Yellow Robe v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF SDRS

• Decision Date: 04 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 22392.,22392.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: Glenford YELLOW ROBE, Appellant, v. Appeal from the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellee.

664 N.W.2d 517

2003 SD 67

Glenford YELLOW ROBE, Appellant,

v.

Appeal from the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellee.

No. 22392.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs January 13, 2003.

Decided June 4, 2003.

Marcia Whiting, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorney for Appellant.

Wade A. Hubbard, South Dakota Retirement System, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorney for Appellee.

GORS, Circuit Judge.

[¶ 1.] Glenford Yellow Robe (Yellow Robe) applied for and was denied disability benefits by the South Dakota Retirement System (SDRS). Yellow Robe appealed and the circuit court affirmed the SDRS denial of disability. Yellow Robe appeals and we reverse.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Yellow Robe joined the Rapid City Police Department (Police Department), as a police officer, on February 1, 1985. On April 5, 1985, Yellow Robe obtained his law enforcement certification and became a Class B member of SDRS.

[¶ 3.] In September 1987, Yellow Robe injured his right knee while performing his duties as a police officer. The injury required surgery. Yellow Robe was put on temporary disability until January of 1989, at which time he returned to light duty with the Police Department. In 1990, Yellow Robe returned to full duty, but his physician would not release him to perform patrol duty. Thereafter, Yellow Robe tested and qualified for a detective's position with the Police Department.

[¶ 4.] While employed as a detective, Yellow Robe's right knee continued to bother him and his left knee also began to bother him. In June 1995, Yellow Robe failed to complete the required firearms qualification course because of his knee trouble. In addition, Yellow Robe re-injured his knee while trying to complete the course and again underwent knee surgery in July 1995. Two weeks after his surgery, Yellow Robe's physician allowed him to return to light duty with the Police Department. Yellow Robe was assigned a partial disability rating of 25%.

[¶ 5.] On October 25, 1995, Yellow Robe met with Police Department Captain Tieszen and Personnel Director Jack Teems. Yellow Robe was told that if his physician did not release him to full duty by December 31, 1995, he would not be able to continue on light duty as a detective. Yellow Robe was not released to full duty by his physician and consequently went on extended sick leave. It was clear that Yellow Robe would be terminated at the end of his sick leave.

[¶ 6.] After Yellow Robe started sick leave, Chief of Police Hennies created the position of license compliance officer for the Police Department. The position consisted primarily of office work and the license compliance officer was not required to pass the firearms qualifications test. The license compliance officer is a civilian employee of the Police Department and is a Class A member of SDRS.

[¶ 7.] Chief Hennies created the license compliance officer position with Yellow Robe in mind. The position was advertised, but an employee of the Rapid City Personnel Office telephoned Yellow Robe at home and informed him of the job opening. He was told that he should apply for the job and that if he did not take the job he would lose his retirement benefits. Yellow Robe was offered and accepted the job on May 1, 1996.

[¶ 8.] On the same day that Yellow Robe accepted the job, SDRS was notified that Yellow Robe had been reclassified from a Class B member to a Class A member. All of his medical and life insurance benefits, unused annual leave, and longevity benefits were transferred without disruption. On May 6, 1996, Yellow Robe applied for SDRS Class B disability benefits. Thereafter, on June 18, 1998, his disability benefits request was denied for the reason that his contributory service had not ended.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 9.] SDCL 1-26-36 governs the review of administrative law decisions and provides:

The court shall give great weight to the findings made and inferences drawn by an agency on question of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in light of the entire evidence in the record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

In accordance with this statute, we review questions of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Wendell v. South Dakota Dept. of Transp., 1998 SD 130, ¶ 5, 587 N.W.2d 595, 597. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Goebel v. Warner Transp., 2000 SD 79, ¶ 10, 612 N.W.2d 18, 21. "Conclusions of law, as well as mixed questions of fact and law that require the application of a legal standard, are fully reviewable." Cohen v. City of Pierre, 2002 SD 110, ¶ 10, 651 N.W.2d 265, 267 (quoting Weeks v. Valley Bank, 2000 SD 104, ¶ 8, 615 N.W.2d 179, 182).

