Yeadon v. New York City Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 04 August 1989
• Docket Number: 87 Civ. 8740(RO) and 87 Civ. 9093(RO).,88 Civ. 1132(RO),No. 87 Civ. 6450(RO),88 Civ. 1131(RO),87 Civ. 6450(RO)
• Parties: Ronald YEADON, et al., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. Eric MOORE and Uriel Hart, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. Harry MENDEZ, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. Ronald SMITH, Plaintiff, v. Robert MORGENTHAU, et al., Defendants. Bennie CLOWERS II and Darrell Williams, Plaintiffs, v. Robert MORGENTHAU, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

719 F. Supp. 204

Ronald YEADON, et al., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

Eric MOORE and Uriel Hart, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

Harry MENDEZ, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

Ronald SMITH, Plaintiff, v. Robert MORGENTHAU, et al., Defendants.

Bennie CLOWERS II and Darrell Williams, Plaintiffs, v. Robert MORGENTHAU, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 87 Civ. 6450(RO), 88 Civ. 1132(RO), 88 Civ. 1131(RO), 87 Civ. 8740(RO) and 87 Civ. 9093(RO).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

August 4, 1989.

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Lankenau Kovner & Bickford, Richard D. Emery, New York City, for plaintiffs Yeadon, et al., for plaintiffs Moore and Hart, and for plaintiff Mendez.

John P. Rudden, New York City, for plaintiff Smith and for plaintiffs Clowers and Williams.

Albert C. Cosenza, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, New York City Transit Authority, Brooklyn, for defendants Transit Authority, Meehan, Rogan, Moraff and Donnelly; Steve S. Efron, of counsel.

Agulnick & Gogel, New York City, for defendants Iannacone and McDermott.

Kliegerman & Friess, New York City, for defendants Lacey and Corkran.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York City for defendants Morgenthau and Holmes; Mark Dwyer, Mark Frazier Scholl, Asst. Dist. Attys., of counsel.

OPINION AND ORDER

OWEN, District Judge:

This class action,¹ consolidated with other cases,² arises out of an apparent pattern of seemingly race-based false arrests and prosecutions initiated by at least four New York City Transit Authority ("NYCTA") police officers from 1983 to 1987.³ According to plaintiffs, the officers, who sought to improve their arrest records in order to secure promotions and other benefits, routinely accused innocent, disproportionately black and hispanic subway riders of petty but humiliating crimes, made racist remarks while arresting them, and initiated prosecutions against them. Often, plaintiffs claim, the officers misrepresented to the accused that another passenger had complained to the officer, or that another officer had witnessed the offensive behavior; later, to facilitate prosecution, the officers attempted to secure false affidavits from these supposedly complaining witnesses. Against the officers, the class and other plaintiffs allege false arrest, conspiracy to violate, and substantive violations of, their civil rights.⁴ Additionally, they claim that the officers are liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

All plaintiffs also name as defendants the NYCTA and certain NYCTA supervisory officers ("supervisor defendants"),⁵ alleging that departmental policy and practice aggravated the officers' unconstitutional behavior and that, in 1984, the supervisor defendants became aware of the false arrest pattern but suppressed their information, causing plaintiffs further harms. Plaintiffs submit the affidavit of Thomas Dargan, an NYCTA investigator, who relates that, starting in November, 1983, the NYCTA and supervisor defendants had notice and documentary proof that the four officers' records of arrests showed signs of serious irregularity.⁶ According to Dargan, the supervisor defendants belatedly ordered an investigation of the officers' arrests, but purposefully avoided contacting the arrestees because civil suits might follow. In the course of defending against plaintiff Vincent's prior state court suit for false arrest, the NYCTA allegedly dodged discovery requests that would have disclosed the false arrest scheme.

Although an NYCTA investigative report ultimately confirmed the pattern of arrest irregularity, the officers' apparent perjury, and the NYCTA's and District Attorney's slow response to preliminary evidence of abuse,⁷ no action was taken to discipline the officers or to alter the treatment of prior or subsequent arrestees, according to Dargan. The District Attorney's office declined to prosecute the officers, and, with certain alleged deviations from standard NYCTA procedure, the investigation was terminated. Allegedly, Dargan made further efforts to prompt action on the report, but NYCTA officers sought to silence him. Thus frustrated, Dargan read with interest news of Ronald Yeadon's early suit for false arrest, and contacted Yeadon's attorney.

