Yeend v. Weeks

• Decision Date: 10 August 1894
• Citation: 16 So. 165,104 Ala. 331
• Parties: YEEND v. WEEKS ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

16 So. 165

104 Ala. 331

YEEND v. WEEKS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

August 10, 1894

Appeal from chancery court, Mobile county; William H. Tayloe Chancellor.

Bill by Thomas A. Yeend, administrator of George Brown, deceased against Dorval W. Weeks, Rosalie Weeks, Felix Andry, Joseph D. Weeks, and others. There was a decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Reversed.

The bill sought to have set aside as voluntary and fraudulent certain conveyances, executed by the said D. W. Weeks to each of the other respondents; and also a contribution from said D. W. Weeks of his share of the amount paid by the complainant on the administrator's bond of one Hall, and that the property so fraudulently conveyed be declared liable for the payment of such contribution. According to the allegations in the original bill, in July, 1884, John W. Hall was appointed administrator of the estate of Stephen Dowty deceased. George Brown and Dorval W. Weeks were the sureties on his administration bond. In March, 1890, William Dowty, a minor, and the only heir at law of Stephen Dowty, deceased filed his bill in the chancery court by his next friend against the said Hall as administrator as aforesaid, and also against said George Brown and D. W. Weeks, as sureties of said Hall, charging that Hall had improperly administered the assets that came to his hand as administrator, and had committed numerous devastavits, and asking for a decree against the said Hall and his said sureties on account of said devastavits. On January 30, 1892, the chancery court of Mobile county rendered a decree in said cause in favor of the complainant Dowty and against the said defendants, for the sum of $4,000 and costs. Subsequent to the rendition of said decree the defendant George Brown died, and the appellant in the case at bar, Thomas A. Yeend, became the administrator of his estate; and on May 16, 1893, filed his bill in Mobile chancery court against Dorval W. Weeks as his cosurety on the administration bond of said Hall, deceased, alleging the rendition of the above-mentioned decree in said cause of William Dowty against John W. Hall, George Brown et al., and also alleging the payment by his intestate, George Brown, of said decree for $4,000 and costs. The right of contribution sought by the complainant's bill is based upon the above-mentioned decree rendered in the case of Dowty against Hall to ascertain the devastavits by Hall, as administration aforesaid, and upon the payment in full by said Brown, as cosurety on the bond of said Hall, of the money ascertained to be due by said decree. Appellant's bill also alleges that on November 30, 1892, he, as administrator of said Brown, deceased, recovered a judgment in the Baldwin county circuit court against the said Dorval W. Weeks as his cosurety on the said bond of John W. Hall for the sum of $2,133.34. The bill then charges that the said Dorval W. Weeks, being the owner of certain personal and real property described therein, made fraudulent transfers and conveyances of the same for the purpose of escaping liability as one of the sureties of said Hall, administrator; that Felix Andry, and one Rosalie Weeks, wife of D. W. Weeks, participated in this fraudulent scheme for the purpose of aiding the said D. W. Weeks in carrying out his design, and to this end, the said Felix Andry received a conveyance from the said Weeks and wife of date August 16, 1887, conveying certain lands, and that on September 24, 1887, the said Andry, by deed, conveyed said land to said Rosalie Weeks, and that while these conveyances recited cash considerations, in fact there was no consideration at all and that the purchase money named was simulated; that on August 20, 1887, said Dorval W. Weeks made a bill of sale to his wife conveying certain sheep and cattle for an expressed consideration, but that this was also simulated and that the conveyance was in fact gratuitous and made for the purpose of putting his property beyond the reach of the law; that said D. W. Weeks also made a fraudulent conveyance of certain land owned by him to his son, Joseph D. Weeks, who took said conveyance with a knowledge of his father's fraudulent purpose. In their answer to the bill the defendants deny the allegations of fraud and collusion made therein, and allege good faith, honesty and fairness in the several transactions, and the defendants Andry and Rosalie Weeks deny a knowledge of the facts that said D. W. Weeks was a surety on the bond of said Hall, as administrator. The complainant examined no witness, and on the hearing of the cause, offered in evidence the record and proceedings in the said cause of Dowty against Hall and others, including the final decree therein, and the duly-certified transcript in the circuit court of Baldwin county of the record and proceedings in the case of Thomas A. Yeend against Dorval W. Weeks, wherein judgment was rendered against the defendant on November 30, 1892. Objection was made by the respondents to the admissibility of said records and proceedings as evidence against the respondents Felix Andry and Rosalie Weeks and Joseph D. Weeks. These objections were based upon the ground that as the deed from D. W. Weeks to Andry, and the deed from Andry to Rosalie Weeks, antedated the filing of the said bill of William Dowty against Hall and others, and antedated the judgment in the circuit court, the records, proceedings, judgments and decrees in that case were as to these defendants res inter alios acta, and that, therefore, they cannot be bound by any fact ascertained or determined in said cause but are entitled to have their day in court and contest the liability of Hall as surety on the charge of waste and devastavit. On the submission of the cause, on the pleadings and proof, the chancellor decreed that the objections to the admissibility in evidence of the records, proceedings, judgments and decrees in the cases above referred to were well taken; and that the proceedings in said cause cannot be evidence against any of the parties to this cause, except the said D. W. Weeks; and that, therefore, no proof having been made of the payment of said decree by said Brown, the complainant had failed to make out his case, and accordingly dismissed the bill. After the submission of the cause, the complainant made a motion that said submission be set aside and that he be allowed to take further testimony to establish the existence of the indebtedness for which he seeks to condemn the property described in said bill; and this motion was submitted for decree on the affidavit of the receiver in said cause, which showed that said Brown had paid the judgment recovered. This motion was overruled in the final decree of the chancellor.

