Yim v. Lizarraga, Case No. 16-cv-03610-WHO (PR)
Decision Date | 26 June 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-03610-WHO (PR) |
Parties | ROBERT D. YIM, Petitioner, v. JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Petitioner Robert Yim seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions for murder and attempted murder on the grounds that (i) the trial court violated his right to self-representation; (ii) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (iii) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance.1 Because Claims (i) and (ii) lack merit, they are DENIED. The ineffective assistance claims are DISMISSED as untimely. But even if I were to review the merits of the dismissed claims, they would be denied.
In 2010, Yim shot Samuel Nava in the head, killing him. (Ans., Dkt. No. 23-8 State Appellate Opinion) at 79.)2 The facts were crisply summarized by the state appellatecourt:
An Alameda County Superior Court jury found Yim guilty of the second degree murder of Nava, and of the attempted murder of the three others. It also found true a sentencing enhancement allegation. (Id. at 79-80.) Yim was sentenced to 127 years to life in state prison. (Id. at 80.) On appeal, his sentence was reduced to 87 years to life, but his appeal was otherwise denied. His other attempts to overturn his conviction were unsuccessful. This federal habeas petition followed.
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),this Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.
On the day of sentencing, Yim asked for the substitution of counsel on grounds that he wanted to file a motion for a new trial, which his current counsel declined to do. (Ans., Dkt. No. 23-8 at 84.) The court found the motion untimely and that Yim had receivedadequate representation. (Id.) Yim asked to represent himself and to file his new trial motion. (Id.) The court acknowledged his self-representation request and directed the clerk to file the new trial motion. (Id. at 84-85.) It appears from the transcript that the trial court sentenced him without ruling on the motions. (Id. at 84.) The clerk's docket and minutes indicate that the motions were denied. (Id. at 85.) Yim alleges the trial court violated his right to self-representation.
This claim was rejected on appeal. Yim first claimed that the self-representation motion was implicitly granted but that he was not allowed to exercise his right. This was unpersuasive. Even if his interpretation of the record was correct, he failed to show prejudicial error:
The record indicates no possibility that Yim would have received a more favorable outcome if he had been allowed to argue his new trial motion. The new trial motion was based on the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial attorney, which the court had already rejected after hearing from Yim during the Marsden [motion to substitute counsel] proceedings; Yim does not challenge this ruling or explain why the new trial motion might have been granted if Yim had argued it. Nor does the record indicate any possibility he would have received a more favorable outcome if he had represented himself at sentencing. Yim was given the opportunity to speak at the sentencing hearing, but he merely stated that he shot at Taylor's car to defend himself. In short, there is no probability that self-representation would have resulted in a new trial, a more lenient sentence, or any other outcome more favorable than what he obtained, so the error Yim alleges was harmless.
(Ans., Dkt. No. 23-8 at 87-88.)
Yim also claimed, in the alternative, that the motion was implicitly denied. This claim was rejected. A motion for self-representation at sentencing must be raised at a reasonable time before sentencing. Because Yim's motion was made on the day of sentencing, it was untimely. At that point, self-representation "is no longer a matter of right, but is subject to the court's discretion." (Id. at 88.) The trial court's implicit denial was thought harmless, for the reasons stated above. (Id. at 89.)
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Farettav. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). A defendant's request to represent himself must, however, be made in timely fashion; "a timeliness element in a Faretta request is clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court." Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[B]ecause the Supreme Court has not clearly established when a Faretta request is untimely," however, "other courts are free to do so as long as their standards comport with the Supreme Court's holding that a request 'weeks before trial' is timely." Id.
In Marshall, the defendant had made his Faretta request on the morning of trial. Marshall, 395 F.3d at 1061. The Ninth Circuit found no constitutional error in the state court's denial of the request. Id. (). In so holding, the Ninth Circuit further observed that the petitioner had "presented no facts to show that his last-minute request was reasonable," and that "he could have made his request much earlier than the day of trial." Id. at 1061.
Habeas relief is not warranted here. Yim's request was made on the day of sentencing, not, as required by Faretta, "weeks before trial." The state court reasonably denied his claim. See Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990) ( ); Ramirez v. Yates, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1118 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2014) (same). Because the state court's denial was reasonable, it is entitled to AEDPA deference. This claim is DENIED.
To the extent that Yim contends his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court implicitly denied or failed to hear his new trial motion, such claim is DENIED. There is no clearly established constitutional right to move for a new trial, or to have such a motion granted. "The Constitution itself, of course, makes no mention of new trials." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407 (1993) ( ) Rather, theright to file a new trial motion is a state statutory...
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