Yazurlo v. Bd. of Educ. of Yonkers
| Decision Date | 24 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17 Civ. 2027 (NSR),17 Civ. 2027 (NSR) |
| Parties | MICHAEL YAZURLO, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, DR. NADER J. SAYEGH, and MIKE SPANO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Michael Yazurlo ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendants Board of Education of the City of Yonkers ("Board"), Dr. Nader J. Sayegh ("Sayegh"), and Mike Spano ("Spano") in his first amended complaint. ("Complaint," ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff's claims are for breach of contract against Defendants Board and Sayegh, slander per se against Defendants Sayegh and Spano, tortious interference with a contract against Defendant Spano, and national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Spano. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant Spano and Defendants Board and Sayegh bring separate motions. Both will be addressed by this opinion.
For the following reasons, Defendant Spano's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants Board's and Sayegh's motion is DENIED.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of these motions.
On May 21, 2014, Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant Board ("Agreement"). (Compl. ¶ 43.) This Agreement set the following terms for Plaintiff's employment with Defendant Board:
1) [T]he [A]greement was to commence on May 22, 2014, and was supposed to end at midnight on June 30, 2016, unless further extended or sooner terminated; 2) plaintiffs [sic] salary was set at an annual rate of. . . [$]199,000.00) Dollars; 3) the Agreement was subject to dismissal if the BOE establishes that there is good and just cause. No discharge shall be effective until written charges have been served upon the plaintiff and plaintiff has been afforded the opportunity for a fair hearing before a BOE designated hearing officer after at least Twenty (20) days notice in writing. If a discharge from employment under this provision is found by a court to be wrongful, the plaintiff shall be entitled to, and shall be limited to, any damages for breach of this Agreement established by the court; 4) in the event that plaintiff shall voluntarily resign from his position, plaintiff shall provide the BOE with prior notice of at least Sixty (60) days.
(Id. ¶ 44.)
Plaintiff started work as superintendent for Defendant Board on May 22, 2014, and he "abided by and performed all the terms of the Agreement and at no time did he breach any of the Agreement's terms and conditions." (Id. ¶¶ 46, 48.) On November 17, 2015, during the term of the Agreement, the Yonkers police commissioner, under the direction of Defendant Spano (Mayor of Yonkers), informed Plaintiff that there was an open investigation into orders for pornographic films that had been placed through the cable box in Plaintiff's office. (Id. ¶¶ 49-51.) Plaintiff denied ordering the films, and the police proceeded with their investigation which included removing the cable box from Plaintiff's office; Plaintiff fully cooperated. (Id. ¶¶ 53-60.) That same day, on November 17, Plaintiff informed Defendant Sayegh, President of the Board, of the investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 61.)
On November 20, 2015, Plaintiff was summoned to a meeting at Defendant Spano's office. (Id. ¶¶ 63-64.) Defendants Spano and Sayegh, along with a city police officer and others, attended the meeting. (Id. ¶ 66.) At this meeting, Defendants Spano and Sayegh held up a paper and told Plaintiff that it was a bill documenting the purchases of the pornographic films, but they refused to allow Plaintiff to review the paper. (Id. ¶¶ 67-68.) Defendant Spano also,"knowing the falsity of is statement . . . [said] 'I think you did it,' " and "falsely and willfully accused the plaintiff of viewing the pornographic material." (Id. ¶ 66.) After falsely accusing Plaintiff "with no actual proof," Defendants Spano and Sayegh told Plaintiff that if he did not resign immediately, they would publish the accusations. (Id. ¶¶ 70-72.) Plaintiff agreed to resign, to the "constructive discharge," in order to keep the investigation private because he was concerned that the public announcement of the investigation would distress his family, cause him personal stress, and damage his future job prospects. (Id. ¶¶ 74-77.)
Despite Plaintiff's resignation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Spano and Sayegh told the media, without proof, that which Plaintiff alleges demonstrates "that that was their intent all along." (Id. ¶¶ 78-79.) Various media outlets published these allegations, causing Plaintiff to lose a job offer as a result, and leading to ongoing difficulties finding other employment. (Id. ¶¶ 79-87.) After Plaintiff's resignation, Defendant Spano appointed Edwin Quezada, a person "of Hispanic National Origin," as Plaintiff's replacement, even though Quezada was less experienced and qualified than Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 89, 90-91.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Spano removed him, a person of "Italian Origin" from his positon so that he could appoint "a member of the Hispanic community" "to appeal to the Hispanic voting population." (Id. ¶¶ 94-97, 101.)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry is whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). A claim is facially plausiblewhen the factual content pleaded allows a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must supply "factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.' " ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is " 'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,' " or to credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district court must consider the context and "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 662. A court is generally confined to the facts alleged in the complaint for the purposes of considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Cortec Indus. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir, 1991). A court may, however, consider documents attached to the complaint, statements or documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken, public records, and documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about, and relied upon, in bringing the suit. See Kleinman v. Elan Corp., 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Board and Sayegh breached the Agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by constructively discharging Plaintiff in bad faith and depriving him of proper notice or a hearing. (Compl. ¶¶ 119-22.)
To state a claim for breach of contract, a party must allege: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance of the contract by one party; (3) breach of the contract by the other party; and (4) damages as a result of the breach. First Inv'rs Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1998). Initial interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for a court to decide. K. Bell & Assocs. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 97 F.3d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 1996). However, at the motion to dismiss stage, a court "must resolve all ambiguities in the contract in Plaintiffs' favor." Serdarevic v. Centex Homes, LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see Wurtsbaugh v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, No. 05-CV-6220(DLC), 2006 WL 1683416, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2006) (). Implied in every contract under New York law, "[t]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . includes an implied undertaking on the part of each party that he will not intentionally and purposely do anything to prevent the other party from carrying out the agreement on his part." Kader v. Paper Software, Inc., 111 F.3d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Carvel Corp. v. Diversified Mgmt. Group, Inc., 930 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff's Complaint contains factual allegations sufficient to support a facially plausible breach of contract claim against Defendants Board and Saygeh. The Agreement is a contract,2 at least one party, Plaintiff, performed under the Agreement, and Plaintiff suffered damages, whichinclude lost salary from the remainder of the term established in the Agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 43-48, 82, 88.). Additionally, according to Plaintiff, Defendants breached the Agreement through constructively discharging him in bad faith from his position before the expiration of the contract and, after he was discharged, by failing to provide him a hearing or the required written notice. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 121-22.) "An employee is constructively discharged when his employer, rather than discharging him directly, intentionally...
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