Yater v. Hancock County Planning Com'n

Decision Date24 May 1993
Docket NumberNo. 30A01-9211-CV-365,30A01-9211-CV-365
Citation614 N.E.2d 568
PartiesDavid G. YATER and Pattee L. Yater, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. HANCOCK COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, Appellee-Defendant.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Raymond S. Robak, Robak & Murphy, Greenfield, for appellants-plaintiffs.

David W. Stone IV, Anderson, Gregg H. Morelock, Cohen & Morelock, Greenfield, for appellee-defendant.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

David G. Yater and Pattee L. Yater (hereinafter referred to as the developers) appeal the denial of their writ of certiorari by which they sought a court order compelling the Hancock County Area Plan Commission (the Commission) to grant them primary approval of a proposed major subdivision plat.

We affirm in part.

The stipulated statement of facts establishes that the developers filed their petition for primary approval with the Commission on July 31, 1990. A technical committee heard the petition and approved it subject to certain conditions. The Commission heard the petition for the first time on August 16, 1990, but at the conclusion of the developers' presentation and at their request, the Commission again referred the matter to a technical committee which again recommended approval subject to certain conditions.

At the second hearing before the full Commission which followed, the developers, through counsel, represented that they had no inclination whatsoever to comply with the conditions of the subcommittee as recommended and accepted by the Commission and asked for a vote on the petition as it had been submitted. The petition was disapproved by a unanimous vote.

At trial, the parties stipulated that the reasons for the petition's disapproval were six of the seven conditions assigned by the Commission's technical committee before the second hearing on the petition, which were stated as follows:

1. Petitioner to obtain written evidence from the Indiana State Highway Dept. as to the right of way for SR9 at the subdiv. location and building set back line to start at this line.

2. Increase building set back off CR500N to 80' from the center line.

3. A Drainage variance to be obtained from the Drainage Board, by the petitioner, for lots 10-11.

4. Minimum lot size to be 23,000 [square] feet ... excluding any road easement or right of way.

. Construct a (sic) accell/decel lane for the 11 lots on SR9 in lieu of frontage road.

. If no accell/decel lane for all lots on SR9, require an internal road with on (sic) more than two (2) points of access onto SR9.

The stipulated facts and reasons for disapproval are the only record we have of the proceedings before the Commission. For organizational purposes, we have treated the reasons for disapproval under four general topics: minimum lot size, setback, drainage, and access to State Road 9 (SR9).

When an aggrieved party seeks relief in a trial court from an adverse administrative determination and attacks the evidentiary support for the agency's findings, he bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency's conclusions are "clearly erroneous." Town of Beverly Shores v. Bagnall (1992), Ind., 590 N.E.2d 1059, 1061. A reviewing court may vacate a board or commission's decision only if the evidence, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates that the conclusions reached by it are clearly erroneous. Id. Such a standard naturally requires great deference toward the administrative board by the reviewing court when the petition challenges findings of fact or the application of the facts to the law. Id. However, if the allegation is that the commission committed an error of law, no such deference is afforded and reversal by the trial court is appropriate if error of law is demonstrated. Id.

In reviewing the decision of a zoning board or commission, this court is bound by the same standard as the trial court. Van Scoik v. Kosciusko County Board of Zoning Appeals (1992), Ind.App., 598 N.E.2d 594, 595, trans. denied. There is a presumption that determinations of a zoning board, as an administrative agency with expertise in the area of zoning problems, are correct and should not be overturned unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, a reviewing court does not conduct a trial de novo, even though evidence may have been taken to supplement the writ of certiorari and return, I.C. 36-7-4-1009, 1016, and may not substitute its decision for that of the board. Scoik, 598 N.E.2d at 595. If the commission's decision is correct on any of the grounds stated for disapproval, its decision should be sustained. Bagnall, 590 N.E.2d 1059, 1062.

