Yin v. Aguiar

Decision Date09 March 2020
Docket NumberSCWC-15-0000325
Citation463 P.3d 911
Parties JIJUN YIN, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant, v. P.I. AGUIAR, as Personal Representative of Virginio C. Aguiar, Jr., Deceased, Kevin Aguiar and Agee, Inc., Respondents/Defendants-Appellees.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Gary C. Zamber, Hilo, for petitioner

Sidney K. Ayabe, Gary S. Miyamoto, Honolulu, for respondents

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.

In this case, the Petitioner filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (circuit court) alleging that the Respondent's cattle trespassed onto his property causing damage to his sweet potato crop. In granting the Respondent's motion for summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that the Petitioner's land was neither "properly fenced" nor "unfenced," and therefore Hawai‘i's statutory law governing the trespass of livestock onto cultivated land did not apply to the Petitioner's property. Further, the circuit court determined that a provision in the Petitioner's lease, making the Petitioner fully responsible for keeping cattle out of his cultivated land, was not void against public policy. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment.

Upon review of the legislative history of the statutes that govern the trespass of livestock onto the cultivated land of another, we conclude that the legislature intended to hold owners of livestock liable for the damage caused by the trespass of their animals on cultivated land whether the land is properly fenced or not. Further, we determine that the lease provision in this case has the effect of absolving the Respondent of liability for livestock damage to Petitioner's cultivated land and therefore is contrary to statutory law and public policy, and it is thus invalid.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2009, Paradise Homes, LLC, entered into an eighteen-month lease ("lease") in which it agreed to lease fifty acres of land to Jijun Yin for agricultural purposes in the Pauka‘a area of the District of Hilo, Hawai‘i. Under the "Rent" subsection of the lease was a provision that stated, "Licensee is fully responsible [for] keeping cattle[ ] out of [their] crops." Additionally, one page of the lease was an unsigned and undated page that stated, "Remove all cattle[ ] across from my farmland. Do [n]ot raise cattle[ ] across from my [f]armland." In February 2010, another lease between Paradise Homes and Yin was executed, and the provision, stating "Licensee is fully responsible [for] keeping cattle[ ] out of [their] crops," was included in the 2010 lease.

On August 29, 2011, Yin filed a complaint ("complaint") against Virginio Aguiar, Jr.,1 Kevin Aguiar, and Agee, Inc. (collectively "the Aguiars"), who owned and pastured cattle near Yin's leased property. The complaint alleged that in September 2009, Kevin Aguiar "released and/or caused" cattle owned by the Aguiars to trespass onto Yin's leased property that resulted in the cattle eating some of Yin's sweet potato crop.2 Following this incident, the complaint contended, a meeting was held between Yin and Kevin Aguiar and Paradise Homes’ managing agent, Teresa Prekaski,3 and an agreement was reached that the Aguiars would prevent their cattle from trespassing onto the property possessed and farmed by Yin.

In March 2011, the complaint stated, Kevin Aguiar released more than 50 cattle in close proximity to Yin's property, resulting in the cattle trespassing onto Yin's property and destroying over 13 acres of Yin's sweet potato crop. After Yin removed the cattle from his property, the complaint alleged, Yin noticed that Kevin Aguiar had left open his gate and allowed his cattle to again trespass onto Yin's property. The complaint contended that the trespassing cattle caused more than $190,000 worth of damage, including the "loss of [Yin's] over 13 acres of sweet potato crop and damage to his fencing."

The complaint asserted that the Aguiars were strictly liable to Yin for the damage to his crops caused by the trespass of their cattle in accordance with statutory law. Yin also claimed that Kevin Aguiar knew or should have known that allowing the cattle outside of the fenced and gated area where he pastured the cattle would likely result in the cattle trespassing onto Yin's property and that his crops were destroyed as a direct and proximate result of the Aguiars' "willful, wanton, deliberate, intentional and/or negligent conduct."4

The Aguiars’ answer to the complaint admitted that a meeting occurred in September 2009 between Kevin Aguiar, Yin, and Prekaski after an incident on Yin's leased property, but the answer denied the essential allegations of the complaint. Additionally, the Aguiars raised numerous defenses, including failure to state a claim, comparative negligence, assumption of the risk, lack of notice, failure of Yin to mitigate damages, statute of limitations, laches, estoppel, waiver, and unclean hands. The Aguiars alleged that they exercised reasonable care at all times, and that their conduct was not a proximate cause of Yin's alleged damages.5 Thus, the Aguiars requested that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

