Yawdoshak v. Somerville Iron Works

Decision Date05 October 1942
Citation28 A.2d 478,20 N.J.Misc. 412
PartiesYAWDOSHAK v. SOMERVILLE IRON WORKS et al.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Frances Yawdoshak, claimant, opposed by the Somerville Iron Works, employer, and the New Jersey Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company.

Judgment for claimant.

David Roskein, of Newark, for petitioner.

George E. Meredith, of Trenton (William J. McNulty, of Trenton, of counsel), for respondent.

HARRY S. MEDINETS, Deputy Commissioner.

The only controversial issue here presented for determination is whether or not the death of Alex Yawdoshak on November 24, 1941, resulted from an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent company. The jurisdictional factors such as notice, dependence and rate appear to be undisputed.

For the proper determination of the basic issue involved in this case, it becomes necessary to review the circumstances of the decedent's employment and activities immediately preceding his death.

The evidence discloses that Alex Yawdoshak, age 56, had been employed as a laborer by the respondent at its plant in Somerville, New Jersey, for a period of upwards of nine years. His duties, in the main, consisted of loading a truck with pig iron and scrap iron, preparatory to smelting in the cupola where the said iron was smelted. The decedent was accompanied in this work by four other laborers. His work required him to bend down to the floor and raise metal bars weighing from five pounds to several hundred pounds and placing them in the said truck. The lighter bars were picked up by the decedent alone. He was assisted in lifting the heavier bars. It took approximately one-half hour to load the said truck to its capacity of four thousand pounds. It would thereupon be pushed by the said laborers who had loaded it, through the yard and to the cupola. The roadway was partially uphill and partially downhill. The testimony discloses that the truck was pushed along tracks, and upon going up the incline, it was necessary that five or six men participate in the effort. On the down grade, two men were sufficient to direct its course. The decedent's employment commenced at 8 o'clock. On alternate days he was required to use a sledge hammer in the mornings to break up the slag. On the day in question it was his partner's day to perform this work.

The decedent had left his home at about 7 o'clock, having had his breakfast, and appearing to his wife to be in usual, normal health. With the exception of a hernia which he had sustained in 1939 and a foot injury, for which he had been treated by the respondent's physicians seven years prior thereto, he had suffered from no serious ailments. On arrival at work at about 8 o'clock he went about his usual routine and by 10 o'clock the decedent and his fellow workers had loaded and moved to the cupola approximately twenty tons of iron. At about ten minutes prior to his death he complained to a fellow workman of a tightening sensation in his chest. He. stopped work and rested. A glass of water was served him in an endeavor to relieve his symptoms. After a short period of rest, the decedent and his partner, John Surowicz, endeavored to push a loaded truck. They had gone about ten feet when the decedent was seen to fall backwards on an empty car, which was in the vicinity, dead. Dr. Edgar Flint, the County Physician, was notified, and after examining petitione'r, made a diagnosis of "heart disease, unclassified". There seems to be no dispute that the petitioner, at the time he suffered his original coronary symptoms, was in the performance of the heavy and arduous labor of the morning. Similarly, his final collapse occurred while he was in the very act of pushing the truck which had been loaded with scrap. There seems to be no substantial contradiction that the work which the decedent was engaged in during the morning on which he met his death was heavy, laboring work. Respondents' counsel's attempt to characterize the work as "not as heavy as work done by the decedent previously," and as "not hard work" and "work nothing out of the ordinary," does not impress me. Neither does the characterization of Dr. Andrew Ruoff and Dr. J. Allen Yaeger that moving scrap iron by the decedent was not unusual to the decedent and therefore played no part in bringing on his death, because he had accustomed himself to this work. Their opinion that 60% to 80% of coronary deaths are brought on without effort form no basis or criteria to dissociate the circumstances of this case with the coronary death at the time at which it occurred. The testimony of Dr. J. Allen Yaeger is far from convincing. His attempted explanation that there was no causal connection between the effort expended by the decedent and his death, because the effort was not unusual, has not been held tenuous by our Courts. I need hardly cite the numerous authorities which have held that this does not correctly form the basis of compensability. His further inconsistency when confronted with his attempted characterization of the initial coronary occlusion suffered by the decedent and his criteria of elements necessary to establish a causal relationship between effort and strain fails to impress the Court, and, under the circumstances, can hardly be accepted by it as a basis in the proper consideration of this case. The Court finds, as a fact, that the work which the decedent had been doing was arduous and required considerable effort. This is especially true under the circumstances disclosed from the testimony.

There appeared, on behalf of the petitioner, Dr. Rossi. He had occasion to treat the decedent during the early part of November for symptoms which he diagnosed as a head cold with slight bronchitis. The Doctor found no cardiac symptoms during the period of his treatment. I feel that the testimony of Dr. Jerome G. Kaufman, eminently qualified in this field, deserves considerable weight. It was the Doctor's opinion that the effort and...

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3 cases
  • Dunn v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 7 Julio 1953
    ...this case. I will cite a few of the more recent cases in this field. Donlan's Case, 317 Mass. 291, 58 N.E.2d 4; Yawdoshak v. Somerville Iron Works 20 N.J.Misc. 412, 28 A.2d 478; Eisen v. Jacquard Fabrics, 19 N.J.Misc. 526, 21 A.2d 614; Amend v. Amend, 12 N.J.Super. 425, 79 A.2d 742; Juhl v.......
  • In re Peppler's Will
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • 14 Octubre 1942
  • Daniel Ornamental Iron Co., Inc. v. Black
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 9 Marzo 1972
    ...compensation cases, reasonable probability and not absolute medical certainty is the test to be applied. Yawdoshak v. Somerville Iron Works, 20 N.J.Misc. 412, 28 A.2d 478. In the instant case, Dr. Richard Bruhn, a neurosurgeon, whose qualifications were admitted, and Dr. John Sherrill, Jr.,......

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