Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt

• Decision Date: 08 June 1983
• Docket Number: YAVAPAI-PRESCOTT,No. 82-5405,82-5405
• Citation: 707 F.2d 1072
• Parties: INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellee, v. James G. WATT, as Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants, and Marlin D. Kuykendall, an individual, Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1072

707 F.2d 1072

YAVAPAI-PRESCOTT INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellee, v. James G. WATT, as Secretary of the Interior, et al., Defendants, and Marlin D. Kuykendall, an individual,

Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant.

No. 82-5405.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 12, 1983.

Decided June 8, 1983.

Philip E. Toci, Prescott, Ariz., for plaintiff/counterdefendant/appellee.

Thomas J. Reilly, Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant/counterclaimant/appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Before DUNIWAY, GOODWIN and SNEED, Circuit Judges.

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Federal law requires the approval of the Secretary of the Interior before certain Indian lands can be leased. This case raises the question whether an Indian Tribe has the authority to terminate a lease executed in accordance with this law without obtaining the Secretary's approval for the lease termination. The district court held that a tribe has that authority. We disagree and reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS

On September 11, 1969, the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe leased a tract of land in Prescott, Arizona to appellant Marlin D. Kuykendall for use as an automobile dealership. The term of the lease was for 25 years with an option to renew for an additional 25 years.

The Tribe obtained the approval of the Secretary of the Interior for the lease pursuant to 25 U.S.C. Sec. 415, authorizing commercial leases of Indian lands, as implemented by 25 C.F.R. Secs. 162.1-162.20. ¹ That statute requires that any lease of certain Indian lands be approved by the Secretary, and "be made under such terms and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary." ²

One of the implementing regulations, 25 C.F.R. Sec. 162.14, establishes procedures, in the event of a breach of a lease agreement, for the Secretary to participate in the cancellation of the lease. ³ Despite the requirements of this regulation, article 30 of the lease--providing remedies to the Tribe in the event of Kuykendall's default on his lease obligations--states that the Tribe "and/or" the Secretary may terminate the lease.

In March of 1979, Kuykendall arranged to sublet the land and sell his dealership to Following termination of the lease, Kuykendall sought assistance from the Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Kuykendall claimed that the Tribe was precluded from cancelling the lease without first obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The Area Director, however, upheld the Tribe's authority to terminate the lease unilaterally.

a partnership. The Tribe disapproved of the sublease and notified Kuykendall that the sublease was a breach of the lease agreement. On June 27, 1979, the Tribe terminated the lease without the Secretary's approval.

Kuykendall filed an administrative appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. The Board held that the Secretary owes a fiduciary duty to the Tribe under 25 U.S.C. Sec. 415 in administering the lease, and that neither the language of the lease nor the conduct of the parties indicates an intent to end the Secretary's fiduciary duty in the event of Kuykendall's default on the lease. The Board explained that the statutory duty, as interpreted by the regulations, could not be abrogated merely by the approval of a lease containing a provision to the contrary. The Board concluded that 25 C.F.R. Sec. 162.14, promulgated pursuant to 25 U.S.C. Sec. 415, and requiring Secretarial involvement in lease cancellations, provides the exclusive method by which the Tribe can terminate a lease. The Board then set aside the determination of the Area Director and reinstated the lease subject to a decision by the Area Director on the merits of the lease cancellation.

The Tribe filed this action in the district court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, for review of and relief from the Board's decision. Kuykendall counterclaimed, seeking declaratory and monetary relief on the merits.

The district court held that the Tribe could cancel a lease without the Secretary's approval. The court pointed out that 25 C.F.R. Sec. 162.14 does not state expressly that it provides the exclusive procedure for cancellation of a lease of Indian land. The district court then determined that since the Secretary had approved the lease, including article 30, the Tribe could enforce its unilateral cancellation. The district court therefore reversed the decision of the Board, 528 F.Supp. 695, and subsequently dismissed Kuykendall's counterclaim without comment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district court and reinstate the Board's decision. ⁴

II. ANALYSIS

While 25 C.F.R. Sec. 162.14 does not expressly require that its procedures be followed when a lease approved by the Secretary is terminated, see note 3 supra, a literal reading of the regulation is not enough. Whether the remedies provided in the regulation are exclusive must be determined in light of the intent of Congress in enacting the statute which the regulation purports to implement. See Loma Linda University v. Schweiker, 705 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.1983); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434, 91 S.Ct. 849, 855, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).

Congress adopted section 415 to encourage long-term commercial leases of Indian land and thereby to enhance its profitable development. H.R.Rep. No. 1093, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1955 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2691. Since the enactment of section 415, business leases have become, as Congress hoped, an important source of income for Indians, and can be called the "cornerstone of a reservation economic development program." Chambers & Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 Stan.L.Rev. 1061, 1063 (1974). The issue, when viewed in the light of this congressional purpose, becomes whether recognizing a power in a tribe to terminate unilaterally a commercial lease will enhance the profitable development of Indian land.

A simple and unqualified answer does not exist. Recognition of such power would increase the economic power of the tribes with respect to unfavorable commercial leases. By termination, when permitted by the lease terms, or its threat, tribes would have greater power to eliminate the unfavorable aspects of commercial leases. No longer would the exercise of this power be subject to approval of the Secretary.

On the other hand, elimination of the Secretary's approval also increases the risk of there being lease terms not consistent with the long-run interests of the tribes. The magnitude of this risk is impossible to measure, but the enactment of 25 U.S.C. Sec. 415 attests that Congress believed it existed. 25 C.F.R. Sec. 162.14 indicates that the Secretary quite properly also believes it exists.

It is difficult to be certain about how the balance should be struck between the risk of improvidence and the enhancement of tribal power. However, we choose to reduce the risk--a cautious approach admittedly. To some extent our level of anxiety is less than it otherwise might be because, whatever our choice, it lies within the power of the Secretary to set aside our choice at least with respect to the future. Were we to enhance tribal power by recognizing under the circumstances of this case the power of the Tribe to terminate the lease unilaterally, it is likely that the Secretary could nullify the effect of our decision by henceforth approving only leases that required his approval for termination. On the other hand, following our decision in this case the Secretary could abandon his position by changing the regulation to recognize to the extent desired the unilateral power of a tribe to terminate a commercial lease. We believe it is more consistent with the judicial process to accept the Secretary's present choice with respect to the proper balance between enhanced tribal power and increased risks of improvidence and to leave to...