Yepa v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't

• Decision Date: 29 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 35,453.,33,101.,35,453.
• Citation: 358 P.3d 268
• Parties: Myron G. YEPA, Petitioner–Appellee, v. STATE of New Mexico TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, Motor Vehicle Division, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

358 P.3d 268

Myron G. YEPA, Petitioner–Appellee

v.STATE of New Mexico TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, Motor Vehicle Division, Respondent–Appellant.

33,101.

No. 35,453.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

June 29, 2015.

Certiorari Denied, Aug. 25, 2015,

Southwest Indian Law Clinic, Barbara Creel, Supervising Attorney, Veronica C. Gonzales, Law Student, Heidi J. Todacheene, Law Student, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Taxation and Revenue Department, Legal Services Bureau, Peter A. Breen, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} On appeal, we are presented with the question whether the application of the ignition interlock requirement set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 66–5–33.1 (2009), to an individual whose license was revoked prior to the effective date of the amendment, violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. As a preliminary matter, we hold that the district court properly had jurisdiction of this case involving a constitutional challenge because it raised a purely legal issue not requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. On the merits, because we conclude that the amendment was not penal for the purposes of ex post facto constitutional analysis, we hold that there was no constitutional violation. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

{2} Petitioner Myron G. Yepa was arrested for aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (DWI) in New Mexico on September 7, 2008. As a consequence, effective September 27, 2008, the Taxation and Revenue Department, Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) revoked his license for a period of six months pursuant to the Implied Consent Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 66–8–105 to –112 (1978, as amended through 2007). The criminal charge against Yepa was dismissed on December 10, 2008, and he became eligible for license reinstatement under the Implied Consent Act on March 28, 2009. At that time, no ignition interlock requirement existed as a prerequisite to license reinstatement. However, effective July 1, 2009, the Legislature amended the statutory license reinstatement requirements to include a minimum of six months of driving with an ignition interlock device before reinstatement of a revoked license. Section 66–5–33.1(B)(4) (the 2009 amendment). Yepa did not request reinstatement of his license until after the amendment came into effect. MVD applied the ignition interlock requirement and denied the request as a result of Yepa's failure to comply.

{3} Yepa subsequently filed the underlying action in district court, seeking a declaration that the ignition interlock requirement was improperly applied to him. The district court ultimately concluded that MVD's application of the 2009 amendment to Yepa constituted a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. This appeal followed.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

{4} We initially address a jurisdictional question. MVD argues that Yepa should have challenged the denial of his request for reinstatement of his license by pursuing an administrative appeal. In light of his failure to do so, MVD contends that the underlying action should have been dismissed.

{5} According to MVD, NMSA 1978, Section 66–2–17 (1995) provides an exclusive statutory remedy for any party aggrieved by any licensing decision. That statutory section sets forth the administrative appeals process. Under Section 66–2–17(A), “any person may dispute” the denial of a license pursuant to the administrative appeals procedure outlined in subsequent portions of the statute, “[u]nless a more specific provision for review exist [s].” Section 66–2–17(I) specifies as follows:

No court of this state has jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding by any person in which the person calls into question the application to that person of any provision of the Motor Vehicle Code, except as a consequence of the appeal by that person to the district court from the action and order of the secretary or hearing officer as provided for in this section.

{6} We agree with MVD in its basic premise. “Under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, where relief is available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed.” Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007–NMSC–055, ¶ 26, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). However, when the matter at issue is purely legal and requires no specialized agency factfinding, and there is no exclusive statutory remedy, “it is a proper matter for a declaratory judgment action and does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.” New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Shoobridge, 2010–NMSC–049, ¶ 12, 149 N.M. 42, 243 P.3d 746.

{7} The district court based its ruling on the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The ruling involved a purely legal issue that did not require specialized agency factfinding. The only facts found by the district court were uncontested and concerned the relevant dates underlying the constitutional challenge. As a consequence, exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required. Smith, 2007–NMSC–055, ¶ 27, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300.

{8} The proposition that a purely legal ruling may be pursued in a declaratory judgment action without administrative review is particularly valid in the circumstances of this case in which the issue involved is a constitutional challenge to the Implied Consent Act. See Schuster v. State of N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2012–NMSC–025, ¶¶ 19, 22, 283 P.3d 288 (holding that MVD is statutorily required to evaluate the constitutionality of arrests); Maso v. State of N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004–NMCA–025, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276 (observing that constitutional questions are generally beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of MVD), aff'd, 2004–NMSC–028, 136 N.M. 161, 96 P.3d 286. We are aware of no statutory provision or case law, and MVD has cited none, suggesting that MVD is vested with subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional questions such as the ex post facto challenge presented in this case. See Pickett Ranch, LLC v. Curry, 2006–NMCA–082, ¶ 45, 140 N.M. 49, 139 P.3d 209 (stating that when no supporting 3 authority for a proposition is cited, this Court may assume that no applicable or analogous authority exists). To the extent that MVD invites us to recognize such sweeping authority in the absence of statutory delegation, we deem it imprudent. See Kilmer v. Goodwin, 2004–NMCA–122, ¶ 24, 136 N.M. 440, 99 P.3d 690 (“[A]n administrative agency may not exercise authority beyond the powers that have been granted to it.”); Collyer v. State of N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1996–NMCA–029, ¶ 6, 121 N.M. 477, 913 P.2d 665 (“MVD is vested only with the power to administer and enforce the Motor Vehicle Code as provided by law.”).

{9} MVD cites Alvarez v. State of N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1999–NMCA–006, 126 N.M. 490, 971 P.2d 1280, in support of its position. In that case, the plaintiffs filed a complaint, seeking a declaration that they were entitled to have their driving privileges restored. Id. ¶ 3. However, the plaintiffs had not applied for or been denied license reinstatement. Id. ¶ 10. Applying Section 66–2–17, we held that the action for declaratory judgment was improper, insofar as the plaintiffs had failed to pursue “the mandated administrative steps necessary to vest jurisdiction in the district court.”Alvarez, 1999–NMCA–006, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 490, 971 P.2d 1280.

{10} Two significant considerations render this case distinguishable. First, unlike the Alvarez plaintiffs, Yepa applied for license reinstatement, and the request was denied. Accordingly, MVD has rendered a decision, such that ripeness is not a concern. See generally U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm'n, 1998–NMSC–032, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 798, 965 P.2d 917 (observing that the doctrine of ripeness “serves to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); New Energy Econ., 2010–NMSC–049, ¶ 17, 149 N.M. 42, 243 P.3d 746 (“One of the prerequisites of ... a declaratory judgment action is that ... the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.” (second omission in original) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

{11} Second, the arguments advanced by the Alvarez plaintiffs do not appear to have implicated constitutional principles beyond the scope of MVD's authority. As we have discussed, this distinction is significant in view of MVD's authority to address constitutional issues.

{12} Constitutional challenges that are beyond the scope of MVD's authority are properly brought before the district courts. See Schuster, 2012–NMSC–025, ¶ 21, 283 P.3d 288 (“[A]ny constitutional challenge beyond MVD's scope of statutory review is brought for the first time in district court under its original jurisdiction.”). As a result, exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required for the district court to rule on the purely legal issue of the ex post facto application of the 2009 amendment to a previous incident triggering a license revocation. See Smith, 2007–NMSC–055, ¶ 27, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300 (holding that because a pure question of law was presented that would have been futile to pursue through the administrative appeals process, exhaustion was not required); State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, Inc., 1973–NMSC–087, ¶ 29, 85 N.M. 521, 514 P.2d 40 (“The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does...