Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 01 November 1944
• Docket Number: 11,12.
• Citation: 39 A.2d 546,183 Md. 546
• Parties: YELLOW CAB CO. v. HENDERSON (two cases).
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

39 A.2d 546

183 Md. 546

YELLOW CAB CO. v. HENDERSON (two cases).

Nos. 11, 12.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

November 1, 1944

Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1944.

Appeals from Baltimore City Court; John T. Tucker, Judge.

Action by Barbara J. Henderson, an infant, by Euell C. Henderson her father and next friend, against the Yellow Cab Company and another, for personal injuries sustained by the minor in an intersectional collision, and by Euell C. Henderson for loss of personal services and medical expenses incurred by reason of such injuries. Verdicts and judgments for plaintiffs as against the defendant named, and it appeals.

Judgments affirmed.

H Beale Rollins and Samuel S. Smalkin, both of Baltimore, for appellant.

I. Duke Avnet and William Taft Feldman, both of Baltimore, for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, MELVIN BAILEY, CAPPER and HENDERSON, JJ.

BAILEY Judge.

The Yellow Cab Company has appealed from two judgments entered against it in the Baltimore City Court. In No. 11, the plaintiff, Barbara J. Henderson, a three-year-old child, by Euell C. Henderson, her father and next friend, sued Yellow Cab Company and Sun Cab Company, Inc., for personal injuries sustained by her in an accident on March 14, 1943, at the intersection of Broadway and North Avenue in Baltimore City. In No. 12, the plaintiff is the father, who sued the same defendants for loss of personal services and medical expenses incurred by reason of his daughter's injuries. The cases were consolidated and tried before a jury. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence the Court granted prayers for instructed verdicts in favor of the defendant, Sun Cab Company, Inc. The cases were subsequently submitted to the jury as to the other defendant, Yellow Cab Company. The verdicts of the jury being in favor of the plaintiffs, judgments were entered thereon against Yellow Cab Company and it is from these judgments that it has appealed.

At about six o'clock in the afternoon of March 14, 1943, Henderson, his wife and two daughters were passengers in a taxicab of the Sun Cab Company, which was proceeding in a northerly direction on Broadway. The four passengers were sitting on the rear seat with Henderson on the right and his daughter, Barbara, between his lega. As the taxicab was approaching North Avenue and when it was about 100 or 150 feet from the south side thereof, the driver stopped when hailed by a prospective passenger who was not taken on. As the taxicab started, the traffic light at the intersection changed from red to green. The Sun Cab was proceeding across the intersection on the green light at a medium rate of speed and had reached the northerly street car tracks on North Avenue when Henderson saw a Yellow Cab fifteen feet to his right driving in a westerly direction on North Avenue at 'a pretty good speed'. The Yellow Cab struck the Sun Cab on the right side between the two doors. As a result of the collision the infant plaintiff, Barbara Henderson, was thrown out of her father's arms and against the door.

Henderson further testified that Barbara had vomiting spells the night of the accident, and that, on the following day, her face was swollen, her left eye was completely closed and that there were cuts over the left eye and on her head.

The witness Braun, a traffic engineer with the Baltimore City Police Department, whose duty was the supervision, installation and maintenance of signs and signals, testified that the traffic signal at this intersection remained green on Broadway for a period of twenty-three seconds, with an additional amber light superimposed on the green for the last four seconds. There was no evidence in the record that the light was not working properly on the day of the accident.

The witness Tawney was walking west on the north side of North Avenue, east of Regester Street, when he heard an unusual noise behind him. Upon turning he saw the Yellow Cab coming at a speed of about forty miles an hour. He watched it until it reached Regester Street, and while he did not observe the cab between Regester Street and Broadway, he had taken only a few steps when the crash occurred. He proceeded immediately to the scene of the accident and found the driver of the Yellow Cab lying on his back between the two automobiles.

At the conclusion of the testimony the appellant offered prayers in both cases asking for instructed verdicts on the ground that there was no affirmative evidence of negligence on the part of the driver of the appellant's taxicab legally sufficient to require the submission of the cases to the jury. The prayers were rejected. This ruling of the trial court constitutes the fifty-fourth exception.

