Yoder v. Yoder

Decision Date06 January 1913
Docket Number219
Citation86 A. 523,239 Pa. 12
PartiesYoder, Appellant, v. Yoder
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued November 1, 1912

Appeal, No. 219, Oct. T., 1912, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., Fourth T., 1909, No. 756, on verdict for defendant in case of William B. Yoder v. Lorenzo T Yoder. Affirmed.

Trespass for false arrest. Before COHEN, J.

At the trial it appeared that on September 23, 1909, Lorenzo T Yoder was the proprietor of the Hotel Yoder in the City of Pittsburgh, and that William B. Yoder, his nephew, was manager of the hotel under a written contract by which his services were to be paid for out of a portion of the profits of the business. On September 23, 1909, a dispute arose between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the latter ordered the former to leave the premises. Upon the refusal of the plaintiff to obey the defendant sent for police officers who ejected him. The evidence for the defendant tended to show that while he ordered the plaintiff's removal from the building he did not direct his arrest. The officers locked him up.

The court charged in part as follows:

["I say to you, first, that if you find by the weight of the evidence that the defendant did not order this arrest, and did not order the plaintiff to be locked up, but merely directed the officers to remove him from the building, he was well within his rights, and you must find a verdict for the defendant."] (1)

Defendant presented these points:

2. That L. T. Yoder had the right in his discretion at any time to direct William B. Yoder, as his employee, to leave the hotel building, and if William B. Yoder refused or neglected to leave the building, as then directed by L. T. Yoder, that said L. T. Yoder had the right to remove William B. Yoder from the premises by force, or, at his option, procure an officer to remove him. Answer. Affirmed. (2)

3. That L. T. Yoder, as the owner of Hotel Yoder, and as the employer of William B. Yoder, had the right to direct him to leave Hotel Yoder, and if William B. Yoder, when so directed to leave refused to obey such direction and L. T. Yoder procured an officer and directed that William B. Yoder be removed from the building, it is immaterial that L. T. Yoder failed to appear at the station house and make a charge against William B. Yoder. Answer.

Affirmed if jury find from the evidence defendant did not order the arrest and imprisonment. (3)

5. If the jury believe from the evidence that all that L. T. Yoder directed the officers called to the Hotel Yoder to remove therefrom William B. Yoder, was, to remove said William B Yoder from the premises, without any direction to lock him up or without any statement that said L. T. Yoder would appear against William B. Yoder, then L. T. Yoder is not responsible for any misunderstanding that the officers may have had with relation to direction to locking him up and is not responsible for the detention of said William B. Yoder in Inpector Bartley's office. Answer. Affirmed. (4)

7. That the contract, Exhibit 1, offered in evidence by the plaintiff, to which the plaintiff and Lorenzo T. Yoder are parties, is one of employment only and constituted L. T. Yoder the employer of William B. Yoder in and about Hotel Yoder during the term of said contract, and said William B. Yoder was bound to obey the directions of L. T. Yoder concerning said employment. Answer. Affirmed. (5)

8. That William B. Yoder, when he was directed by L. T. Yoder to leave Hotel Yoder, was bound to do so, notwithstanding the existence of his contract of employment with L. T. Yoder and what his opinion of his rights were under that contract. His failure to obey the direction to leave made him a trespasser at Hotel Yoder, liable to be removed by force or through the assistance of an officer at the discretion of L. T. Yoder. Answer.

Affirmed as qualified by any terms pertaining to said employment contained in said contract. (6)

Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

Errors assigned were (1-6) above instructions quoting them.

The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.

W. H. S. Thomson, with him Frank Thomson and John W. Dunkle, for appellant. -- There was no termination or breach of the contract so long as both parties were treating it as in force: Cobb v. Hall, 33 Vt. 233; Mersey Steel & Iron Co. v. Naylor, L.R. 9 Q.B. Div. 648.

Telling plaintiff to leave the premises did not make him a trespasser. If he was first discharged, then he might become a trespasser after a proper request or order to leave: Smith v. Pierce, 110 Mass. 35.

If plaintiff was where he had a right to be under his contract, the order to leave was neither lawful nor reasonable: Lichtenwallner v. Laubach, 105 Pa. 366; Burk v. Howley, 179 Pa. 539; Cassidy v. Janauschek, 17 Philadelphia 325; Walbridge v. Pruden, 102 Pa. 1.

Under the testimony of the defendant himself, his instructions to the officers to remove the plaintiff because he was a trespasser, made these officers his agents and that he was liable in damages for the consequences of what they did, within the general scope of the orders given them: Harris v. Louisville, Etc., R.R. Co., 35 Fed. Repr. 116; Corbett v. Ry. Co., 42 Hun. (N.Y.) 587; Rown v. R.R. Co., 34 Hun. (N.Y.) 471.

A. M. Neeper, for appellee. -- In removing the employee from the premises after notice to go and refusal to leave, appellee had the option of

1. Personally and manually removing the appellant, with proper force, from the premises; or

2. Employing other employees or police force at his direction to remove the appellant from the premises: Newkirk v Sabler, 9 Barb. (N.Y.) 652; Sloan v. Schomaker, 136 Pa. 382; Commonwealth v. Ribert, 144 Pa. 413; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 2 Parson's ...

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