Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 07 December 1908
• Citation: 94 Miss. 242,47 So. 662
• Parties: YAZOO & MISSISSIPPI VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY v. WILEY H. HUGHES
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

47 So. 662

94 Miss. 242

YAZOO & MISSISSIPPI VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY v. WILEY H. HUGHES

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 7, 1908

October 1908

FROM the circuit court of, second district, Bolivar county, HON SYDNEY SMITH, Judge.

Hughes appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; the railroad company, appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff defendant appealed to the supreme court.

The opinion of the court states the facts of the case.

Reversed and remanded.

Mayes & Longstreet, for appellant.

The court below should have granted the peremptory instruction requested by appellant. The facts indisputably show that appellant held the property solely as a warehouseman, and that while the property was thus held it was destroyed by fire without fault of appellant. The burden of proof was upon appellee, as bailor, to show neglect upon appellant's part. He failed as to this; hence the peremptory instruction asked for by appellant should have been granted. Prince v. Alabama State Fair Ass'n, 106 Ala. 340, 17 So. 449, 28 L. R. A. 716; Knights v. Piella, 111 Mich. 9.

While it is true that appellant, as a common carrier, contracted with appellee as to transportation of the goods, yet the evidence shows that this obligation upon appellant's part was satisfactorily fulfilled. When appellee left the goods in storage with appellant, a new obligation, that of warehouseman, arose upon the part of appellant. In other words, appellant had fulfilled its duty as a common carrier of property, and had entered upon an entirely different relationship at the time of the loss by fire.

The court below erred in instructing the jury peremptorily to find for the appellee as to appellant's liability. Even if the appellant's contract as a common carrier had not been fulfilled, but, as a carrier, it still had possession of appellee's goods at the time they were burned, even then the peremptory intruction in appellee's favor would have been improper, because, in such case, the appellant would have received the goods as baggage, had they not been destroyed. And since some of the goods were not, strictly speaking, baggage, and since the company's agent at Boyle did not know the true nature of the contents of the tool chest, the appellant could not legally be liable therefor. Yazoo etc., R. Co. v. Georgia, etc., Insurance Co., 85 Miss. 7, 37 So. 500.

Jones & Hardee, for appellee.

Can a bailee for hire excuse himself from liability for loss of the goods entrusted to him, by merely showing that the goods were destroyed by fire? This is the main question in this case. Our court has held that if the circumstances surrounding a fire, in cases such as this, fail to show negligence on the part of the bailee, or want of proper care upon his part, it then devolves on the bailor to turn the scale by some evidence inculpatory of the defendant. The law does not intend to presume negligence. It does make the reasonable requirement of the bailee who fails to return the thing bailed, to show that he cannot return it, and why; and when he discloses fully the fact showing the impracticability of a return because of the destruction of the thing, with the attendant circumstances, and nothing connected with his showing in this respect inculpates him, the plaintiff must show liability or fail in his action. Meridian Fair, etc., Ass'n v. North Birmingham, etc., Railroad Co., 70 Miss. 808, 12 So. 555.

Under the foregoing decision of our court, the instruction in behalf of appellee and the verdict and judgment in the court below were correct. For there was absolutely no showing made by appellant disclosing the "attendant circumstances" of the fire.

OPINION

FLETCHER, J.

The appellee on July 3, 1907, purchased a ticket at Memphis, from the agent of the appellant company for Boyle, and on his ticket two articles of baggage were checked. One was a trunk filled with wearing apparel, and the other was a chest of carpenter's tools. The baggage reached Boyle in safety, and was stored in the station house of the railroad company. Three or four days after the baggage was so stored, appellee and the agent of the company had a conversation, in which it was arranged that appellee should leave his baggage in the appellant's wareroom for an indefinite time, paying storage thereon. The depot and its contents were destroyed by fire some time subsequent to this arrangement, and Hughes sued for the value of his baggage. The court gave a peremptory instruction in behalf of the appellee as to liability, leaving the jury the duty of ascertaining the damages. From a verdict for the appellee, the railroad company appealed.