After discovery was conducted, the Aguiars filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims. In a memorandum accompanying the motion, the Aguiars argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because, as a matter of law, they did not owe a duty to construct a cattle fence that prevented the cattle from entering Yin's land. Instead, the Aguiars contended, Yin was solely responsible for constructing a cattle fence because he assumed the duty when he leased the land; the Aguiars noted that Yin's lease specifically provided that "he ‘is fully responsible [for] keeping cattle[ ] out of [their] crops.’ "

The Aguiars also asserted that Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 142-63 did not prevent the entry of summary judgment in their favor because the statute did not apply to Yin's claims as "it is only applicable to claims involving trespass on ‘properly fenced cultivated ground[.] "6 Yin's property was not "properly fenced," the Aguiars contended, because "the fence was poorly constructed and did not prevent cattle from entering his land." Specifically, the Aguiars stated that Yin's fence was only two and one half to three feet tall and used hog wire instead of barbed wire. Because the fence was under four feet tall and used loosely-wound hog wire, it did not satisfy the definition of a "lawful fence" under HRS § 142-61, the Aguiars argued.7 Nor did HRS § 141-64 apply, contended the Aguiars, because the statute only applies to trespass claims on unfenced cultivated ground, and Yin's property was not unfenced.8 Thus, because they were not liable for Yin's alleged damages, the Aguiars concluded, they were entitled to summary judgment.

In his memorandum in opposition, Yin argued that the lease between himself and Prekaski was unenforceable because it was "contrary to the public good." Yin contended that Hawai‘i law supports the principle that courts should not enforce contracts contrary to public policy. (Citing Inlandboatmen's Union v. Sause Bros., Inc., 77 Hawai‘i 187, 196, 881 P.2d 1255, 1264 (App. 1994).) Yin argued that his lease violated an explicit public policy established by HRS §§ 142-63 and 142-64 that shifts the liability of livestock damage from the property owner to the livestock owner. Thus, cattle owners hold the burden to prevent their cattle from doing damage to adjacent farmland and are liable for the damage caused by their cattle, Yin concluded.

In reply, the Aguiars maintained that they were entitled to summary judgment because Yin did not raise any genuine dispute of material fact and his argument that his lease violated public policy was unsupported by the facts. Specifically, the Aguiars contended that neither the statutes nor public policy prevented Prekaski from requiring Yin to build a fence to protect his property because HRS §§ 142-63 and 142-64 do not prohibit landlords from requiring their tenants to construct fencing as part of lease agreements.

The circuit court granted the Aguiars’ motion and concluded that they met their burden of producing evidence that HRS §§ 142-63 and 142-64 did not apply because Yin's property was not "properly fenced" so as to prevent cattle from entering.9 And HRS § 142-64 did not apply, the court stated, because the land was not "unfenced." Further, the court concluded that the lease provision at issue was not void against public policy under the standards described in Inlandboatmen's Union because the provision only shifts the duty to fence from the rancher to the farmer by a contract on lands leased to them by a common lessor.10

The court's order granting summary judgment as to all claims was filed on March 27, 2015, and its order granting in part and denying in part the Aguiars’ motion for fees and costs was granted on June 9, 2015. The court issued its judgment on July 1, 2015, incorporating the rulings on these orders. Yin filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.

II. ICA PROCEEDINGS

On appeal, Yin argued that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Aguiars based on the court's erroneous interpretation of HRS §§ 142-63 and 142-64 and its conclusion that he had a contractual obligation to protect his crops from damage by trespassing cattle that precluded any liability on the part of the Aguiars. Yin contended that HRS §§ 142-63 and 142-64 taken together, impose liability for livestock damage to cultivated land, whether the land is legally fenced or not. This is bolstered by the statutes’ legislative history, Yin explained, as the statutes were amended to their present forms in 1975 with the intent to simplify determination of damages in animal trespass cases. Rather than combining the two statutes, the 1975 amendment was grafted onto the pre-existing statutes that divided liability according to whether or not the land was fenced, Yin argued....

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