Yates v. Hill

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Yates v. Hill, 761 A.2d 677 (R.I. 2000)
• Decision Date: 06 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-533-Appeal.,99-533-Appeal.
• Parties: Dallas Pell YATES v. Valerie HILL and Valerie Hill, in her capacity as Trustee of the D. Valerie Hill Trust.

761 A.2d 677

Dallas Pell YATES v. Valerie HILL and Valerie Hill, in her capacity as Trustee of the D. Valerie Hill Trust.

No. 99-533-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

November 6, 2000.

Present LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Turner C. Scott, for plaintiff. Thomas Dickinson, Providence, Richard Fisher, James F. Hyman, Newport, for defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The propriety of awarding specific performance against a seller of real estate forms the legal locus of this appeal. A trial justice granted a buyer's request for specific performance of a seller's agreement to transfer a certain parcel of real estate owned by a trust. The seller, however, had "second thoughts" about the sale, and through her attorney, asked to be "relieved of her obligations under the agreement." In addition, the seller signed the sales agreement in her individual capacity rather than in her capacity as the sole trustee of the trust. Under these circumstances, did the trial justice err in granting specific performance? No, we hold, for the reasons conveyed below.

Individually and in her capacity as Trustee of the D. Valerie Hill Trust, defendant-seller, Valerie Hill (Hill) appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court. A trial justice ordered her to specifically perform a purchase and sale agreement (agreement) for the sale of certain real estate in Newport (property) to the plaintiff-buyer, Dallas Pell Yates (Yates). This Court directed both parties to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided. After consideringthe parties' written and oral arguments, we conclude that no cause has been shown, and we proceed to decide this case at this time.

Yates contended that Hill had breached the agreement to sell the property to Yates. The property featured an oceanfront residence nestled on two acres abutting Newport's Bellevue Avenue. Yates averred that she had attempted to tender the one million dollar purchase price to Hill, that she had demanded that Hill convey the property to her as per their agreement, but that Hill had refused to do so, asserting that she was not the real owner of the property — rather, her trust held the title. Yates then went to court seeking reformation of the contract, specific performance, and damages arising from Hill's alleged breach.

A Superior Court justice tried this case without a jury. The evidence established that Hill had owned and resided at the property since 1976. On December 14, 1992, Hill transferred the property to a trust, of which she was the sole trustee. Despite the trust's ownership, Hill continued to rent the property and to maintain it in her individual capacity. As sole trustee, she also conceded that she had the power to sell or otherwise to dispose of the property.

Sporadically since 1988 Hill had listed the property for sale with her son, a real estate broker and owner of M.F. Hill Realty, Inc. From 1988 through 1997 she also had executed numerous listing agreements with her son's firm, and Hill's daughter, Melanie, had served as the listing agent for the property during various periods from 1988 through 1997.

In March 1998, Hill's property came to the attention of Yates's real estate agent, who made arrangements to show the house to her. After signing the agreement with Hill, Yates sold her home in New York and moved into her parents' Newport home on a temporary basis. But on September 18, 1998, Hill's daughter, Abbie, called Yates and stated that her mother was having "second thoughts"about selling the house. Several days later, Hill's other daughter, Melanie, called Yates and stated that "the deal was off, that Abbie was the one that was making the trouble * * *" and that "Abbie was discouraging her mother from moving on."

Nevertheless, on September 20, 1998, Yates was ready to close on the property. On September 24, 1998, Yates's real estate agent sent a letter to Melanie requesting a closing date. A couple of days later, however, Hill's attorney, recognizing that a valid agreement had been signed by the parties, wrote a letter to Yates stating that Hill "no longer wishes to sell her property and is asking that you relieve her from her obligations under this agreement."

Hill claimed that she "was under a lot of pressure * * * and * * * didn't realize what [she] was doing" when she agreed to sell her house. Apparently, she had not discussed with her other daughters the prospect of selling the house to Yates. When she later did so, she said she learned how much the house meant to them. She admitted, however, that she had signed the agreement "freely and voluntarily." But she later concluded that she had made a mistake in signing it because she had not consulted an attorney and "hadn't thought about it enough."

The trial justice found that Hill "was fully aware of the obligations she was assuming when she signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement." She concluded that Hill's "about face is apparently a response to some disappointed children." The court also determined that it was irrelevant that the property was held in a trust, because "[f]or all intents and purposes, Mrs. Hill is that Trust." Further, the trial justice stated:

"Mrs. Hill's commitment to the agreement was the product of an alert and intelligent mind. `Having second thoughts' * * * `disappointing her children' * * * thinking she `made a mistake' months after the agreement, cannot furnish any legal basis for avoidance. The record isdevoid of any evidence which could be interpreted as furnishing any sound reason for extinguishing defendant's obligations."

Finding that Yates "has, at all times, been ready, willing and able to close," the court granted specific performance and entered a final judgment in Yates's favor.

In support of her appeal, Hill raises numerous issues. She suggests that the trial justice reformed the contract with respect to Hill's capacity and that reformation was improper because Yates failed to prove mutual mistake. She also alleges that the trust should not be obligated under the agreement because Hill had not signed this contract in her...