Yayman v. Fia Card Services, N.A.
Decision Date | 30 May 2008 |
Docket Number | 2061109. |
Citation | 996 So.2d 845 |
Parties | Suzanne O. YAYMAN v. FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Suzanne O. Yayman, pro se.
Naomi A. Cohen Ivker of Zarzaur & Schwartz, PC, Birmingham, for appellee.
The parties' dispute regarding the use of a credit card issued to Suzanne O. Yayman by MBNA America Bank, N.A., now known as FIA Card Services, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as "FIA Card Services"), was resolved in an arbitration proceeding. On October 20, 2006, an arbitration hearing was convened and an arbitrator approved by the National Arbitration Forum entered an award in the amount of $23,599.17 in favor of FIA Card Services and against Yayman.
On March 27, 2007, FIA Card Services filed with the circuit clerk of Jefferson County an "Application to Confirm Arbitration Award" ("the application"), pursuant to § 6-6-12, Ala.Code 1975. Appended to the application was a copy of the parties' agreement to arbitrate and a copy of a document signed by the arbitrator containing the arbitrator's findings and conclusions and the arbitrator's award ("the arbitration order"). The certificate of service indicates that the application was served upon Yayman.
On April 4, 2007, Yayman filed an "Answer and Opposition to Application to Confirm Arbitration Award" ("the answer"). The answer denied the allegations contained in the application, other than the allegation that the parties had been unable to select or appoint an arbitrator by agreement, and demanded a trial by jury.1 The answer also asserted numerous affirmative defenses relating to the merits of the claim that had been resolved in the arbitration proceeding. Yayman contemporaneously filed a memorandum of law, an affidavit, and multiple discovery requests. The memorandum of law argues that the parties had no agreement to arbitrate and that the arbitrator's award is not enforceable. However, in her affidavit, Yayman admits:
"[W]ith respect [to] [FIA Card Services'] claim, I served an objection to arbitration on [FIA Card Services] and the National Arbitration Forum, and I did not participate in said arbitration action."
However, the arbitration order provides:
The arbitration order also states that the parties had notice of the arbitration hearing, that the hearing was conducted in accordance with the rules, of the National Arbitration Forum, that the parties had the opportunity to present their evidence to the arbitrator, and that the arbitrator reviewed all the submitted evidence. Further, the arbitrator specifically found that the parties had entered into a valid, enforceable, written agreement to arbitrate their dispute and that the dispute was arbitrable according to the terms of the parties' agreement. In Opinion of the Clerk, 394 So.2d 954 (Ala.1981), the clerk of the Supreme Court of Alabama stated:
"This Court, in Moss v. Upchurch, 278 Ala. 615, 179 So.2d 741 (1965), referring to the sections that are now Sections 6-6-12 and 6-6-15, Code, 1975, indicated that in case of an appeal [of an arbitration award] the circuit court was empowered to review the award as to whether the arbitrators are guilty of fraud, partiality or corruption making it."
394 So.2d at 957. All Yayman's contentions, in the trial court and on appeal, involve the existence of an agreement to arbitrate rather than whether the arbitrator was guilty of fraud, partiality, or corruption in making the arbitration award. Id.
On May 7, 2007, FIA Card Services moved to strike the discovery requests served upon it by Yayman, asserting that the arbitrator had already decided the case on the merits and that FIA Card Services was merely trying to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to § 6-6-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. On May 9, 2007, the circuit clerk entered a judgment confirming the arbitration award as the judgment of the court; that judgment states that it was entered pursuant to § 6-6-12 and § 6-6-15, Ala.Code 1975.
On May 15, 2007, Yayman filed a motion to vacate the judgment, arguing that the trial court should not have confirmed the arbitration award as the judgment of the court because, she asserted, "[p]ursuant to Alabama law, a defendant has ten (10) days to object" to a motion to confirm an arbitration award and she had complied with this requirement by objecting to the application within 10 days of its filing by filing her answer. Yayman did not file a notice of appeal from the arbitrator's award "within 10 days after receipt of notice of the award," as required by § 6-6-15, Ala.Code 1975. She apparently interprets § 6-6-15 so as to prevent a trial court from confirming an arbitration award in the face of an objection; her interpretation is incorrect.
Section 6-6-15 provides:
Recently, in Jenks v. Harris, 990 So.2d 878 (Ala.2008), our supreme court addressed the procedure for appealing arbitration awards as set out in § 6-6-15. The supreme court, quoting its previous order, stated:
990 So.2d at 882 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
In Pruett v. Williams, 623 So.2d 1115 (Ala.1993), Pat Williams sued Thad Pruett, James Sharpe, and Noel Wadsworth as the partners of Pruett-Sharpe Construction Company ("the partnership"). Williams alleged that the partnership had breached a contract to pay him an architect's fee. The parties arbitrated their dispute pursuant to their contract, and on August 24,...
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