound, that his injuries were received, by a collision with the rear end of a freight train of the Delaware & Hudson Company, defendant, which was pulling into the Carbondale yard. The Delaware & Hudson Company has trackage rights over this branch of the Erie Railroad, its trains being subject, however, to the direction and orders of the dispatcher of that road, as well as its rules and timetables. The accident was caused by the failure of the crew in charge of the freight train to get out of the road of the Erie passenger on which the plaintiff was riding, which they knew was closely following them and had the right of way, and on whose time they were in fact running; or, not succeeding in this, to properly flag it. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff of $1,000, and the defendant now asks for a new trial upon the ground that under the statute law of Pennsylvania it was not liable.
As a matter of general law, aside from any local statute, a railway mail clerk, while engaged in the performance of his duties, is unquestionably to be regarded as a passenger, and entitled to the rights and immunities growing out of that relation. This is decided by courts of the highest character, the authority of which is not to be resisted. Nolton v. Western Railroad, 15 N.Y. 444, 69 Am.Dec. 623; Seybolt v. N.Y.,L.E. & West. R.R., 95 N.Y. 562, 47 Am.Rep. 75; Collett v. Lond. & N. West. R.R., 16 Q.B. 984; Gleason v. Va. Midland R.R., 140 U.S. 435, 11 Sup.Ct. 859, 35 L.Ed. 458; Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 498, 20 Sup.Ct. 385; 44 L.Ed. 560; Arrowsmith v. Nashville, etc., R.R. (C.C.) 57 F. 165; Farley v. Cin., H. & D.R.R., 108 F. 14, 47 C.C.A. 156; Ohio & Miss. R.R. v. Voight, 122 Ind. 288, 23 N.E. 774; Clev., Cin., Chic. & St. L. v. Ketcham, 133 Ind. 346, 33 N.E. 116, 19 L.R.A. 339, 36 Am.St.Rep. 550; Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Stat, 72 Md. 36, 18 A. 1107, 6 L.R.A. 706, 20 Am.St.Rep. 454; Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Shott, 92 Va. 34, 22 S.E. 811; Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 427; Gulf, Col. & Santa Fe R.R. v. Wilson, 79 Tex. 371, 15 S.W. 280, 11 L.R.A. 486, 23 Am.St.Rep. 345; Hammond v. North East R.R., 6 S.C. 130, 24 Am.Rep. 467; Libby v. Maine Cent. R.R., 85 Me. 34, 26 A. 943, 20 L.R.A. 812; Magoffin v. Mo. & Pacific R.R., 102 Mo. 540; 15 S.W. 76, 22 Am.St.Rep. 798; Mellor v. Mo. & Pacific R.R., 105 Mo. 455, 16 S.W. 849, 10 L.R.A. 36; Louisv. & Nashville R.R. v. Kingman (Ky.) 35 S.W. 264; Weaver v. Railroad Company, 3 App.D.C. 436. As is said by Morris, J., in Ches. & Ohio R.R. v. Patton, 23 App.D.C. 113:
or those privileged to conduct a business on the train, by arrangement with the carrier (Com. v. Vermont, etc., R.R., 108 Mass. 7, 11 Am.Rep. 301, Yeomans v. Contra Costa Nav. Co., 44 Cal. 71).
By act of the General Assembly of the state of Pennsylvania of April 4, 1868, Sec. 1 (P.L. 58), it is provided, however:
'When any person shall sustain personal injury or loss of life while lawfully engaged or employed on or about the roads, works, depots, and premises of a railroad company, or in or about any train or car therein, or thereon, of which company such person is not an employe, the right of action and recovery in all such cases against the company shall be such only as would exist if such person were an employe; provided, that this section shall not apply to passengers.'
Construing this act, it was decided in Pennsylvania Railroad v Price, 96 Pa. 256, that a railway postal clerk such as the plaintiff, engaged in his duties on a railroad train, was not a passenger within the meaning of the proviso, and being employed in and about the railroad was thus within the terms of the statute, and the company were only liable to him for personal injuries caused by negligence, to the extent that they would be to an employe. 'Was the deceased a passenger within the meaning of the act of 1868?' says Paxson, J. 'Looking at the mischief which the act was intended to remedy, the answer to this question is not difficult. The deceased was 'lawfully employed upon the road.' He was therefore within the precise language of the act, and must be held to have had the rights only of an employe, unless he comes within...
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Jablinsky v. Continental Pac. Lines, Inc.
...and consideration for their safety. (This is the reason most frequently given, and for an excellent statement see Yarrington v. Delaware & Hudson Company, C.C.1906, 143 F. 565.) That reason does not apply in this case, because the defendant is not a common carrier but a contract carrier and......