Yates v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 18 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18-cv-02966-JD |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | HALEY YATES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EAST SIDE UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiffs Haley Yates (Yates) and her parents (together with Haley, the Yates family) have sued the East Side Union High School District (the District), two District employees, and a fellow student for an array of claims under Title IX, 20 U.S.C § 1681, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and California state statutes, as well as for several common law torts. The case arises out of Yates's junior year at Piedmont Hills High School (Piedmont Hills), when she was 15 years old and was physically and sexually abused by another student, Toure Oliver. Plaintiffs allege that the District conducted a biased and inadequate investigation of the situation, and that its overall response amounted to deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual harassment.
This order resolves a motion for summary judgment filed by the District and Piedmont Hills teacher Archie Kregear, who are jointly represented, Dkt. No. 81, and a separate motion filed by Piedmont Hills Principal Traci Williams, Dkt. No. 83. The motions ask for judgment in defendants' favor on the Title IX, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and California Education Code § 220 claims against the District; and the Bane Act, Unruh Civil Rights Act, “violation of mandatory duty, ” intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligence, and negligent supervision claims against all defendants. Defendant Toure Oliver is proceeding pro se and did not seek summary judgment.
The parties buried each other, and the Court, under a mountain of filings for the motions. All told, they filed approximately 150 pages of briefs and almost 900 pages of declarations and exhibits. These materials did little more than highlight the myriad of genuine disputes of key facts in this fact-driven litigation.
Overall the parties' approach to summary judgment is not consonant with the goals and purposes of Rule 56. See FTC v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 17-cv-00039-JD, 2018 WL 6040192 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018). A good argument can be made that the motions should be summarily denied on this basis alone. Even so, in the interest of moving this case along, the Court reviewed the voluminous filings and concludes that the claims for a violation of a mandatory duty, IIED, and under the Bane Act, must be dismissed as a matter of law. Summary judgment is denied in all other respects.
The parties' familiarity with the record is assumed. There is a modest degree of agreement about the basic circumstances of the case. The parties do not dispute that Yates was diagnosed with dyslexia and received specialized education at Piedmont Hills under an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) beginning her freshman year. Dkt. No. 84-1 (H. Yates Dep.) at 23-24. At the end of her freshman year, Yates attempted suicide. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. V (G. Yates Dep.) at 51.
Yates began a relationship with Oliver during her junior year -- the 2016-17 school year -when she was 15 years old. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. A at 14, 54. Oliver sexually abused her from October 2016 to early January 2017. Dkt. No. 84-1 at 67-73, 79. He physically abused her on campus from October 2016 to May 2017. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. A at 119-120. Yates did not tell her parents or anyone at Piedmont Hills about the abuse until late April 2017. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. A at 120, and Ex. V at 112.
In December 2016, students reported to two teachers that an “explicit sexual video of Haley Yates and Toure Oliver [was] being transmitted to their friends.” Dkt. No. 102, Ex. C (Harris Dep.) at 20. The students said the videos had been circulating for a month “and that Haley was unaware of them.” Dkt. No. 102, Ex. D at ECF 103. There is some evidence that one of the teachers told Oliver to delete any videos he might have. See Dkt. 102, Ex. E at ECF 107. One of the teachers gave defendant Williams the names of at least four students to interview: Richard Fedeline, Michael Welch, Lorenza Alves, and Haley Yates. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. D at ECF 103. Only Alves was ultimately interviewed. See Dkt. No. 102, Ex. L (Williams Dep.) at 31, 73.
Pursuant to a protocol at Piedmont Hills, a report of “inappropriate” photos or videos triggers an internal investigation by the school, and the police are not contacted immediately. See Dkt. No. 83-1 (Vander Zee Dep.) at 56. Williams assigned Associate Principal Nancy Pereira to investigate the situation; Steve Sellers, a student advisor, assisted Pereira. Dkt. No. 84-4 (Williams Dep.) at 29; Dkt. No. 84-6 (Pereira Dep.) at 86. Yates was not interviewed as part of the investigation, for reasons that are disputed. The District took no disciplinary action against Oliver as a result of the investigation. Dkt. No. 84-4 at 40. The parties agree that Williams is Oliver's cousin.
In May 2017, San Jose Police arrested Oliver at school for sexually and physically assaulting Yates. Id. Williams went to Oliver's juvenile detention hearing to support him, and the Yates family saw her in the area of the hearing room. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. V at 116-17. Williams asked two District staff members to attend the hearing in support of Oliver, but neither Williams nor the employees were allowed into the hearing room during the proceedings. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. L at 42 and Ex. A at 128.
In response to a complaint about the investigation filed by Yates's mother, Williams was reprimanded by the District for conducting an inadequate and biased investigation. See Dkt. No. 102, Ex. K. The District expressly reprimanded Williams for attending Oliver's hearing, which Id. at 2.
In May 2017, Yates largely stopped attending Piedmont Hills in person. Dkt. No. 102, Ex. A at 130. She went on independent study for her senior year but continued to play softball at school, and attended a prom and graduation. Id. at 137-38.
Parties Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The Court may dispose of less than the entire case and even just portions of a claim or defense.” CZ Servs., Inc. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., No. 3:18-CV-04217-JD, 2020 WL 4368212, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (citing Smith v. Cal. Dep't of Highway Patrol, 75 F.Supp.3d 1173, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. To determine whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and “all justifiable inferences are to be drawn” in that party's favor. Id. at 255. The moving party may initially establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by “pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). It is then the nonmoving party's burden to go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 323-24. “A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
“It is not the Court's responsibility to root through the record to establish the absence of factual disputes, or to look for evidence on the nonmoving parties' behalf.” CZ Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 4368212, at *3 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, 293 F.Supp.3d 980, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 932 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2019).
Defendants' initial grounds for summary judgment are based on several theories of immunity from suit. All three defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars the Yates family's state law claims because school districts and their employees who are sued in an official capacity are state entities immune from suit in federal court. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 81 at 9-10; Dkt. No. 83 at 11. All three defendants contend that a California discretionary immunity statute, Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2, immunizes the school district employees from suit for acts and omissions that occurred during the December 2016 investigation. See Dkt. No. 81 at 10; Dkt. No. 83 at 22. The District and Kregear also say that they are entitled to qualified immunity for the claims arising from the December 2016 investigation. See Dkt. No. 81 at 11.
The Eleventh Amendment bars damages suits against a state unless the state has abrogated its immunity through legislation or otherwise consented to suit in federal court. Kentucky v Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). California school districts are “arms of the state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1992),...
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