[¶ 10.] Construction of statutes, Bergee v. South Dakota Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 2000 SD 35, ¶ 4, 608 N.W.2d 636, 638 (citing State v. Shadbolt, 1999 SD 15, ¶ 10, 590 N.W.2d 231, 233), and rules, Island v. Department of Corrections, 1996 SD 28, ¶ 8, 545 N.W.2d 201, 203; Nelson v. South Dakota Bd. of Dentistry, 464 N.W.2d 621 (S.D.1991), is a question of law reviewed de novo.

DECISION

[¶ 11.] The Hearing Examiner found that Yellow Robe qualified for disability as prescribed by ARSD 62:01:04:09. He found:

[t]he condition of Mr. Yellow Robe's knees constitutes a physical impairment diagnosed by a licensed physician, Dr. Anderson. Applicant's impairment is long term, and will continue without improvement. Due to his physical impairment the Applicant will never be able to serve as a sworn law enforcement officer for the Rapid City Police Department, or any other law enforcement agency.

The Hearing Examiner also found that "no comparable level of employment with the Rapid City Police Department exists for the Applicant."

[¶ 12.] Although the Hearing Examiner found Yellow Robe to be disabled as defined by SDCL 3-12-47(3), he recommended that Yellow Robe not receive disability benefits because "he has not terminated his employment with the Rapid City Police Department." The Hearing Examiner found that "the Applicant transferred to a different, and non-comparable job, with his employer."

[¶ 13.] In Matter of Schott, SDRS Case # 723625 (decided October 23, 1992), SDRS was presented with a strikingly similar case. Reiny Ray Schott was a senior patrolman with the Rapid City Police Department. He was injured and could no longer perform the duties of a city patrolman. Schott then transferred to the position of "evidence custodian" which was a civilian job with the Rapid City Police Department. Schott's disability application was initially denied by the SDRS Administrator but the Board reversed, finding that "[t]he applicant's contributory service with the System was terminated within the meaning of ARSD 62:01:04:02 effective as of January 1, 1992, because he no longer qualified for Class B membership and was reclassified as a Class A member." Schott ceased to be a Class B member so his contributory service in Class B was terminated even though he was still a contributing member to the system under Class A.

[¶ 14.] Yellow Robe argues that the doctrine of stare decisis mandates that the decision in his case follow the decision in Matter of Schott. However, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to administrative determinations:

"In the judicial setting, previously decided questions of law involving similar fact situations often provide precedential value, embodying the concept of stare decisis. Both federal and state courts have repeatedly noted, however, that administrative agencies are not bound by stare decisis as it applies to previous agency decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, `An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in circumstances.'"

Interstate Telephone Cooperative, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of South Dakota, 518 N.W.2d 749, 752-753 (S.D.1994)(citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc., v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2874, 77 L.Ed.2d 443, 446 (1983) (citation omitted)). See also City of Alma v. United States, 744 F.Supp. 1546, 1561 (S.D.Ga.1990)

("An agency is not forever bound by its prior determinations, as its view of what is in the public interest may change, even if the circumstances do not.").

[¶ 15.] Although stare decisis does not apply, the legislature has enacted its substantial equivalent in SDCL 3-12-100 which provides the following:

The board of trustees shall set the criteria for determining the disability of members. Methods of disability determination shall be applied uniformly and consistently to all members applying for the disability benefits."

(emphasis added). SDCL 3-12-100 does not mean an agency is married to a decision forever. Times change and there are good reasons for an agency to divorce itself from an earlier decision. However, absent a sound reason for changing treatment of claimants in the same situation, SDCL 3-12-100 requires the agency to continue to treat similar claimants similarly.

[¶ 16.] The SDRS Board's decision to deny Yellow Robe's application was based solely on the determination that the law relating to Yellow Robe's claim was changed by the 1992 amendment to SDCL 3-12-98 and the subsequent amendment of the SDRS administrative rules. No other reasons were given for treating Yellow Robe different from Schott. However, examination of the 1992 ...