According to plaintiffs, the supervisor defendants' failure to take any action on the report's findings, and their efforts to keep plaintiffs from finding out what the report contained, constituted a conspiracy to deny plaintiffs their civil rights.⁸ Additionally, two non-class plaintiffs sue the Manhattan District Attorney and his deputy, claiming that their continued prosecution of plaintiffs in the face of evidence of the false arrest pattern, and their handling of that and other exculpatory evidence in the course of the prosecutions, made them members of the conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their rights. Although the class and other plaintiffs have not named the prosecutors as defendants, they do allege that the District Attorneys office's continued prosecution of these cases and denial of requests for exculpatory evidence furthered the infringements on plaintiffs' rights.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSES

All defendants having moved, under Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss some claims on statute of limitations grounds, plaintiffs submitted affidavits and other materials calculated to convert defendants' move for dismissal into motions for summary judgment. Such a conversion, explicitly sanctioned under the Rules, is appropriate so long as both sides have notice that the court will consider extrinsic matters, and have an opportunity to present supporting materials in response. See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1066 (2d Cir.1985); Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir.1980). Because defendants had such notice and opportunity to respond, and because their reply papers and other submissions address the materials set forth in plaintiffs' affidavits, these motions to dismiss are properly converted to summary judgment motions. In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 295 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1195, 89 L.Ed.2d 310 (1986).

The defendants argue that the statute of limitations bars these claims,⁹ because the triggering events occurred during 1983 and 1984, and plaintiffs failed to file suit until late 1988.¹⁰ Under appropriately borrowed New York law, the statute of limitations period applicable to § 1983 and § 1985 actions is three years. Okure v. Owens, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). For § 1986 claims, Congress specifically provided a one year limitations period. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (West's 1988). Civil RICO claims must be brought within four years of RICO injury. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2767, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987).

Ordinarily, many of plaintiffs' actions would be time-barred;¹¹ however, plaintiffs may avoid dismissal of their actions because the defendants' alleged fraudulent conduct may well have deprived plaintiffs of information essential to the formulation of their claims. Under federal accrual principles, the statute of limitations only begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known the fact of his injury and its cause. See Kubrick v. United States, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979); Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 3111, 77 L.Ed.2d 1366 (1983). Additionally, if a defendant has concealed facts that are critical to a cause of action, then the statute of limitations is tolled until plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered his claim. Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.1983). A plaintiff with knowledge of one claim but deprived of information critical to another claim may still invoke these tolls to save the claims about which he could not have known. See Barrett v. U.S., 689 F.2d at 329-30; see also Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 33-34 (D.C.Cir.1984); Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 70 (D.C.Cir.1981). Ordinarily, whether or not a plaintiff knew or should have known the critical facts of the challenged claim is a question of fact, not susceptible of resolution on a motion for summary judgment. See Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.1979); Guccione v. U.S., 670 F.Supp. 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir.1988).

Plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to create issues of fact as to the availability of deferred accrual or a fraudulent concealment toll on all of their claims. As to each claim against the officer defendants, plaintiffs have made possible a finding that: 1) the defendant concealed critical information from the plaintiff; 2) the concealment prevented plaintiff from discovering his claim within the limitations period; and 3) plaintiff could not have discovered his claim in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 633 F.Supp. 1423 (S.D.N.Y.1986).

Plaintiffs' pleadings and supporting materials show that the arresting officers may have concealed critical information from each plaintiff, preventing discovery of claims, even in the exercise of reasonable diligence. The officers repeatedly represented to plaintiffs that complaining witnesses had initiated the arrests, and that the witnesses would appear in court to prosecute. These misrepresentations may have prevented plaintiffs from discovering that they had been falsely arrested, because, while they knew they were innocent, they nevertheless could believe that their arrests were the result of the claimed witnesses' misperceptions and consequently were supported by probable cause. Cf. Deary v. Three Unnamed Police Officers, 746 F.2d at 200 ...