Yon v. Reeves
| Decision Date | 02 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-02120 |
| Parties | JACOB YON PLAINTIFF v. SARA REEVES DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Before the Court are Defendant Sara Reeves' motion (Doc. 22) to dismiss and brief in support (Doc. 23). Plaintiff Jacob Yon filed a response (Doc. 26) in opposition. For the reasons stated below, Ms. Reeves' motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This action involves a long-distance relationship and a fabricated pregnancy. Mr. Yon and Ms. Reeves were in a romantic relationship for two years. During that time, Mr. Yon lived in Florida and Ms. Reeves lived in Arkansas. The events giving rise to this action began in June 2021, when Ms. Reeves told Mr. Yon that she had taken a pregnancy test and was pregnant. Within days, the parties began communicating, largely over text messages, about the pregnancy and next steps. These communications began by discussing whether Ms. Reeves should seek an abortion. Throughout the rest of June, the parties texted on and off about meeting in person to discuss the pregnancy.
In July, the parties' conversations shifted. They began the month discussing whether they should break up. Mr. Yon expressed frustration about the long-distance relationship; Ms. Reeves stated she thought Mr. Yon was giving up on her. As July continued, the parties continued to text about due dates, appointments, and concerns about miscarriages. Ms. Reeves also advised Mr. Yon that she had spoken with his mother about doctor's appointments for the pregnancy. As July ended and August began, Ms. Reeves reassured Mr. Yon that she was pregnant with his child and was excited to see him as a father.
Miscommunication and discord plagued the parties' texts in August. Early in the month, Mr. Yon told Ms. Reeves that his father was dying. Ms. Reeves texted Mr. Yon throughout the day his father died and later offered up the comforting thought that “good news is that baby is okay.” Later that month, Ms. Reeves expressed that she had concerns about the baby's health, so she scheduled an appointment with a clinic. Ms. Reeves first texted Mr. Yon that tests confirmed the baby had Down syndrome. The next day Ms. Reeves texted that the clinic made a mistake: the baby did not have Down syndrome. The day after that, Ms. Reeves texted she could still pursue an abortion. Mr. Yon opposed that suggestion. The month ended with Ms. Reeves telling Mr. Yon that she wanted to name the baby after his late father, and that she had a surgery scheduled.
In September, the discord continued. Ms. Reeves first told Mr. Yon she would not contact him for a while. The same week, however, Ms. Reeves again contacted Mr. Yon. She said that she spent the night in an emergency room and had a risky surgery scheduled in Tallahassee. Later that week, Mr. Yon was at a college football game when he received a text from Ms. Reeves that instructed him to go to the hospital where she was admitted. The parties spoke throughout the day as Mr. Yon called several local hospitals trying to find Ms. Reeves. Ms. Reeves then told Mr. Yon not to come to the hospital. Mr. Yon could not locate Ms. Reeves. The next day, Ms. Reeves told Mr. Yon that the baby was fine. Mr. Yon states that throughout this time Ms. Reeves made disparaging comments about him to others, including “statements to the effect that he does not want the baby, that he has essentially abandoned her, and that he is a deadbeat father (or will be).”
Finally, the parties' tumultuous relationship ended. Following the September hospital scare, the parties texted infrequently. At the end of November and early December, Ms. Reeves texted Mr. Yon a sonogram but stated that she did not want him at an upcoming appointment. After that, Ms. Reeves stopped responding to texts. In early 2022, Mr. Yon filed a paternity lawsuit seeking parental rights and requesting hospital access on the delivery day. In response, Ms. Reeves admitted she fabricated the entire pregnancy, which mooted the paternity action.
Mr. Yon sued Ms. Reeves in the Circuit Court of Sebastian County, Arkansas for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. (Doc. 4). He later amended his complaint and added invasion of privacy claims under public disclosure of private facts and false light theories. (Doc. 20). Although an Arkansas citizen, Ms. Reeves removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 2). This violates the forum-defendant rule, which prevents defendants in diversity actions who are citizens of the state where the action is brought from removing the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). But violating the forum-defendant rule is a nonjurisidictional defect which plaintiffs waive if not raised in a timely remand motion. Holbein v. TAW Enters., Inc., 983 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Mr. Yon never moved to remand the case, so this Court retains jurisdiction.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as true all facts pleaded by the non-moving party and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the nonmoving party.” Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Those alleged facts must be specific enough “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action will not do.” Id.
The Court will grant Ms. Reeves' motion to dismiss Mr. Yon's intentional infliction of emotional distress, public disclosure of private facts, and defamation claims. The Court will deny Ms. Reeves' motion to dismiss the false light claim. The Court will address each claim in turn.
Under Arkansas law, the tort of IIED is also known as outrage. Sawada v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015). To sustain an outrage claim, a plaintiff's complaint “must contain sufficient facts, as opposed to mere conclusions,” demonstrating:
Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Calvary Christian Sch., Inc. v. Huffstuttler, 238 S.W.3d 58, 68 (Ark. 2006)). Arkansas courts have described outrage claims as disfavored. Crockett v. Essex, 19 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ark. 2000). Arkansas courts also give “a narrow view to the tort of outrage, and require[] clear-cut proof to establish the elements in outrage cases.” Id. (citing Croom v. Younts, 913 S.W.2d 283 (Ark. 1996)). “[T]he tort of outrage should not and does not open the doors of the courts to every slight insult or indignity one must endure in life.” Id. (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Ark. 1999)).
Mr. Yon has alleged that the false pregnancy “weighed heavily on him” and “understandably created a great deal of stress,” but that does not rise to a severity of emotional distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure. (Doc. 20, ¶ 33). Emotional distress manifesting as sleep loss, loss of appetite, and anxiety cannot sustain an outrage claim. FMC Corp., Inc. v. Helton, 202 S.W.3d 490, 505 (Ark. 2005). Feeling embarrassed is also insufficient to rise to the level of severe distress a plaintiff must show. Kiersey v. Jeffrey, 253 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Ark. 2007). Mr. Yon's complaint does not include facts that prove he suffered greater distress than a reasonable person would be expected to endure. Although he was rightly stressed at the thought of losing a child, that does not go beyond what a reasonable expectant parent would have to endure. Mr. Yon's complaint spends great detail discussing the fabricated pregnancy, but it fails to include any facts that show his “great deal of stress” was so severe that it can satisfy the outrage claim's final element.
Additionally, the Court finds Mr. Yon's allegation that “[Ms. Reeves'] conduct was extreme and outrageous” is a mere label or conclusion and recitation of the elements, which the Court is not bound to accept as true. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (); see also Sims v. Little Rock Plastic Surgery, P.A., 2020 WL 4514572, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 5, 2020) (). Because of this, Mr. Yon has not plausibly pled facts demonstrating that he suffered extreme and severe emotional distress from Ms. Reeves' actions which was utterly intolerable in a civilized community and beyond all possible bounds of human decency. Therefore, his outrage claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
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