Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond
Decision Date | 12 July 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 8198,8198 |
Parties | YELLOWSTONE PIPE LINE COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James A. DRUMMOND and Dorothy Drummond, his wife, James A. Drummond, Trustee of King Mining Company, a Kentucky corporation, and Emil Bouwens and Stephanie Bouwens, his wife, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Robert J. Fanning, Kellogg, Edward J. Crowley, Spokane, Wash., for appellants.
H. J. Hull & Sons, Wallace, for respondent.
On March 25, 1954, respondent filed its amended complaint seeking to condemn a right-of-way for a pipeline across certain mining claims owned by appellants or in which they claim an interest. Respondent seeks a right-of-way 50 feet wide during construction of its proposed pipeline and 20 feet wide permanently thereafter. Its proposed pipeline is for the purpose of transporting petroleum and petroleum products from Montana across the State of Idaho to Spokane, Washington, as a distributing point. Part of such materials are to be hauled back by truck from the distributing point to retail outlets in Idaho.
On April 12, 1954, respondent filed a motion for an order permitting respondent to take immediate possession of the right-of-way sought to be condemned. This motion was based upon the affidavit of Piatt Hull, attorney for respondent, as to the necessity for immediate possession of the right-of-way by respondent for construction of its pipeline, and upon the affidavit of one William Zanetti made on behalf of respondent wherein affiant appraises the value of the easement sought to be condemned at the sum of $46.25 with accruing damages in the sum of $1,300. On the same day respondent purportedly served and filed notice of such motion. In such notice it was stated that on April 17, 1954, respondent would move the court for an order permitting respondent to take possession of the premises sought to be condemned pending a completion of the action as provided in Section 7-717, I.C., Chapter 252, Session Laws of 1953.
On April 17, 1954, the court denied the motions of appellants to quash service of notice of motion for possession. Thereupon, the court proceeded over the objection of appellants to take testimony introduced by respondent in support of its motion for possession. Appellants introduced no testimony although they filed an affidavit as to value and damages.
On May 7, 1954, the trial court filed its order of possession whereby respondent was permitted to take immediate possession of the right-of-way sought to be condemned. The court found the value of the right-of-way to be $100 and the accruing damages to be $1,400. The order for possession was conditioned upon the deposit by respondent of $3,000, being double the amount of value and damages, with the clerk for the use and benefit of appellants before the taking possession of such right-of-way; and such order further provided for the filing of a $2,500 bond by respondent to cover any additional damages which might be eventually assessed. From such order of possession appellants have appealed to this court.
The principal contention made by appellants under their assignments of error is that Chapter 252, Session Laws of 1953, amending Section 7-717, I.C., is unconstitutional and void as it violates Article I, § 13, and Article I, § 14, of the Idaho Constitution. Having determined that appellants are correct in this contention, as hereinafter discussed and decided, it follows that the order of possession made by the trial court based upon the 1953 amendment is null and void. Thus it becomes unnecessary for us to consider the additional assignments of error contesting the service of notice, challenging the rulings and procedure of the trial court and attacking its findings of fact. It is likewise unnecessary to set out the additional parts of the record upon which the other assignments of error are based.
Section 7-717, I.C., prior to its amendment in 1953, provided for the appointment of three disinterested persons as commissioners to assess and determine, after a hearing, the damages which would arise by reason of the taking of the property sought to be condemned. Upon the payment of the amount of such damages to the landowner by the condemnor or the deposit of same with the clerk for the landowner's benefit if he refused to accept the same, an order could be made permitting the condemnor to take possession of and use the property pending the final outcome of the litigation. Section 7-717, I.C., was amended by Chapter 252, 1953 Session Laws, by deleting therefrom the provisions for the appointment of commissioners to assess damages and substituting in lieu thereof the following:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article I, § 13, of our constitution reads in part as follows:
'No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'
Article I, § 14, of our constitution reads in part as follows:
'Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor.'
At the outset, respondent admits in effect that the provision of the 1953 amendment purporting to vest title in the plaintiff upon the entry of the order for immediate possession and prior to the final determination and payment of just compensation, violates the constitution. Respondent urges, however, that such provision is contrary to the main body of the eminent domain statute, and should be held meaningless and be eliminated.
The real vice in the 1953 amendment is that it does not provide due process of law for the determination of the value of the land sought to be condemned and the damages arising from such condemnation and the payment thereof prior to the making of an order for possession, which results in the taking of the property before just compensation is paid therefor. Due process of law envisions an opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. In Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, at page 546, 207 P. 724, at page 727, the court said that 'due process of law is not necessarily satisfied by any process which the Legislature may by law provide, but by such process only as safeguards and protects the fundamental,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. C. B. Lauch Const. Co., 8414
...the construction given our statute in the Brown case would render it of doubtful constitutionality. In Yellowstone Pipe Line Company v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288, we held the 1953 amendment to § 7-717, I.C., was unconstitutional insofar as it attempted to vest title in the condemn......
-
Easterling v. HAL Pac. Props.
... ... 680, 684 ... (1916) (logging roads); Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v ... Drummond , 77 Idaho 36, 44, 287 P.2d 288, 293 ... ...
-
Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co.
...v. Fiesta Motel, supra; Bear Lake County v. Budge, 9 Idaho 703, 711-12, 75 P. 614, 616-17 (1904); see Yellowstone Pipeline Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 43, 287 P.2d 288, 293 (1955). However, because no judgment was entered against IGCP, the question of whether the joinder of IGCP violated ......
-
Easterling v. Hal Pac. Props., L.P.
...Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co. , 28 Idaho 556, 558, 155 P. 680, 684 (1916) (logging roads); Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond , 77 Idaho 36, 44, 287 P.2d 288, 293 (1955) (pipelines); Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson , 12 Idaho 769, 775, 88 P. 426, 427 (1906) (condemning twelve a......