Yoder v. Ferguson

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Murphy
• Citation: Yoder v. Ferguson, 885 N.E.2d 1060, 381 Ill.App.3d 353, 319 Ill. Dec. 380 (Ill. App. 2008)
• Decision Date: 06 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 1-04-3230.,No. 1-04-3214.,1-04-3214.,1-04-3230.
• Parties: Jerelyn YODER, Individually, and Jerelyn Yoder, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Teagan L. Yoder, Deceased, and Jerelyn Yoder, as Mother and Next Friend of Zachary S. Yoder, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James N. FERGUSON, Romar Transportation Systems, Inc., Ro-Mar Transportation Systems, Inc., Thomas I. Alexander, Jr., and Single Source Transportation Company, Defendants-Appellants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants; Mary Beth Marshall and Scott Yoder, Defendants and Third Party Defendants-Appellees, Ruan Leasing Company, Roy John Adler, Berg Grain and Produce, Inc., Rolling Plains, Inc., David Knoll, Kee Transport, Inc., The Midland Grocery Company, Roundy's Inc., Lawrence R. Heaney, and Robert J. Parks, Defendants; Joseph Rezetko, Defendant and Third-Party Defendant.

885 N.E.2d 1060

381 Ill.App.3d 353

Jerelyn YODER, Individually, and Jerelyn Yoder, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Teagan L. Yoder, Deceased, and Jerelyn Yoder, as Mother and Next Friend of Zachary S. Yoder, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James N. FERGUSON, Romar Transportation Systems, Inc., Ro-Mar Transportation Systems, Inc., Thomas I. Alexander, Jr., and Single Source Transportation Company, Defendants-Appellants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants Mary Beth Marshall and Scott Yoder, Defendants and Third Party Defendants-Appellees Ruan Leasing Company, Roy John Adler, Berg Grain and Produce, Inc., Rolling Plains, Inc., David Knoll, Kee Transport, Inc., The Midland Grocery Company, Roundy's Inc., Lawrence R. Heaney, and Robert J. Parks, Defendants Joseph Rezetko, Defendant and Third-Party Defendant.

No. 1-04-3214.

No. 1-04-3230.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

March 6, 2008.

Rehearing Denied April 3, 2008.

Paul J. Bargiel, P.C., Paul J. Bargiel and William Porter, Ernest Wagner, Chilton, Yambert, Porter & Young, LLP, Chicago, for Appellants Thomas I. Alexander, Jr. and Single Source Transportation Co.

John W. Patton (Trial Counsel), Patton & Ryan, and Michael J. Mullen (Trial Counsel), Kralovec & Marquard, Chtd., Clausen Miller P.C., Edward M. Kay, Barbara I. Michaelides, Paul V. Esposito, Agelo L. Reppas, Chicago, for Romar Transportation Systems, Inc. and James N. Ferguson.

Alan J. Brinkmeier, Merlo Kanofsky Brinkmeier & Gregg, Ltd., Chicago, for Mary Beth Marshall.

Bruce W. Lyon, Angie M. Grove, LaBarge, Campbell & Lyon, L.L.C., Chicago, for Scott Yoder.

Kevin P. Durkin, John T. Karnezis, Clifford Law Offices (Robert P. Sheridan, of counsel), Chicago, for Jerelyn Yoder.

Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the court:

This cause of action arises from a February 12, 1999, multivehicle accident just west of the Kishwaukee River Bridge (bridge) on westbound Interstate 90 near Rockford, Illinois. Plaintiff Jerelyn Yoder and her family were involved in the accident. Plaintiff's then-husband, defendant Scott Yoder (Scott), was driving their GMC Jimmy with plaintiff sitting in the passenger seat and their two children, Zachary and Teagan, in the backseat. Jerelyn and Scott suffered severe injuries in the accident. Zachary was profoundly disabled as a result of injuries suffered from the accident and Teagan was killed. Jerelyn brought suits individually, as next friend of Zachary, and as administrator of Teagan's estate (collectively, Jerelyn). Scott also brought suit against the same defendants.

Among others, Jerelyn named James Ferguson and his employer, Romar Transportation Systems, Inc. (Ferguson); Thomas Alexander and his employer, Single Source Transportation Company (Alexander); David Knoll and his employers, Kee Transport, Inc., and Roundy's, Inc. (Knoll); Mary Beth Marshall; Joseph Rezetko; and Scott as defendants. Scott named the same defendants in his suit and the cases were consolidated for trial. Prior to trial, Jerelyn entered into settlement agreements with Scott and Rezetko which were found to be made in good faith. Ferguson, Alexander, and other defendants filed contribution claims as well.

