Yellow Cab Co. of Providence v. Public Utility Hearing Bd., 1736

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROBERTS
• Citation: Yellow Cab Co. of Providence v. Public Utility Hearing Bd., 222 A.2d 361, 101 R.I. 296 (R.I. 1966)
• Decision Date: 14 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. 1736,1736
• Parties: YELLOW CAB CO. OF PROVIDENCE v. PUBLIC UTILITY HEARING BOARD. M.P.

Page 361

222 A.2d 361

101 R.I. 296

YELLOW CAB CO. OF PROVIDENCE v. PUBLIC UTILITY HEARING BOARD.

M.P. No. 1736.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Sept. 14, 1966.

[101 R.I. 299] Albert J. Hoban, Providence, for petitioner.

J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Americo Campanella, Providence, for applicant.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the public utility hearing board ordering the issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity for the operation of two taxicabs within the city of Providence. The appeal was prosecuted pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956, § 39-5-14, which authorize any party in interest aggrieved by an order of the hearing board to appeal to the supreme court for a reversal of such order.

It is not disputed that the applications for the certificates in question were made by two individuals in 1962, each seeking authority to operate one taxicab within the said city of Providence. The applications were made under the pertinent provisions of § 39-14-3, were heard by the public utility administrator in July 1964, and were by him denied in a decision issued on November 9, 1964. From this decision the applicants appealed to the public utility hearing board under the provisions of § 39-5-9, and the board thereafter reversed the decision of the administrator and ordered the certificates to issue. It is from that decision that petitioner is prosecuting the instant appeal in this court.

Before us the applicants argue, in substance, that this court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal prosecuted from the decision of the hearing board pursuant to § 39-5-14, that statute having been repealed by necessary implication when in 1962 the legislature enacted the administrative procedures act, so called, G.L.1956, chap. 35 of title 42. They direct our attention particularly to § 42-35-15 of that act, which provides that final decisions of administrative agencies shall be afforded a judicial review in the superior court. In our opinion there is merit in this contention.

The administrative procedures act became effective on January 1, 1964 and provides that any person who, having exhausted the administrative remedies made available to him within an agency, and who is aggrieved by a final decision of such agency may institute proceedings for such judicial review by filing in the superior court a bill of complaint within thirty days after the mailing of notice of the final decision of the agency. We are constrained to conclude that said § 42-35-15 furnishes a method for obtaining judicial review of administrative decisions that must be followed, barring peculiar circumstances, when the...