Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 November 1948
• Parties: YAUN v. ALLIS-CHALMERS MFG. CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

253 Wis. 558

34 N.W.2d 853

YAUN

v.ALLIS-CHALMERS MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Nov. 16, 1948.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Green County; Jesse Earle, Judge.

Action by Clarence Yaun against the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company for personal injuries sustained while operating a hay baler manufactured by defendant.

Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.-[By Editorial Staff.]

Reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment for defendant dismissing the complaint.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while operating a hay baler manufactured by the defendant. From a judgment allowing the plaintiff recovery, defendant appeals.

The defendant is a manufacturer of farm and other heavy machinery. One of the items produced by it is a hay baler known as the Roto-Baler. It is intended as a one-man operational unit, towed to the rear and off-side by a tractor. The apron which picks up the window is equipped with two chains on which raddle bars carry the hay up and along the apron to the point where rollers compress the hay into a flat band which is wound into a bale behind the rollers. When the bale reaches the proper size a twine bar drops down immediately in front of the rollers (see cut, Plaintiff's Ex. ‘B’), the twine catches in the last of the hay and goes into the rollers. The operator then stops the forward motion of the tractor leaving the power unit engaged, and the rollers continue to operate, turning the bale and binding it with the twine. The bale is then ejected by the machine. The raddle bars stop when the forward motion of the tractor is stopped. When the bale is completed the operator starts the tractor forward and the process is repeated.

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Occasionally the twine does not engage as intended and the operator then must leave his seat on the tractor, go around to the front of the baler and, by tossing a handful of hay up on to the rollers in front of the twine, carry the twine between the rollers.

The plaintiff was employed by John Erb, a machinery dealer, to operate the baler and tractor on Erb's farm and other farms. He had operated the machine for about a week and had made 2,500 or 3,000 bales of hay. It was necessary to toss hay at the twine ten or twelve times each day, and he had done so without incident.

On July 17, 1947, late in the afternoon, the twine failed to engage and the plaintiff went around to the front of the baler, tossed a handful of hay, and fell up the apron in such manner that his right arm was caught between the rollers and crushed to a point between the elbow and shoulder, requiring its amputation somewhat below the shoulder.

The testimony of the plaintiff was that he placed his right foot on the apron about seven inches above the ground, picked up a handful of hay and, with a side motion from left to right, tossed the hay. He further testified that his foot slipped and he fell full length on the apron with hand extended, that his fingers were caught in the nip of the rollers and he was pulled into the rollers until the thickness of his arm jammed the machine and stalled the tractor.

Defendant contends that it would have been impossible for the accident to have happened as described by the plaintiff for the reason that from toe to the tip of plaintiff's hand outstretched is eighty-eight inches, and that from the ground to the nip of the rollers is ninety-six inches, the platform itself being ninety-three inches (see cut, Defendant's Ex. ‘2’).

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We shall assume, without deciding the point, that the accident happened as plaintiff contends.

The case was submitted to the jury upon the following questions:

1. Whether the manufacturer, in making and marketing the baler, was negligent in failing to equip said machine with safety devices and safeguards and methods and processes in any of the following respects:

(a) The method of twine feeding;

(b) Guards or enclosures for the horizontal rollers;

(c) A readily accessible quickstopping device.

2. Did such failure on the part of the defendant to exercise ordinary care in the particulars designated render said machine imminently dangerous to life and limb when used for the purpose for which it was intended.

All of these questions, as well as similar questions on causation, were answered in the affirmative. The jury found the plaintiff free from contributory negligence, and assessed damages. Upon this verdict the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff.

Lines, Spooner & Quarles, of Milwaukee (Charles B. Quarles and Irving T. Babb, both of Milwaukee, of counsel), for appellant.

Edward T. O'Neill, of Fon du Lac, for respondent.

HUGHES, Justice.

The respondent contends that ‘The rule of law governing this case is that a manufacturer of a product is liable to a user thereof who sustains injuries by reason of the manufacturer failing to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design, where such failure renders said product imminently dangerous to life and limb when used in a manner and for a purpose for which it is manufactured, whether the danger be open or hidden.’ The cases do not support the respondent's rule.

In Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 1928, 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855, 60 A.L.R. 357, relied upon by respondent, the Fox Company was held liable for injuries to the plaintiff Flies when struck by an automobile purchased from it by one Johnson. Liability was founded upon the affirmative negligence of the company in failing to examine the brakes of the car which it had rebuilt after it was damaged in a wreck, although it had informed Johnson before turning the vehicle over to him that it was equipped with all safety devices. The general rules of law applicable to the liability of a manufacturer were exhaustively examined in the opinion by Justice Owen. The court there said, 196 Wis. at page 203, 218 N.W. at page 857, 60 A.L.R. 357:

‘There is no privity of contract between Fox Bros. and the plaintiff. Any duty owing by Fox Bros. to the plaintiff therefore must be imposed upon Fox Bros. as a matter of law. It is a general rule that manufacturers are not liable for damages to persons with whom they have no contractual relations for personal injuries sustained by such persons because of the negligent manufacture of their product.-This for the reason, it is said, that an injury to any other person than the owner for whom the article is built and to whom it is delivered cannot ordinarily be foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of the negligence in its construction. To this an exception has long been recognized with reference to products which are inherently and normally dangerous, such as poisons, contaminated foods, weapons, explosives, and the like-products which are normally destructive in their nature. From an early day the manufacturers of such articles have been held to a very high degree of care to see to it that their poisons are properly labeled, that their foods do not contain poisonous ingredients, and that their explosives and weapons will function in a normal manner. This duty is cast upon manufacturers for the purpose of conserving life and limb.’

Then, after discussing cases which tend to broaden the responsibilty of manufacturers, the court said, 196 Wis. at pages 206, 207, 218 N.W. at page 858, 60 A.L.R. 357:

‘While this doctrine may not presently be supported by the weight of authority, there is a decided tendency on the part of courts to recognize its soundness and to apply it to new situations as they arise. Thus, it is said by the Massachusetts court in Windram Manufacturing Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 125, 131 N.E. 454, 455, 17 A.L.R. 669 at page 671: ‘A tendency appears in some recent cases to extend the class of ‘inherently dangerous' articles, so as to include not only those that in their ordinary state are dangerous to health and safety, such as poisons and explosives, but also those that are reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril because of negligent preparation’-citing many cases.

‘The doctrine of Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 42 Am.Rep. 311, was recognized and applied by this court in Bright v. Barnett & Record Co. 88 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418,26 L.R.A. 524, where a contractor building a defective scaffold was held liable to an employee of the company for whom it was built who was killed by reason of defective material placed in the scaffold. While the doctrine of the Bright case was apparently ignored in Zieman v. Kieckhefer Elevator Manufacturing...