Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Bd.
| Decision Date | 21 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | 82-7262,Nos. 82-7149,s. 82-7149 |
| Citation | 719 F.2d 1530 |
| Parties | 35 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 870, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,929 Kitty Jones YATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. MOBILE COUNTY PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. Kitty Jones YATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOBILE COUNTY PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Blacksher, Menefee & Stein, Gregory B. Stein, Larry T. Menefee, Mobile, Ala., for Kitty Jones Yates.
Engel & Smith, Mylan R. Engel, Edgar P. Walsh, Mobile, Ala., for Mobile County Personnel Bd.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Before VANCE and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and SWYGERT *, Senior Circuit Judge.
In case no. 82-7149 the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. See circuit rule 25.
In case no. 82-7262 plaintiff appeals the district court's award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, urging that the district court erred in reducing the amount recommended by the magistrate acting as special master. 1 The magistrate's report contains an analysis made in accordance with Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974). He recommended a fee covering 1,038.5 compensable hours at $75.00 per hour plus a thirty-five percent enhancement for a total of $105,148.10 together with $4,022.36 in expense reimbursement. Twenty-five percent of the recommended enhancement was based on the contingent nature of the fee and the concomitant delay of several years in payment. The remaining ten percent was based on other Johnson factors including the results obtained, the novelty of the case, the skill required, the adverse impact on other work, the standing of plaintiffs' counsel, and awards in similar cases. The full report of the magistrate appears as an appendix to this opinion.
The district court awarded the recommended $75.00 per hour plus expenses but disallowed the entire enhancement of thirty-five percent, which it found to be unreasonable. Its brief order was largely conclusory but the court specifically addressed the contingent aspect of the fee,
This does not impress the Court. Every lawyer knows when he takes a case on a contingent basis that there might be no recovery in the case. This is something the lawyer must weigh in his decision whether he will represent the client.
In connection with the delay the court stated:
[T]his Court is only willing to compensate Mr. Stein at the rate of $75 per hour in this case because, in part, the Court believes that that hourly rate is required to make Mr. Stein whole for the years during which he worked for no compensation.
The court intimated that except for the delay factor an hourly rate of $60.00 might be appropriate. Its order did not reveal the basis on which the remaining ten percent enhancement was disallowed. From the language of the order we take it to be implicit that the district judge otherwise approved all of the magistrate's findings not explicitly disapproved.
Plaintiff's argument proceeds from the contention that the recommendation of the magistrate is an exercise of discretion that the district court is bound to follow in the absence of an abuse of discretion. We do not agree. The discretion lies with the district court, whose determination of reasonable amount is subject to review by this court. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d at 717.
The policy that guides our review of this exercise of discretion was recently stated in Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205 (11th Cir.1983) and bears restatement here:
This nation has sought to protect citizens' most basic, cherished rights and liberties by enacting a plethora of civil rights laws. Congress recognized in the Fees Act and in Title VII, however, that effective enforcement of those laws depends to a large extent upon the action of private citizens, not just government officials.... It also perceived that most victims of civil rights violations lacked the resources to obtain the legal counsel necessary to vindicate their rights through the judicial process.... Adequate fee awards are essential to the full enforcement of the civil rights statutes and are an integral part of the remedies necessary to secure compliance with those laws.... The standards and principles underlying the Fees Act and the fee provisions of Title VII are the same....
Congress further recognized that effective enforcement of civil rights laws depends on fee awards sufficient to attract competent counsel without producing a windfall to the attorneys. To this end, it explicitly expressed its intent that the "amount of fees awarded [under the Fees Act] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases ...", and that fee computations result in payments, "as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time reasonably expended on a matter.' " ... This Court has recognized that "the standard of reasonableness is to be given a liberal interpretation."
Id. at 1211 (citations omitted). Our application of this stated policy is given shape in the familiar methodology established in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 n. 9, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ().
Our review of the district court's exercise of discretion is precluded by the court's failure to enter an order that meets the adequate explanation requirements set out in Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 332 (11th Cir.1982). When a magistrate's report meets those requirements, clearly indicating how each Johnson factor influenced his recommendation, we see no necessity for a trial judge to repeat the procedure if he is entering an order confirming and adopting the recommendation. To the extent that the trial judge is not following the recommendation, however, it is necessary that he articulate his ruling in sufficient detail to enable us to accomplish a meaningful review. The order before us reveals the basis for disallowing the twenty-five percent enhancement but is silent as to the basis on which the additional ten percent enhancement was disallowed. Subject to one modification the district court's award was based simply on an hours times hourly rate computation. The one modification was approval of a higher than usual hourly rate to compensate plaintiff's counsel for delay in payment.
The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate methodology for vindicating the public policy underlying attorneys' fee awards in civil rights cases. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), which came down subsequent to the award that is now before us, the Court discussed the standards to be applied when a plaintiff prevails on less than all of the stated claims and emphasized that a crucial factor is the extent of the plaintiff's success.
The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of "the results obtained." This factor is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed "prevailing" even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief.
Id. at 1940 (footnote omitted).
Concerning the results obtained in this case the magistrate made a finding, which is clearly supported by the record, as follows:
8. The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained. Counsel for plaintiff obtained what amounts to full relief for most of the class members, with back pay totaling $322,406.00, with front pay accruing at the rate of $4,700.00 per month, as well as injunctive relief. This very significant amount involved, and results obtained, would support a rather high award in this case.
The partial success problem that was addressed in Hensley is essentially absent here. To the extent that the results obtained factor was due to be considered it weighed heavily in favor of enhancement of the hourly rate award for Yates' counsel. That factor, together with the novelty of the case, the skill required, the adverse impact on other work, the standing of plaintiff's counsel and awards in similar cases were the bases of the magistrate's recommendation to the extent of ten percent enhancement. This recommendation of ten percent enhancement was simply ignored in the district court's order with no articulated consideration of the factors on which it was based.
The most significant difference between the amount recommended and the fee awarded, however, resulted from the district judge's rejection of any enhancement based on the contingent nature of the fee. In Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc) we said,
No one Johnson criterion should be stressed to the neglect of others. However, because the fee in this case was contingent on success, it is appropriate for the court to consider Johnson criterion number six, "whether the fee is fixed or contingent." This reflects the provisions of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(B)(8), and the practice of the bar. Lawyers who are to be compensated only in the event of victory expect and are entitled to be paid more when successful than those who are assured of compensation regardless of result. This is neither less nor more appropriate in civil rights litigation than in personal injury cases. The standard of compensation must enable counsel to accept apparently just causes without awaiting sure winners.
Application of these principles frequently results in a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Major v. Treen
...Magistrate Chasez and may exercise its discretion in determining the attorneys' fees in the instant action. Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Board, 719 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1983). Plaintiffs have objected to: (1) the 50% across-the-board reduction in the hours claimed by their attorneys; (2)......
-
Amico v. New Castle County
...moment to say whether more or less civil rights enforcement is required. 53 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 1105. But see Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Bd., 719 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir.1983) (without a multiplier to encourage "highly skilled lawyers to take contingent fee civil rights cases, the enfor......
-
Spell v. McDaniel
...such cases if the fees available upon prevailing are strictly limited to the regular hourly rate. See Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Board, 719 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir.1983); Williamsburg, 599 F.Supp. at 520. Accord, Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d at 892; Vulcan Society v. Fire Departme......
-
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council For Clean Air
...thus appropriately " 'enable[s] counsel to accept apparently just causes without awaiting sure winners.' " Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Bd., 719 F.2d 1530, 1533 (CA11 1983), quotingJones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (CA5 1981). Not surprisingly, the Courts of Appeals are in agreement......