Yoda v. State
| Decision Date | 06 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-19-00191-CR,11-19-00191-CR |
| Citation | 630 S.W.3d 470 |
| Parties | James Vincent YODA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Brent A. Morgan, Midland, for Appellant.
Laura Nodolf, District Attorney, Susannah E. Prucka, Assistant, Eric Kalenak, Assistant, for Appellee.
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
The jury convicted Appellant, James Vincent Yoda, of the offense of felony driving while intoxicated as enhanced by two prior misdemeanor DWI convictions: one from 2000 and the other from 2016. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2020). The State alleged two prior felony convictions for enhancement purposes. Appellant pleaded "true" to the prior felony convictions, and the trial court found both to be "true." The trial court assessed Appellant's punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of thirty-five years.
Appellant brings two issues on appeal. First, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress due to the challenged validity of the initial stop for speeding. Second, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a jury instruction, pursuant to Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, to disregard evidence presented if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether the evidence was obtained illegally or in violation of Appellant's constitutional rights. We affirm.
Around 2:15 a.m. on March 25, 2017, Deputy Blake Gibson of the Midland County Sheriff's Office saw Appellant cross in front of him on Front Street at a high rate of speed. Deputy Gibson stated that he was stationary, approximately ten feet from the intersection, when Appellant crossed in front of him. Deputy Gibson testified that "it took me a while to catch up" and that he had to accelerate to approximately 73 miles per hour to catch up to Appellant. The speed limit on Front Street in that area was 45 miles per hour. Deputy Gibson believed that Appellant was traveling approximately 60 to 70 miles per hour or at "highway speeds." Deputy Gibson testified that he was able to catch up to Appellant once Appellant slowed down, possibly due to seeing the patrol car approaching from behind. Appellant slowed to approximately 30 miles per hour until he was signaled to stop by Deputy Gibson.
Deputy Gibson testified that, from his own personal driving experiences, he estimated that Appellant was speeding. Deputy Gibson stated that he lacked the appropriate certification to activate and use radar to determine a vehicle's speed. Deputy Gibson testified that he had no scientific method for gauging Appellant's speed, and he admitted that he was not authorized to issue speeding tickets because a speeding ticket calls for an exact speed determination. Deputy Gibson also admitted that he had not received any specialized training on how to tell if a vehicle was speeding from a side vantage perspective. However, Deputy Gibson based his assessment on his own "experience driving [and knowing] that [Appellant was traveling] well over the posted speed limit" of 45 miles per hour, as well as knowing what a car traveling at 60 or 70 miles per hour would look like.
After pulling Appellant over, Deputy Gibson approached Appellant's vehicle, smelled alcohol, and saw a bottle of malt liquor inside. Appellant showed signs of impairment, including slurred speech, and admitted drinking alcohol at a local bar. Deputy Gibson testified that Appellant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and slurred speech and that he struggled to remove his license from his wallet. Deputy Ethan McKinney, who was going through training with the Midland County Sheriff's Office, was called to the scene to conduct the remainder of the traffic stop.
Deputy McKinney conducted the DWI portion of the investigation. Appellant admitted to Deputy McKinney that he had been drinking and said that he just wanted to go home. Appellant, when prompted by Deputy McKinney, struggled to touch the tip of a pen. Deputy McKinney testified that Appellant showed signs of intoxication while performing the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Appellant also showed signs of intoxication during the "walk-and-turn" test and the one-leg stand test. After receiving the proper statutory warnings, Appellant refused to give a breath sample. A warrant was obtained to draw Appellant's blood.
Nick Pierce, a forensic toxicologist with the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory, testified that Appellant's blood-alcohol level came back at 0.204, two and one-half times the legal limit. According to Pierce, this amount of alcohol would affect a person's mental faculties regardless of that person's experience with alcohol.
After the State rested, Appellant requested a jury instruction pursuant to Article 38.23. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2018). The trial court denied Appellant's request, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because Deputy Gibson lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop on Appellant's vehicle. Specifically, Appellant asserts that, "[a]s Appellant was detained solely based upon an officer's lay opinion conclusory statement [that] Appellant was exceeding the speed limit, Appellant's detention was unlawful." Thus, Appellant asserts that Deputy Gibson should not have conducted an investigative detention for any criminal act which he claims to have observed but about which he could do nothing. Therefore, it is Appellant's argument that any evidence against him, obtained as a result of the traffic stop, was unlawfully obtained. We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Brodnex v. State , 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; Turrubiate v. State , 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Martinez v. State , 348 S.W.3d 919, 922–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, especially when a trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Brodnex , 485 S.W.3d at 436 ; Crain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The same deference is afforded the trial court with respect to its rulings that concern the application of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns on the weight or credibility of the evidence. Brodnex , 485 S.W.3d at 436 ; see Lerma v. State , 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We review de novo whether the presented facts are sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion in a case. Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 190.
When the record is silent as to the reasons for the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, as in the case before us, we review the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, infer the necessary fact findings that support the trial court's ruling if the evidence supports those findings, and assume that the trial court made implicit findings to support its ruling. State v. Garcia-Cantu , 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ; see Wiede v. State , 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ; Carmouche v. State , 10 S.W.3d 323, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Maxwell v. State , 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As such, the trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. State v. Ross , 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ; Johnson v. State , 803 S.W.2d 272, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We will sustain the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress if it is supported by the record and if it is correct under any applicable theory of law. Lerma , 543 S.W.3d at 190 ; Ross , 32 S.W.3d at 855–56.
When, as here, the defense participates in the examination of witnesses at trial on issues pertinent to a pretrial motion to suppress or does not participate but also does not object to the subject matter of the testimony, the defendant has consensually relitigated the suppression issue. Rachal v. State , 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ; Hardesty v. State , 667 S.W.2d 130, 133 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ; Davis v. State , 74 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). Therefore, the trial court's pretrial ruling is assessed in light of the evidence at both the pretrial hearing and trial. Rachal , 917 S.W.2d at 809.
There are three different types of interactions between citizens and law enforcement officers: (1) consensual encounters; (2) investigatory detentions; and (3) arrests. State v. Woodard , 341 S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ; Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 111–12, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) ). Consensual encounters do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 411. Police officers may stop and request information from a citizen with no justification. Id. A citizen may terminate such a consensual encounter at will. Id. A citizen's acquiescence to an officer's request does not transform a consensual encounter into a detention or seizure, even if the officer does not communicate to the citizen that the officer's request for information may be ignored. Id. If a police officer through force or a showing of authority restrains a citizen's liberty, the...
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