Yoder v. Ryan, No. 03 C 7508.

• Decision Date: 30 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03 C 7508.
• Citation: 318 F.Supp.2d 601
• Parties: C. Rodney YODER, Phil A. Yoder, Loren M. Yoder, Jennifer J. Moss, and Shirley Yoder, Plaintiffs, v. George H. RYAN, Linda Renee Baker, Stephen L. Hardy, Ph.D., Nageswararao Vallabhaneni, M.D., Daniel J. Cuneo, Ph.D., Percival Tiongson, M.D., Mirza S.A. Baig, M.D., Aikarakudy G. Alias, M.D., M.V. Reddy, M.D., Adolfo Callabio, M.D., Suresh Chand, M.D., Syed Hussain, M.D., Patricia Kelly, Dennis Headley, Darrell Williamson, Michael Burke, William A. Schuwerk, Jr., Fred Frederking, Jr., The Illinois Dept. of Human Servs., and Does 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Page 601

318 F.Supp.2d 601

C. Rodney YODER, Phil A. Yoder, Loren M. Yoder, Jennifer J. Moss, and Shirley Yoder, Plaintiffs, v. George H. RYAN, Linda Renee Baker, Stephen L. Hardy, Ph.D., Nageswararao Vallabhaneni, M.D., Daniel J. Cuneo, Ph.D., Percival Tiongson, M.D., Mirza S.A. Baig, M.D., Aikarakudy G. Alias, M.D., M.V. Reddy, M.D., Adolfo Callabio, M.D., Suresh Chand, M.D., Syed Hussain, M.D., Patricia Kelly, Dennis Headley, Darrell Williamson, Michael Burke, William A. Schuwerk, Jr., Fred Frederking, Jr., The Illinois Dept. of Human Servs., and Does 1-10, Defendants.

No. 03 C 7508.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois.

April 30, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stuart Randolph Kretchmar, Attorney at Law, Wilmette, IL, for plaintiffs.

Alison Irene Abel, Chicago, IL, Janet M. Fasano, Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BUCKLO, District Judge.

Plaintiffs C. Rodney Yoder and members of his family sue numerous officials, former officials, and departments of the state of Illinois in connection with an alleged conspiracy to wrongfully imprison Mr. Yoder. Three defendants move to dismiss the counts against them; the remaining defendants move to transfer the case to the Southern District of Illinois. I deny the motion to dismiss and grant the motion to transfer.

I.

Defendants Darrell Williamson and Michael Burke claim that as prosecutors, they are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Defendants correctly point out that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). However, the complaint alleges actions on the part of Mr. Williamson and Mr. Burke that go well beyond initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case. Specifically, they are alleged to have conspired to have Mr. Yoder assaulted by fellow inmates. These actions, if true, would be quite outside the prosecutorial sphere, and thus the absolute immunity of prosecutors as quasi-judicial officers would not apply. Insofar as the allegations go beyond prosecutorial activity, the defendants have not established that they are entitled to absolute immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

Defendant Fred Frederking, Jr. claims that as a sheriff, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which protects public officials from civil liability where their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir.2000). Mr. Frederking is accused of conspiring to prevent Mr. Yoder from practicing his religion, from communicating with the outside world, from compiling a legal defense, etc. These are clearly established rights any reasonable person would be aware of. Mr. Frederking has not established that he is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

The three defendants next argue that the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims alleged under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments must be dismissed under the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). That rule states that a state prisoner may not assert a § 1983 claim that implicates the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence unless he can show that the conviction or sentence has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. According to the plaintiffs, whose account is not disputed, Mr. Yoder has two criminal convictions, one in 1979 and one in 1990. However, the allegations of the pleading do not necessarily call the constitutionality of Mr. Yoder's convictions into question. Most of the alleged acts occurred well after the more recent conviction, and on their face, they go to the constitutionality of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Yoder's civil commitment, not his criminal convictions. As the defendants do not specify which aspects of Mr. Yoder's convictions would be compromised by which allegation, this argument fails.

Next, the three defendants allege that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine mandates dismissal of the claims against them. This doctrine "precludes lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that would require them to review a final judgment of a state court ... [or] claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court determinations." Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392 (7th Cir.2001). This doctrine is not applicable here. The defendants are accused of violating Mr. Yoder's constitutional rights. The fact that they did so in connection with a state court proceeding does not mean that this court is effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over the final determination of a state court. Id.

Defendants further argue that plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 fails because the complaint does not allege class-based discriminatory animus as a purpose of the conspiracy. The complaint alleges animus against the mentally ill on the part of the defendants. While this allegation could have been pleaded more clearly as part of the § 1985 count, it is sufficient to state a claim under that statute.

Defendants claim that they are protected by Illinois' Tort Immunity Act, which protects state employees from liability for injuries caused by an act or omission which is a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion. Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P'ship, 181 Ill.2d 335, 230 Ill.Dec. 11, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (1998). However, this immunity does not extend to the acts of a public employee which are (1) based on corrupt or malicious motives or (2) willful and wanton. Munizza v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill.App.3d 50, 164 Ill.Dec. 645, 583 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1991). As the acts described in the complaint are alleged to fit into both of these exceptions, this argument also fails.

Finally, defendants Williamson, Burke, and Frederking argue that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply Rules 8(a) and 8(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require the plaintiff to set forth a short and plain statement of the facts which entitle him to relief, and to make simple, concise, direct allegations. In the alternative, the defendants move that the...