Yeatts v. Murray, 940635

• Decision Date: 03 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 940635,940635
• Citation: 455 S.E.2d 18,249 Va. 285
• Parties: Ronald Dale YEATTS v. Edward W. MURRAY, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 18

455 S.E.2d 18

249 Va. 285

Ronald Dale YEATTS v. Edward W. MURRAY, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.

Record No. 940635.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

March 3, 1995.

Gerald T. Zerkin, Richmond (Melanie A. Hopper, Robert Godfrey, Gerald T. Zerkin & Associates, on briefs), for appellant.

Robert H. Anderson, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. (James S. Gilmore, III, Atty. Gen., Kathleen B. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

HASSELL, Justice.

Ronald Dale Yeatts was convicted of the capital murder and robbery of Ruby Meeks Dodson in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County and sentenced to death. We affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946, 112 S.Ct. 1500, 117 L.Ed.2d 639 (1992).

Yeatts filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court against Edward W. Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, asserting several claims of constitutional violations. Yeatts alleged, among other things, that his trial counsel were ineffective for numerous reasons. For example, Yeatts claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective by failing to: effectively challenge the Commonwealth's evidence relating to future dangerousness; obtain certain expert witnesses; contest certain expert testimony about Yeatts' mental condition; develop evidence in mitigation of the imposition of the death penalty; present an adequate closing argument and object to the Commonwealth's argument during the penalty phase of the proceedings; conduct adequate voir dire; properly cross-examine Yeatts' cohort in the robbery and murder of the victim; advise Yeatts to change his plea to guilty after the jury had returned the verdict; and demonstrate that juries in Virginia generally do not impose the death penalty for capital murder with a robbery predicate.

The respondent filed a motion to dismiss Yeatts' petition. The respondent's motion was supported by sworn affidavits submitted by Yeatts' trial counsel. These affidavits contained explanations for certain actions trial counsel took during Yeatts' capital murder trial. Yeatts filed a memorandum, supported by affidavits and exhibits, in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Yeatts' affidavits and exhibits were offered to rebut the explanations of his trial counsel. Yeatts also filed a motion to strike the affidavits of his trial counsel or for the entry of an order that would have permitted him to take the discovery depositions of the affiants.

The habeas court dismissed Yeatts' petition. The court held that all Yeatts' claims, except his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, were either procedurally defaulted or had been presented at trial and on direct appeal and, therefore, were not cognizable. The court held that Yeatts' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not meet the standards established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

We awarded Yeatts an appeal limited to the following issues: whether the trial court erred by denying Yeatts' motion to strike the affidavits or for discovery; and whether the trial court erred by dismissing Yeatts' petition for writ of habeas corpus without ordering an evidentiary hearing on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Yeatts argues that the habeas court erred by considering the respondent's affidavits. Yeatts contends that the habeas court lacks the authority to consider affidavits in support of a motion to dismiss a habeas petition. The respondent, however, argues that Code § 8.01-660 permits a habeas court to consider affidavits when deciding a motion to dismiss. We agree with the respondent.

Code § 8.01-660 states:

In the discretion of the court or judge before whom the petitioner is brought, the affidavits of witnesses taken by either party, on reasonable notice to the other, may be read as evidence.

In applying this statute, we observe "that the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction." Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983); accord Wilder v. Attorney General, 247 Va. 119, 124, 439 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1994); Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990).

The clear and unambiguous language in Code § 8.01-660 leads us to the inescapable conclusion that this statute permits a habeas court to consider the affidavit of any witness as substantive evidence. This is precisely what the court below did when it considered the affidavits submitted by Yeatts and the respondent. Indeed, in Walker v. Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 571, 299 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1983), we recognized that Code § 8.01-660 permits the use of affidavits in a habeas proceeding:

Using affidavits where appropriate (Code § 8.01-660) or a plenary hearing when necessary (Code § 8.01-662), the parties can produce a complete record, one that will permit an intelligent disposition of the habeas petition both in the trial court and on appeal. Of course, if the record of the criminal trial is sufficient itself to show the merit or lack of merit of a habeas petition, the case may be determined upon that record alone. Code § 8.01-654(B)(4).

We also observe that Code § 8.01-660, which permits the habeas court to use affidavits when deciding a motion to dismiss, is consistent with the collateral nature of a habeas corpus proceeding. The primary avenue for review of a conviction is a direct appeal. "When the process of direct review ... comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 1391-92, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). The state's dual interests of insuring the criminal defendant of his right to a fair trial as required by the federal and state constitutions and the sovereign's need to punish offenders and achieve finality in judgments permit a habeas court "to minimize the burdens to all concerned through the use of affidavits or other simplifying procedures." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986).

Yeatts argues that "[d]ismissal of a habeas petition without a hearing is authorized only by § 8.01-654(B)(4)," which, he says, "clearly refers to the...