Following an eight-week trial, the jury found that Scott was at least 51% at fault and judgment was entered against him with respect to his claims. However, in Jerelyn's case, the jury found that Scott was not the sole cause of the accident. As a result of Jerelyn's settlement with Scott, he was not included on the verdict forms for the purpose of allocating fault and the jury entered a verdict for Jerelyn that totaled $38.3 million. The fault allocation was computed among Ferguson, Alexander, Knoll and Marshall. These consolidated appeals followed.¹

Ferguson argues: (1) the trial court erred by excluding the settling defendants from the jury fault allocation forms; (2) the exclusion of settling defendants pursuant to section 2-1117 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994)) violated due process and equal protection; (3) the jury's finding in Scott Yoder's case that he was 51% or more at fault in the accident is res judicata in this case; (4) the trial court erred in redacting a portion of Jerelyn's statement to a treating paramedic; (5) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury, and alternatively, and (6) the trial court erred in calculating setoff amounts with respect to Marshall's settlement.

Alexander adopts Ferguson's arguments above, except for the equal protection and due process argument, and advances additional arguments. Alexander asserts: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Jerelyn's settlements with Scott and Rezetko were in good faith; (3) the trial court erred in not allowing testimony of Alexander with respect to the speed of the Yoder vehicle; (4) the trial court erred in admitting opinion testimony not disclosed prior to trial; and (5) that the proceedings were tainted by juror misconduct. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Pretrial Motions

Prior to trial, numerous motions in limine were filed. At issue on appeal are three of Jerelyn's pretrial motions and one of Alexander's granted by the trial court. Motion in limine number 11 sought to bar any testimony or opinions on the speed of the Yoder vehicle based on physical damage to the vehicle sustained in the crash. In motion in limine number 14, Jerelyn sought to exclude any reference to Jerelyn's alleged postaccident statement to paramedic James Richmond that she "told that son-of-a-bitch to slow down." Finally following her settlement with Scott, in her trial brief, Jerelyn moved in limine to exclude parties that had settled in good faith from the fault allocation verdict forms.

In Alexander's motion in limine number 5, he moved to bar the testimony of expert Dr. John Wiechel, who completed a reconstruction of the accident and formulas ascertaining the braking coefficient and speed of various vehicles involved in the accident. Wiechel admitted during his deposition that several conclusions regarding Alexander were based on two hypotheticals and were entirely speculative. The trial court granted Alexander's motion and barred Wiechel from testifying to any opinions regarding Alexander that were based on speculation.

B. Pretrial Settlements

Scott settled Jerelyn's claims against him for the remainder of his policy limit of $500,000, or $469,000 after payment of his medical payment limit of $15,000 to Jerelyn and other settlements not at issue. Following Jerelyn's motion to exclude settling parties from the allocation forms, Rezetko settled with Jerelyn for $300,000. Over defendants' objection, the trial court found each settlement was fair and reasonable, constituting good-faith settlements pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/1 et seq. (West 2004)). Accordingly, the actions pending against Scott and Rezetko were dismissed with prejudice.

C. Trial Testimony and Evidence

1. Mary Beth Marshall and Mary Ann Miller

Mary Beth Marshall testified that on the day of the accident she and her coworker, Mary Ann Miller, were traveling westbound on Interstate 90 to her company's office in Rockford, Illinois. Marshall testified that it had snowed lightly, but after she passed the Belvidere toll plaza it began snowing heavily. Marshall testified that as she approached the bridge, the weather worsened to whiteout conditions— the worst conditions she had ever driven through.

Marshall testified that she was in the right-hand lane and slowed down to approximately 20 to 30 miles per hour because of poor visibility. As she approached the bridge, she was approximately one car length behind a tract or-trailer which began to fishtail. She did not lose control of her vehicle or lose traction as she continued to slow down; however, she felt that there was black ice on the bridge. When the truck regained control, Marshall moved slowly forward in the right lane and saw Rezetko's car in her rearview mirror prior to him rear-ending her vehicle. Marshall testified that she and Rezetko slowly came to a stop approximately 25 feet apart in the right lane of traffic. Marshall next saw a truck slowly glide to a stop with its trailer crossing the Interstate approximately six car lengths from Rezetko's car.

At this point, Marshall and Rezetko drove up to the next exit and got off the Interstate to exchange information. Marshall testified that her passenger had called the police before they drove up to the exit, but that she did not personally call the police. The police called Marshall three days later to discuss the accident. Miller's testimony was consistent with Marshall's.

2. Joseph Rezetko

Rezetko also testified that the weather turned dramatically worse after he passed the Belvidere oasis and approached the bridge. Rezetko testified that it became very windy and a light rain had turned into "like an ice" and then heavy snow. From Belvidere to the bridge, Rezetko slowed his vehicle from about 55 miles per hour to 35 to 40 miles per hour. Rezetko testified that the weather continued to deteriorate and he slowed further to about 15 to 20 miles per hour just before he reached the bridge.

Rezetko testified that he was driving in the right lane behind Marshall, who did not have her lights on. At the bridge, the weather worsened and Rezetko lost sight of Marshall's car until he saw her brake lights after he passed the bridge and realized that she was stopped. Rezetko pumped his brakes and then pushed the brake pedal hard but was unable to stop before rear-ending Marshall's vehicle. The two cars remained in the right lane and two cars passed in the left lane before Rezetko saw Ferguson's tractor-trailer slowly jackknife, coming to rest...