Gregory L. & H. T. Smith, for appellant.

Pillans, Torrey & Hanaw, for appellees.

HARALSON J.

1. When one makes a conveyance of his property on a consideration which is merely good, as contradistinguished from one which is valuable, it is without effect, inoperative and voidable against any debt the grantor may owe at the time of its execution, and this, without reference to the good intentions of the parties, and the solvency or insolvency of the grantor, at the time of the execution of the conveyance. Such a conveyance, when not tainted with actual fraud, is void only as to antecedent debts; but, if made with an intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, which is actual fraud, it is void as to subsequent, as well as to existing creditors. Dickson v. McLarney (Ala.) 12 So. 401; Seals v. Robinson, 75 Ala. 364; Kirksey v. Snedecor, 60 Ala. 197; Huggins v. Perrine, 30 Ala. 396.

2. Only those persons whose rights are interfered with,-who are injured by conveyances alleged to be fraudulent,-have the right to interfere to set them aside. Strangers have no interest, and, therefore no right, to question their validity; and, between the parties and their privies, they are valid. When one aggrieved by such a conveyance calls its validity in question, and moves to set it aside, the parties claiming under the gift or conveyance may dispute his claim by demanding that he shall prove himself to be a creditor of the grantor or donor, with a valid, subsisting debt against him. The fact of primary importance in such a proceeding,-whether it be to set aside the conveyance, as constructively fraudulent, and therefore voidable as against past-due debts, or actually fraudulent, and voidable as to future, as well as to past obligations,-is the existence of a debt, for the payment of which, except for the conveyance, the property transferred could be made liable. The grantee in the conveyance must have an opportunity to dispute the debt, and may plead any defense, not merely personal, which the grantor or debtor could have made against it. Troy v. Smith, 33 Ala. 469; Half-man v. Ellison, 51 Ala. 544; Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 520; Lawson v. Warehouse Co., 73 Ala. 292, and authorities supra.

3. The decisions of this court also establish the principle, that "no alienee, grantee, or assignee is bound or affected by a judgment or decree rendered in a suit against the alienor, grantor, or assignor subsequent to the alienation grant or assignment; for the plain reason, that otherwise his rights of property could be divested without his consent, and the fraud or laches of the grantor, could work a forfeiture of estates he had created by the most solemn conveyances." Coles v. Allen, 64 Ala. 106; Donley v. McKiernan, 62 Ala. 34; Floyd v. Ritter, 56 Ala. 359. But, this principle does not, in any wise, conflict with that other, that where a judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in the regular course of judicial proceeding, without fraud or collusion, it is conclusive evidence of the amount and existence of a...