The declaration in this case contained three counts. The first was framed upon the theory that the liability of the company was that of a common carrier; second, that the compnay was liable as a warehouseman, but had "carlessly" allowed the trunks and contents to be destroyed by fire, on a day named in the declaration; the third count, that the company was liable as a warehouseman, and that the defendant had "wrongfully, carelessly, and negligently failed and neglected to exercise and maintain that degree of care, prudence, and caution which it, as bailee for hire or warehouseman, was bound to exercise and maintain, wrongfully and inexcusably permitted the said chest and contents to be wholly lost and destroyed, to plaintiff's damage," etc. It is perfectly obvious that no liability rested upon the company as a common carrier, since its duty in that respect had ceased, and by special contract the railroad company had become liable as a warehouseman only. Indeed, appellee from the first placed no reliance in the first count of the declaration. Only one witness testified in the case, the appellee himself. He stated that he saw the trunks in the depot two or three days before the fire which destroyed the depot, and that the agent of the company at Boyle afterwards stated to him, appellee, that the trunks had been burned. The sole instruction given in the case recited: "The court instructs the jury to find for plaintiff, and to assess his damages at such amount as the proof shows the goods lost to have been reasonably worth at the time they were destroyed by the fire which consumed the depot at Boyle." This instruction, as well as the whole course of the trial, assumes that the goods were destroyed in the fire which consumed the depot, and we think this fact may be said to have been fairly established. It is clear, therefore, that the trial was had upon the second count, the one in which it was alleged that the property was destroyed by fire. On the trial the plaintiff showed the value of the articles lost, the delivery to the company, the contract of bailment, and, as we have shown, the fact that the property was destroyed by the fire that consumed the station. No evidence was introduced by the defendant, and there was no testimony from either side as to the circumstances and incidents of the fire. It is merely shown that the baggage was burned, and the railroad company relied upon this fact as a sufficient answer to the charge of nondelivery. The precise and narrow question, therefore, before the court for decision is as to where lay the burden of proof in the case; that is to say, was the fire presumably caused by the negligence of the appellant or was it presumably nonnegligent? Of course, the contract of bailment in this case was for the mutual benefit of the parties, and the warehouseman is therefore held to the exercise of ordinary care. The question is interesting and somewhat novel in this jurisdiction. We think our conclusion in this matter can best be stated by a consideration of a few authorities.

It appears that the ancient rule was that in all cases where a bailee was sought to be held no presumption of negligence arises on account of the loss of the goods, and the burden of proof is always on the plaintiff to establish that negligence was attributable to the bailee. But by the weight of modern authority this doctrine is substantially modified. It may now be said to be established that, when a bailor shows that goods are delivered to his bailee in good condition and are lost or destroyed or returned in a damaged condition, this fact creates a prima facie presumption of negligence; and it thereupon devolves upon the bailee to absolve himself from negligence. But the bailee may acquit himself of the charge of negligence by showing that the loss occurred from a cause which prima facie exonerates the bailee from negligence. "Thus, if he proves that the loss was occasioned by burglary, fire, the falling of the warehouse in which the goods were stored, the death of an animal bailed, . . . the burden is again shifted to the bailor to prove the defendant's negligence." 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d. ed.), 750.

Among the cases cited to support this declaration of the text is Meridian Fair & Exposition Association v. North Birmingham Street Railway Co., 70 Miss. 808, 12 So. 555. In that case the fair association had become responsible to the owners for the safe return of a balloon borrowed by one Fisk, an aeronaut. This balloon while in the air took fire in some inexplicable manner, and was destroyed. On the trial Fisk, the only man who could have explained the accident, was not examined, and the spectators who testified could only say that the balloon suddenly took fire from a cause of which they were ignorant. The court says: "When a bailee in an action for nonreturn of an article shows that it was destroyed by fire under circumstances fully disclosed, and not suggestive of any want of due care, it devolves on the bailor seeking to hold him responsible to turn the scale by some evidence inculpatory of the defendant. The law does...