Yolton v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1951
• Citation: 368 Pa. 429,84 A.2d 501
• Parties: YOLTON v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

84 A.2d 501

368 Pa. 429

YOLTON v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 13, 1951

Action by Richard Yolton against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for injuries sustained by plaintiff when his automobile collided with a train of defendant at a grade crossing at night. From a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County at No. 394, August term, 1948, Roy I Carson, J., granting a motion of defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for plaintiff for $37,500, the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, No. 161, March term 1949, Per Curiam, affirmed the judgment on the opinion of the lower court holding that plaintiff failed to establish any negligence of the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.

George I. Bloom, Michael Hanna and Bloom, Bloom & Yard, all of Washington, for appellant.

Marriner, Wiley & Marriner, Rufus S. Marriner and Stephen D. Marriner, all of Washington, for appellee.

Before DREW, C. J., and STERN, STEARNE, JONES, BELL, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.

The part of the opinion of Judge Carson on which the judgment was affirmed follows:

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and for judgment n o. v. within the required time after the jury rendered a verdict for $37,500 in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. We shall first consider the motion for judgment n. o. v. It must be remembered in disposing the motion for judgment n. o. v. that the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Riefer v. Niehl Transportation Company, 309 Pa. 251, 252, 163 A. 529; Elbell, Administrator v. Smith, 357 Pa. 490, 491, 55 A.2d 321.

The plaintiff, Richard Yolton, 23 years of age at the time of the accident, had lived in the vicinity of the accident until about six years ago, when he entered the military service and thereafter established his residence in California. He had returned for a visit and on the night of May 15th, 1948 at approximately 12:30 a. m. was operating his automobile from Burgettstown toward McDonald via a state highway.

Plaintiff produced testimony to show that immediately before the accident he had been traveling at a rate of speed of 25 to 35 miles per hour around a curve down a hill. He was not familiar with all of the road because it had been relocated since he had last traveled it. When he thought he was in close proximity to a railroad crossing, he brought his car to a stop at a point which was between 45 to 50 feet from the nearest railroad track and while so stopped, looked and listened. Not seeing nor hearing anything, he then proceeded slowly. As he did so an automobile which had been parked facing him on his right turned on its headlights and momentarily blinded him. Nevertheless, plaintiff continued forward at a speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour. When he recovered his vision so that he could see, he noticed a large black object some 8 to 10 feet away and directly in front of him. He applied his brakes, heard a thud or scraping noise, and has no further recollection of what happened as he was seriously injured in the collision and remained unconscious for several days.

The plaintiff collided with the seventeenth car of a twenty-three car coal train which was traveling at a speed of between 3 to 8 miles per hour, being pushed by an engine in the rear. The collision occurred in a semi-rural area although there were a few houses and buildings in the immediate vicinity of the place of the accident. The brakes and the lights on the plaintiff's car were in good condition. There was testimony by some of the witnesses that there was a little fog but no one testified that it interfered with vision.

The road as relocated has been in use for about two years but no railroad crossing or warning signals have been erected at the railroad crossing and no such sign or signal was in place as a warning to the plaintiff on the night of the accident.

The plaintiff received severe painful injuries which have permanently disabled him. He has lost for industrial purposes the use of one eye, vision in his other eye has been partially destroyed, and his hearing has been impaired. He received disfiguring scars on his face. Before the accident he was steadily employed at fifty-five dollars per week. By reason of impaired sight and hearing and of headaches, he is unable to do the work required at his former job. He has secured lighter work from his employer, whereby he earns thirty-five dollars per week, but is now unable to work every day.

The defendant demurred to the evidence but the trial judge submitted to jury the question of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence and also at the request of the plaintiff submitted the following special finding which the jury answered in the affirmative: ‘ And now, to wit, December 2nd, 1948, we, the jurors empaneled in the above entitled case, find specially that the railroad crossing described in this case was peculiar, unusual, extra hazardous and very dangerous at the time of the accident. Answer ___’ . The jury answered this question ‘ yes'. There was testimony given by nearby residents that the crossing was very dangerous and hazardous and that it was difficult to see a train standing or moving slowly over the crossing. The defendant at the close of the trial submitted a point for binding instructions.

The decision of this case depends upon whether it is ruled by Wink et al. v. Western Maryland Railway Company, 116 Pa.Super. 374, 176 A. 760, 762, in which case the court said, ‘ Undoubtedly cases do and will arise where a railroad company, because of peculiar and unusual * * * circumstances rendering the situation extra hazardous, must in the exercise of reasonable care do things which are not required by statute.’ Many of the conditions in the Wink case are similar to the conditions in the instant case. The Supreme Court in the case of Everetts v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 330 Pa. 321, 198 A. 796, in a Per Curiam opinion, held that the facts there were similar to the Wink case and that there was no evidence to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence.

The plaintiff's contention that the defendant was guilty of negligence, placed upon him the burden of furnishing proof of unusual, peculiar, and extra hazardous conditions, as would take his case out of the rulings in the Wink and Everetts cases. The decisions in other states...