Yeager v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | 3:14-cv-00023 JWS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
| Parties | Brandi Yeager, Plaintiff, v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, Defendant. |
[Re: Motion at Docket 24]
At docket 24 defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company ("PIIC") moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Brandi Yeager ("Yeager") responds at docket 30. PIIC replies at docket 38. Oral argument was not requested and would not assist the court.
This case presents claims arising from a 2012 automobile collision between Yeager and Hope Jackson ("Jackson"). At the time of the collision Yeager was employed by Safe and Fear-Free Environment, Inc. ("SAFE"), an organization that assists victims of domestic violence and sexual assault in the Bristol Bay area. Yeager was on "back-up duty" that night, meaning that she was required to be available torespond to calls from individuals in crisis if SAFE's on-duty employee needed assistance.1 According to SAFE, while Yeager was performing this duty "she had access to the SAFE vehicle and permission to use it for her back-up duties."2 The exact scope of this permission is in dispute. SAFE's "Director Services Coordinator," Karen Carpenter ("Carpenter"), stated that SAFE allows its employees performing "back-up" or "on-call" duty to use the SAFE vehicle if they "don't happen to have a personal vehicle" or if they need to transport clients.3 For example, Carpenter stated that Yeager could have used the vehicle if she "had to go out on call," if she had to come into work, or if she had to go to court on the weekend.4
On the night of the collision Yeager drove the SAFE vehicle to a bar where she consumed alcohol. After leaving the bar Yeager's blood alcohol content ("BAC") was above the legal limit.5 Her vehicle collided with Jackson's, injuring herself, her passenger Wassily Kyakwok ("Kyakwok"), Jackson, and Jackson's passenger. SAFE terminated Yeager's employment the next day stating that Yeager had used SAFE'svehicle "for personal use without authorization" and drove it while intoxicated "in violation of state law and SAFE's policies."6
Kyakwok brought a negligence action against Yeager in state court.7 Yeager's responsive pleading includes a "counterclaim"8 against PIIC in which she alleges that she is entitled to a declaration that she is owed benefits pursuant to the uninsured motorist ("UIM") and medical payments coverage found in SAFE's automobile insurance policy with PIIC ("the Policy").9 PIIC removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.10 The case was then severed—Kyakwok's negligence claim against Yeager was remanded to state court, and this court retained jurisdiction over Yeager's declaratory judgment claim against PIIC.11 PIIC now moves for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."12 The materiality requirement ensures that "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."13 Ultimately, "summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such thata reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."14 However, summary judgment is mandated under Rule 56(c) "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."15
The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.16 Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, the moving party need not present evidence to show that summary judgment is warranted; it need only point out the lack of any genuine dispute as to material fact.17 Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.18 All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed for purposes of summary judgment, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant.19 However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.20
The parties agree that Yeager is an "insured" under the Policy's UIM endorsement because she was occupying a covered automobile at the time of thecrash.21 PIIC argues that Yeager's claim is nevertheless precluded by the UIM endorsement's Exclusion C.7 ("the exclusion clause"), which states that UIM coverage "does not apply to . . . [a]nyone using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so."22 Yeager disagrees, arguing that the exclusion clause is void because it violates Alaska statutory law and, alternatively, the clause does not apply under the facts of this case.
Yeager argues that the exclusion clause is void because it violates AS 28.20.440(b) and AS 21.96.020(c). The first statute is part of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act ("MVSRA"), codified as Title 28, chapter 20, of the Alaska Statutes.23 All automobile policies issued in Alaska must meet the content requirements imposed by the MVSRA.24 Among other things, the requirements found at AS 28.20.440(b) provide that every liability policy must (1) insure the named insured, "and every other person using the vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the . . . use of the vehicle.;"25 and (2) contain uninsured motorist coverage for the protection of persons insured under the policy who are legally entitled to recover damages from uninsured motorists for damages arising out of the use of the uninsured motor vehicle.26
The second statute, AS 21.96.020(c), is part of the Alaska Insurance Act, which also "sets out 'required motor vehicle coverage' in Alaska."27 The statute "prescribes requirements partly by referring to provisions of two other statutes, the [MVSRA] and the Alaska Mandatory Automobile Insurance Act."28 Relevant to this case, AS 21.96.020(c) requires automobile liability insurers to offer UIM coverage "prescribed in AS 28.20.440 and AS 28.20.445 or AS 28.22."29
Yeager's first statutory argument relies on both AS 21.96.020 and AS 28.20.440. She argues that AS 21.96.020(c) requires PIIC to offer UIM coverage to every person using a covered vehicle with permission of the named insured, and AS 28.20.440(b)(2) provides that such coverage must exist for damages arising out of any "use" of the vehicle.30 She concludes that the exclusion clause violates these two statutes because it "purports to limit what uses are covered."31 Yeager's argument relies on Kalenka v. Invinity Insurance Companies.32 There, the insurer's policy limited the covered uses to those that are "the main cause of a bodily injury or property damage."33 The Alaska Supreme Court held that this limitation is void because it reduces the scope of coverage below the statutory minimum, which does not limit the scope of coverage depending on the type of "use" that caused the damages.34
Kalenka does not control here. There, the court held that the only causes of damages that insurers may exclude from liability coverage are those which do not arise from the "ownership, maintenance, or use" of a vehicle.35 The exclusion clause here does not purport to limit coverage based on the "use" that caused damages. Instead, it purports to limit coverage based on the user. Alaska law permits insurers to provide UIM coverage only to the named insured and permissive users.36 The real question presented here is whether the exclusion clause limits the covered users below what is required by Alaska law.
Yeager's next argument focuses on that very question. Yeager argues that the exclusion clause is void because it focuses on the user's "reasonable belief" and not his or her actual permission, as is required under AS 28.20.440(b). Courts considering similar arguments have reached divergent conclusions; at least one court ruled that the clause impermissibly limits the scope of coverage,37 and at least one other upheld the clause because it expands the required coverage.38 The Alaska Supreme Court has yet to weigh in.
The court concludes that only the second of these three interpretations is consistent with the coverage...
To continue reading
Request your trial