Yellowstone County v. Pease

• Decision Date: 11 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-36026,95-36026
• Citation: 96 F.3d 1169
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6795, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,103 YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl PEASE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1169

96 F.3d 1169

36 Fed.R.Serv.3d 169, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6795,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,103

YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carl PEASE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-36026.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 7, 1996.

Decided Sept. 11, 1996.

D. Michael Eakin, Montana Legal Services, Billings, MT, for defendant-appellant.

Harley R. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, MT, for plaintiff-appellee.

Dale T. White, Fredericks, Pelcyger, Hester & White, Boulder, CO, for amicus Crow Tribe.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Jack D. Shanstrom, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-00131-JDS.

Before: WRIGHT, BEEZER and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether an Indian tribal court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action challenging a county's right to impose property taxes on reservation land held in fee by a member of the tribe.

I

Carl Pease, a member of the Crow Tribe of Indians ("the Tribe") in Montana, appeals from the district court's summary judgment for Yellowstone County (the "County") in the County's action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Crow Tribal Court exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling that Pease was not required to pay property taxes imposed by the County.

Pease owns fee title to real property located within the boundaries of the Crow Reservation. The property was allotted and patented in fee to Pease's father under the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751. ¹

Pease has failed to pay his state property taxes from 1987 to the present. In July 1991, he filed an action in Crow Tribal Court seeking to enjoin Yellowstone County from imposing state property taxes on his land. The parties agreed to stay the tribal court action pending the Supreme Court's decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992) (holding that states could impose an ad valorem property tax on fee land that had been allotted under the General Allotment Act). After the Court decided Yakima, the tribal court lifted the stay. The parties stipulated to the facts and submitted cross motions for summary judgment. The tribal court concluded that Montana's Constitution bars the County from imposing taxes on Pease's land, and enjoined the County from issuing a tax deed or tax sale certificate. The County appealed to the Crow Court of Appeal, which held that the Crow tribal courts had jurisdiction of the case and that the County could not tax Pease's land because it was allotted under the Crow Allotment Act, not the General Allotment Act.

The County brought an action in federal district court seeking a declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over Pease's case and that the County could tax Pease's land. The County later withdrew its request for a declaration that the County could tax Pease's land. ² Relying on Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), the district court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, holding that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Yellowstone County v. Pease, No. CV 94-131-BLG-JDS (D.Mont. July 26, 1995) (memorandum and order). The district court granted the County's unopposed motion for entry of final judgment, and entered judgment on September 13, 1995, thus vacating the tribal court decisions. Pease timely filed a notice of appeal.

II

As a threshold matter, we reject Pease's contentions that the district court (1) should have dismissed the County's action for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, and (2) abused its discretion in failing to conclude that the Crow Tribe is an indispensable party.

A

In National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a party must exhaust tribal court remedies before a federal district court may entertain a challenge to tribal jurisdiction. Id. at 857, 105 S.Ct. at 2454; see Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19, 107 S.Ct. 971, 978, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) ("National Farmers Union requires that the issue of jurisdiction be resolved by the Tribal Courts in the first instance"). The Supreme Court concluded that the congressional policy of supporting tribal self-government "favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge." National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856, 105 S.Ct. at 2454 (footnote omitted).

Although Pease concedes that "the [C]ounty exhausted tribal remedies," he contends that the County's failure to challenge tribal jurisdiction before filing its tribal appellate reply brief deprived the tribal court of a "full opportunity" to consider the jurisdictional issue and to develop a "full record." See id. at 856-57, 105 S.Ct. at 2454. The district court rejected Pease's contention, and concluded that the County exhausted its tribal remedies because "the Crow Court of Appeals ruled on its jurisdiction."

Pease's contention lacks merit. As this court has stated: "Once all tribal remedies are exhausted and the tribal courts finally decide that tribal jurisdiction exists, then the district court can decide the question of tribal jurisdiction." Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1227 (9th Cir.1989) (citing National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 852, 105 S.Ct. at 2451-52). Here, the tribal court clearly had a "full opportunity" to consider the jurisdictional issue because the Crow Court of Appeals actually and finally decided that tribal jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the County exhausted tribal court remedies.

B

We are also unpersuaded by Pease's contention that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the "Crow Tribe is not an indispensable party, and [that] the Tribe would be bound by a judgment of this Court."

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, a non-party is "indispensable" to an action if (1) the non-party is "necessary" under Rule 19(a); (2) the non-party cannot be joined (due to sovereign immunity, for example); and (3) the non-party's absence would mandate dismissal according to a weighing of the factors outlined in Rule 19(b). Because we conclude that the Tribe is not a necessary party, we need not advance to steps two and three.

This court undertakes a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a non-party is necessary under Rule 19(a). ³ If a non-party satisfies either of the two prongs, the non-party is necessary. First, we determine whether "complete relief" is possible among those already parties to the suit. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir.1990); see also Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500, 1501 (9th Cir.1991) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The relevant question for Rule 19(a) must be whether success in the litigation can afford the plaintiffs the relief for which they have prayed."). Second, we decide whether the non-party has a "legally protected interest in the suit." Makah, 910 F.2d at 558.

Pease contends that the County should have sued the Tribe or the tribal court because "it is the actions of the tribal court that the County seeks to void." Pease maintains that the County cannot obtain complete relief without joining the Tribe because the "Crow Tribe could continue to assert its jurisdiction and enforce the judgment of its court if it is not made a party to the action." Pease also contends that the Tribe has a legally protected interest in its "right to maintain a court system that can determine the rights of a tribal member and Yellowstone County to real property on the reservation."

Pease's contention that the district court's judgment is not binding on the Tribe is without merit for several reasons. First, the County's challenge to the tribal court's jurisdiction raises a federal question that is clearly within the jurisdiction of a federal district court. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir.1990) (citations omitted) ("[F]ederal courts are the final arbiters of federal law, and the question of tribal court jurisdiction is a federal question."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 1404, 113 L.Ed.2d 459 (1991); see National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 852, 105 S.Ct. at 2451-52. Second, it is not necessary to join the tribal court as a party to Pease's suit for the simple reason that tribal judges, like state judges, are expected to comply with binding pronouncements of the federal courts. See, e.g., In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.1982) (citations omitted) ("it is ordinarily presumed that judges will comply with a declaration of a statute's unconstitutionality without further compulsion"); James v. Jones, 148 F.R.D. 196, 203 (W.D.Ky.1993) (holding that state judges were not necessary parties to action challenging constitutionality of state laws relating to detention of juveniles). Accordingly, the district court provided complete relief to the County for the purposes of Rule 19(a).

Pease's contention that the tribal court has a legally protected interest in maintaining a court system that adjudicates property rights is also without merit. First, this case is not about the Tribe's right to tax reservation lands; rather, this action arose from Pease's claim that the County, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, is powerless to tax his fee-patented property. Second, concluding that courts are necessary parties under Rule 19(a) whenever their jurisdiction is challenged would lead to absurd results. Clearly, the County can seek to have the...