Lot Size

Section 7-82 of the Hancock County Zoning Ordinance establishes that the minimum lot area for lots proposed in an R-2 district is 23,000 square feet. However, no provision of any of Hancock County's zoning ordinances specifically states where a lot begins or ends. The developers interpret the ordinances to permit a lot to extend to the center line of the existing roadways adjoining the lots, thereby including one-half of the area of the existing right-of-way in the 23,000 required square footage. The Commission has taken the position that the developers must "exclude any road easement or right-of-way" from the minimum lot area. We find support for the Commission's interpretation in the ordinances.

Section 7-41(1) of the Subdivision Control Ordinance provides that "[s]ubdivision lots shall be adequate for the types of development and land use proposed, and shall conform to the Hancock County Zoning Ordinance requirements." A subdivision lot is "a tract ... of land of at least sufficient size to meet minimum zoning requirements for use and area and to provide such yards and other open spaces as are herein required...." Zoning Ordinance of Hancock County, Sec. 7-118(27). The term "use" is defined as the "purpose or activity for which land ... is designed, arranged, or intended, or for which it is occupied or maintained." Id., Sec. 7-118(51).

By the terms of the Subdivision Control Ordinance, a right-of-way is a "strip of land appropriated for public use as a street, highway ... or for any drainage or public utility purpose ..." It is, by definition, not property owned by the Yaters which they may subdivide into lots to transfer for purposes of residential use, as they have indicated they intend to do with the property which is the subject of their petition. Thus, the ordinances establish that the area within the right-of-way is not part of a subdivision lot.

According to the Commission's witnesses before the trial court on the writ of certiorari, the reason for the 23,000 square foot area requirement is to provide adequate space for the installation of a septic system, i.e. to permit residential use. Right-of-ways cannot be used for this purpose. To provide sufficient area for residential use, a lot's dimensions must be calculated based upon area allocated by the subdivider other than the right-of-way.

The definition of "lot" is not the only provision in which the drafters of the ordinances exhibited an intent to delineate the boundary of the right-of-way as the boundary of the lot. One can infer from a comparison of the definitions of "lot width," i.e. "the horizontal distance between the side lot lines of a lot measured along a line drawn parallel to the front property line at a distance equal to the depth of the minimum required front yard," Sec. 7-118(31), and the definition of front yard, i.e. "the space not containing any structures between a structure and thoroughfare right-of-way line," Sec. 7-118(19), that the drafters of the Zoning Ordinance meant for the front "property" line and the thoroughfare right-of-way line to be the same line. Although "front property line" is not defined by the ordinance, we can give the term its generally accepted meaning, Zoning Ordinance, Sec. 7-118, and conclude that the front property line refers to the boundary of the lot.

To the extent, then, that the Commission disapproved the Yaters' petition because the lots as proposed were of insufficient size to meet the requirements of the zoning ordinances, that disapproval is sustained by a reasonable interpretation of the ordinances and the evidence in support of it.

Setback

The Commission also conditioned approval upon the requirement that the developers obtain "written evidence from the Indiana State Highway Dept. as to the right of way for SR9 at the subdivision location" and start the "building set back line" 1 at this line. The implication of this condition is that the setback in the proposed plat must be at the right-of-way for SR9 as has been determined by the state highway department. The technical subcommittee also imposed the condition that the developers "[i]ncrease building setback off CR500N to 80' from the center line." The proposed plat contained a setback of 70' from the center of CR500N.

The developers relied upon Sec. 7-82 of the zoning ordinance in proposing the location of the setback for the project. This section specifies, in chart form, the size requirements of lots and yards. The reader is referred by an asterisk above the "Minimum Depth Front Yard" column to the statement at the bottom of the page that "[t]he Minimum depth of the front yard (set-back) shall be 70 feet from the center of the road or 50 feet from the road right-of-way, whichever is greater." Since the ordinance gives the "minimum depth front yard" in chart form, the "Minimum depth of the front yard (set-back)" must refer to the location of the setback.

The Commission acknowledges, indeed, utilizes, this provision to partially explain its location of the setback. But, as to the setback along both roads, the Commission now maintains that Sec. 7-38(1) and Sec. 7-39(6) of the Subdivision Control Ordinance dictate the size of each right-of-way and hence, the location of the setback. At least three reasons emerge from the record for not affirming the Commission's disapproval of the...

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