Yerkes v. Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1879
• Parties: JAMES H. YERKES, Respondent, v. KEOKUK NORTHERN LINE PACKET COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

7 Mo.App. 265

JAMES H. YERKES, Respondent,

v.KEOKUK NORTHERN LINE PACKET COMPANY, Appellant.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

May 27, 1879.

1. The breaking of a paddle-wheel of a steamboat, by which a passenger was injured, raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier.

2. Carriers are bound to exercise the highest degree of care which a prudent man would use, and to adopt all precautions which have been practically tested and are known to be of value; but are not bound to have machinery constructed of the “most perfect material,” and in the “most perfect manner which care and diligence can suggest,” consistent with the construction and operation of their boats.

APPEAL from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Reversed and remanded.

GLOVER & SHEPLEY, for appellant: Under the facts in this case the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, there being no evidence of negligence.-- Curtis v. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 534; Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79; Stokes v. Salstonstall, 13 Pet. 192; Carpue v. Railway Co., 5 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 747; Laing v. Colder, 8 Barb. 479; Deyo v. Railroad Co., 34 N. Y. 9; Brehm v. Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 256; 12 N. Y. 236. The burden of proving negligence is on the plaintiff.-- Smith v. Railroad Co., 37 Mo. 286; Nolan v. Shickle, 3 Mo. App. 300. Where the plaintiff's evidence shows that the accident was the result of internal defects not discernible, or deficiencies unavoidable by the exercise of the utmost care and diligence, it fails to furnish any proof whatever of negligence, and there is no presumption of law or fact concerning it.-- Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1; 2 Greenl. on Ev., sect. 222. A railway company is bound to use the best precautions in known practical use, but not every possible precaution which the highest scientific skill, according to speculative evidence, might have suggested.-- Steinwig v. Railroad Co., 43 N. Y. 123; Fuller v. Talbot, 23 Ill. 357.

HARRIS & JOY, for respondent: An injury to a passenger occasioned by the breaking of part of the machinery or appliances of the common carrier makes a primâ facie case of negligence against the carrier sufficient to shift the burden of proof.-- Higgins v. Railways Co., 36 Mo. 432; 1 Redf. on Rys. 559; Dunim v. Railroad Co., 5 L. T. (N. S.) 682; Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79. The carrier is bound not only to extraordinary care in the management of the conveyance, but also in the construction and subsidiary arrangements.-- McElroy v. Railroad Co., 4 Cush. 400; Knight v. Railroad Co., 56 Me. 243; Nicholson v. Railway Co., 3 Hurl. & Colt. 534; Ford v. Railway Co., 2 Fost. & Fin. 732; Philadelphia & Reading R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 486; Edwards v. Lord, 49 Me. 279.

LEWIS, P. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant was a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting passengers and freight, for hire, in steamboats on the Mississippi River. Plaintiff was a passenger on board of the Minnesota, one of defendant's boats, and, while she was running, was seated in the water-closet directly in front of the larboard wheel, with his back toward the wheel. There was a thin partition, or bulkhead, between the wheel and the water-closet. A sudden breakage occurred in the periphery of the revolving wheel; its fragments were dashed through the partition, and the plaintiff was struck upon the back with a force that drove him through the closed door of the closet and into the gangway outside. His bodily injuries were so severe as to require his confinement under surgical treatment for several weeks, and as to leave his system in a diseased and enfeebled condition, which, according to the testimony of medical experts, is likely to continue through the plaintiff's life. Plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment in this suit, for $3,000 damages.

The defendant complains that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the evidence. It is insisted that there was no evidence whatever of negligence on the part of defendant or its employees. Counsel present a careful review of the cases in which it has been held that the fact of the injury to a passenger raises a presumption of negligence in the carrier, and shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. The conclusion is reached that the presumption arises, not from the injury alone, but from the circumstances which caused it, and because, in the language of Ruggles, J., “it generally happens that the same evidence which proves the injury done, proves also the defendant's negligence, or shows circumstances from which a strong presumption of negligence arises, and which casts on the defendant the burden of disproving it.” Holbrook v. Railroad Co., 2 Kern. 236.

The doctrine is correct, but the difficulty lies in the application. What are the “circumstances” from which the strong presumption of negligence arises? In all the cases reviewed, they are found to consist of defects or malperformance in some of the means or agencies used by the carrier for effecting the transportation. The displacement of a railroad switch, the spreading or breaking of the rails, the flying off of the wheel of a coach, the intoxication of a driver, the breach in an embankment, resulting from heavy rains--in short, any deficiency in aids or materials, however recent in origin, or even if simultaneous in appearance with the accident, has been found sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendant carrier. Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 192; Carpue v. Railroad Co., 5 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 747; Laing v. Colder, 8 Barr, 479; Curtis v. Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 534. An example suggested in Holbrook v. Railroad Company, 12 N. Y. 236, clearly illustrates the difference between two classes of cases, thus: “A passenger's leg is broken while on his passage in a railroad car. This mere fact is no evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier, until something further be shown. If the witness who swears to the injury testifies also that it was caused by a coach in a collision with another train of cars belonging to the same carriers, the presumption of negligence immediately arises; not, however, from the fact that the leg was broken, but from the circumstances attending the fact. On the other hand, if the witness who proves the injury swears that at the moment when it happened he heard the report of a gun outside of the car, and found a bullet in the fractured limb, the presumption would be against the negligence of the carrier. It is incorrect, therefore, to say that the negligence of the carrier is to be presumed from the mere fact that any injury has been done to the plaintiff. The presumption arises from the cause of the injury, or from other circumstances attending it, and not from the injury itself.”

Here we have a test, easy of application, in the distinction between causes and circumstances developed in and from the vehicle, or any aid or apparatus used by the carrier, and causes of injury which approach from something outside, and wholly independent of the carrier's means of operating. Such a test, in the present instance, clearly establishes a prima facie case against the defendant. The cause of the plaintiff's injury is traced to nothing beyond the breaking of the paddle-wheel. This was sufficient for the plaintiff. It raised a presumption of negligence on the part of these whose duty it was to see that everything was in order, and “free from any defect which the utmost vigilance, aided by the highest...