This Court has held repeatedly that a case will not be withdrawn from the jury for the want of legally sufficient evidence if there is any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove negligence, competent, pertinent and coming from a legal source, but that the weight and value of such evidence will be left to the jury. State v. Carroll-Howard Supply Co., Md., 37 A.2d 330; Taxicab Co. v. Hamburger, 146 Md. 122, 125 A. 914; Taxicab Co. v. Emanuel, 125 Md. 246, 93 A. 807; Geiselman v. Schmidt, 106 Md. 580, 585, 68 A. 202; Sun Cab Co. v. Reustle, 272 Md. 494, 192 A. 292. The evidence which we have outlined above meets this test. From it the jury could have found that there was negligence on the part of the driver of the Yellow Cab in entering the intersection on a red light or in driving at an unlawful rate of speed, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. We find that the Trial Court committed no error in rejecting the demurrer prayers.

The fifty-fifth exception embodies the appellant's objections to the Court's oral instruction to the Jury. These objections were not pressed in the appellant's brief or in its oral argument. We are, therefore, justified in treating this exception as abandoned. Rules and Regulations Respecting Appeals, Rule 39, Sec. 4, 1943 Supplement, Annotated Code of Maryland, p. 1175. However, we have examined the instruction and are of the opinion that it properly stated the law of the cases and that it fairly reviewed the evidence, with a reminder that the Jury are the judges of the fact. Feinglos v. Weiner, 181 Md. 38, 28 A.2d 577.

The fifty-sixth exception, relating to the preparation of the record, was abandoned by the appellant. The fifty-second exception complains of the Trial Court's action in refusing demurrer prayers at the close of the plaintiff's case, but since the appellant thereafter proceeded with its defense, it thereby waived its right to have this ruling reviewed. Poe, Pleading and Practice, Vol. 2, sec. 295 B, and cases there cited; Ashman, Directed Verdicts and Instructions, p. 173; Carroll v. Kerrigen, 173 Md. 627, 635, 197 A. 127.

The remaining exceptions, one to fifty-one inclusive, and fifty-three relate to the Trial Court's rulings on the evidence. We shall not attempt to discuss each of the exceptions separately. Many of them may be conveniently grouped and considered together. The first group embodies the appellant's objections to the testimony of Dr. Joseph S. Blum, who was the family physician and who attended Barbara on the night of the accident and thereafter until the day of the trial. His testimony is in part as follows: 'On March 14, I was called to attend Barbara Henderson, who had been a patient of mine for several years previous to that. As the family doctor, I have seen the family before, and particularly this child. I was told the child was in an accident, and received injuries, and examination disclosed that there were numerous signs of violence, such as abrasions or that is, discolorations and bruises, marks about the forehead and large discoloration around the left eye, with swelling and a lacerated or split upper lip, on the inside of the cheek, marks about both shoulders, the back and around the thighs. These were the external signs of violence. Besides these signs, the child was vomiting and crying with pain, complaining of headache. The vomiting and headache and limited motion of the arms lasted for a period of two weeks during which time I kept her under constant observation in bed. The vomiting has never subsided until the present time completely, because where formerly she had very little tendency to vomit, she has been vomiting, according to the complaint of the mother on numerous occasions since this episode. Another condition that has existed up to the present time is a noticeable drooping of the left lid. After the swelling had cleared up, this drooping of the left lid and an abnormal turning inward of the left eye-ball was noticed by myself on every occasion that I examined her since then the last being about two weeks ago. On the basis of these injuries I had her X-rayed about a week following the sustaining of these injuries and the report by an X-ray specialist was there was no fracture of the skull. External evidences of the injuries sustained had disappeared, but the eyelid drooping and the turning inward of the eyeball on certain directional movements of the head is still present.'

Dr. Blum further testified that the child had concussion of the brain and that the muscle over the left eye was damaged; that that there would be no permanent injuries as a consequence of the concussion; but that the damage to the muscle over the left eye had caused a drooping of the upper lid which would be permanent; and that this permanent condition of the left eye was due to a blow or injury to the muscle supporting the upper lid received by her in the accident on March 14, 1943.

All of this testimony was objected to by the appellant on the ground that the symptoms...