Yellow Cab Co. v. Price

• Decision Date: 18 June 1943
• Docket Number: No. 4963.,4963.
• Citation: 50 F. Supp. 730
• Parties: YELLOW CAB CO. v. PRICE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

50 F. Supp. 730

YELLOW CAB CO. v. PRICE.

No. 4963.

District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

June 18, 1943.

Miller, Gorham, Wescott & Adams and Charles F. White, all of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Joseph D. Ryan, of Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

On August 27, 1936, Arlouine Price (hereinafter called counterclaimant) was injured while a passenger in a taxicab for hire, owned and operated by the Yellow Cab Company, a corporation (hereinafter called complainant), organized and existing under and by virtue of the Laws of the State of Maine.

The counterclaimant on March 4, 1937, filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County to recover damages for the injuries sustained.

On November 18, 1938, a jury returned a verdict in counterclaimant's favor assessing damages at $40,000.

On December 9, 1938, the trial court entered judgment on the verdict for $30,000, after a remittitur of $10,000 by the counterclaimant.

An appeal was taken from the judgment by the complainant to the Appellate Court of Illinois where, on May 28, 1940, it was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

The counterclaimant's petition for rehearing was denied on June 13, 1940. 305 Ill.App. 622, 27 N.E.2d 856. The Appellate Court then modified its opinion upon counterclaimant agreeing to a remittitur of $15,000.

On July 9, 1940, the Appellate Court entered judgment for $15,000 which was later satisfied.

On December 31, 1942, the complainant filed in this Court the complaint herein praying first, that the verdict and judgment of the Circuit Court and Appellate Court be vacated and set aside because of fraud supposed to have been committed by counterclaimant in describing her injuries in said Courts; second, that this Court then determine the actual damages sustained by the counterclaimant as a result of the alleged accident; and, third, that the Court enter a judgment in favor of complainant for the amount this Court finds the judgment of the Appellate Court exceeded the amount that should have been awarded the counterclaimant.

On February 3, 1943, the counterclaimant filed her answer, which included a counterclaim, praying the remittiturs given in the Circuit and Appellate Courts be vacated and set aside, and a judgment be entered on the verdict of the jury for $40,000, or in the alternative, the judgment of the Circuit and Appellate Courts be vacated and set aside and this Court determine the damages counterclaimant is entitled to receive as a result of the injuries she sustained in the above mentioned accident. The counterclaim contained two counts, the prayer for relief being the same in both counts.

On February 23, 1943, the complainant filed a reply to the answer of counterclaimant together with a motion to dismiss the counterclaim.

On March 1, 1943, the complainant filed its brief in support of its motion to dismiss the counterclaim. On March 22, 1943, a memorandum in opposition to the complainant's motion to dismiss the counterclaim was filed by counterclaimant, and on April 5, 1943, a reply brief was filed by complainant.

The counterclaimant made no motion to strike the complaint, being content to file an answer and a counterclaim.

The reply to the counterclaim prays for a dismissal for want of equity.

The Court, after considering the pleadings in this case, is of the opinion that the complaint and cross-complaint should be dismissed for want of equity. There are no facts alleged in either the complaint or cross-complaint which warrant the Court carrying the proceedings further for, at the threshold, it appears the parties herein are not entitled, as a matter of equity, to the relief prayed.

It is admitted by the pleadings that a judgment was entered by the Appellate Court of Illinois which has been fully satisfied by payment. There is no request herein for injunctive relief to restrain the enforcement of any judgments secured in the State Court. The elements essential to a cause in equity are not here present. The cause of action heretofore pending in the Circuit Court and reviewed by the Appellate Court has been terminated by the entry of the final judgment and its payment.

The circumstances under which a court of equity will set aside a judgment on the ground of fraud have been the source of much litigation both in the Federal and State Courts. Most, if not all, of these cases involve applications to the Court for relief against the enforcement of judgments.

The facts in this case are not similar to those in the case of Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Callicotte, 8 Cir., 267 F. 799, referred to in the briefs. In the Callicotte case the judgment was secured through a conspiracy to perpetrate a fraud upon the Court and the use of that agency in carrying out the fraud. The judgment entered on the verdict was reviewed and affirmed. The railway company in the lower Court attempted to invoke the writ of coram nobis and was denied the right. After the Supreme Court affirmed both judgments, 204 S.W. 528; 274 Mo. 689, 204 S.W. 529, a bill in equity was filed to restrain the enforcement of the judgment, the judgment being in existence unsatisfied.

In the instant case, the complainant, in reply to the answer filed by the counterclaimant, does not deny that the counterclaimant sustained an injury to her cervical spine, her left hip and lower back, but merely states that the injury was not severe. It does not deny that the counterclaimant was in a hospital for many months under the care of physicians furnished by it, and that the counterclaimant was examined by various physicians at "its behest", but contents itself by denying the materiality of the affirmative allegations found in the counterclaim.

It appears from the pleadings that when the counterclaimant procured a judgment for $40,000 it was reduced to $30,000 by reason of a remittitur being filed. It is evident the complainant was not satisfied with this figure and appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois. After the Appellate Court reversed the judgment, the complainant had the right and opportunity to have a re-trial of the issues because a petition for a rehearing was denied the counterclaimant. Evidently it did not choose to do this for when the Appellate Court reduced the judgment from $30,000 to $15,000 upon the counterclaimant filing a remittitur therein, it paid same. It is therefore evident from the pleadings that the complainant was then satisfied for two reasons: first, it did not appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois and, second, it paid the judgment.

Justice Sanborn speaking in Re National Surety Company v. State Bank, 8 Cir., 120 F. 593, at page 597, 61 L.R.A. 394, said: "Fraud, accident, and mistake are three great heads of equity jurisprudence; and whenever injustice or wrong, irremediable at...