Yoo Thun Lim v. Crespin
Citation | 100 Ariz. 80,411 P.2d 809 |
Decision Date | 03 March 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 7294,7294 |
Parties | YOO THUN LIM, aka Fay Lim, and Jane Doe Lim, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Fred A. CRESPIN and Lupe Angie Crespin, husband and wife, Appellees. |
Court | Supreme Court of Arizona |
Stokes & Moring, Casa Grande and Coolidge, for appellants.
Morgan & Rosenberg, Tucson, for appellees.
Fred A. Crespin and his wife Lupe Angie Crespin, appellees herein, brought this action to recover from Yoo Thun Lim damages suffered by reason of personal injury arising out of an automobile accident in which Lim was the driver and Crespin a passenger. A unanimous verdict was returned by the jury in favor of Lim. The court thereafter granted the Crespins' motion for a new trial and it is from the order granting the new trial that Lim appeals.
The action in which Fred Crespin suffered his injuries was a one-car accident near Miami, Arizona, in which the car, owned and driven by Lim, overturned. Lim worked as a cook until midnight on the 10th day of April, 1959. Thereafter he and Crespin started to drive from Superior to Miami, Arizona. A short distance from Miami on Highway 70 they approached a curve at about fifty miles an hour. Lim testified that he got 'just a little bit too close to the edge of the road' and hit a 'soft shoulder' and 'some small rocks' and then overturned. There is no testimony that fifty miles an hour is in excess of the legal speed limit.
In 1954, this Court adopted Rule 59(m), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., which provides that 'No order granting a new trial shall be made and entered unless the order specifies with particularity the ground or grounds on which the new trial is granted.' At the time of adoption of Rule 59(m), we had long adhered to the rule that if an order granting a motion for a new trial was general in its terms, it would be affirmed where properly granted on any of the grounds assigned. Huntsman v. First National Bank, 29 Ariz. 574, 243 P. 598. The granting of a new trial is different from an order refusing a new trial, for in the former the rights of the parties are never finally disposed of as in the latter they may be. Sanchez v. Stremel, 95 Ariz. 392, 391 P.2d 557. Accordingly, the burden is upon the party who disagrees with the action of the trial court to show an abuse of discretion in the granting of a new trial.
In the instant case, the Crespins' motion was granted 'on the grounds set forth in their motion for a new trial.' The motion was couched in the language of the statutory grounds for a new trial, Rule 59 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.; namely, that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice, that it was not justified by the evidence and contrary to law, that it was the result of the court's error admitting inadmissible evidence, and that it was the result of the court's error in refusing instructions of the plaintiff. Manifestly, the order for a new trial does not comply with Rule 59(m). Particularity means 'in a detail'. Webster's Third International Dictionary.
This Court has often commented on the failure of the court below to comply with Rule 59(m). We will not dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with the rule, Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647, feeling that such a remedy is too harsh. We have said that the rule may be enforced by petition in this Court to return the record to the trial court to enlarge upon its order by specifying with particularity the grounds. Caldwell v. Tremper, 90 Ariz. 241, 367 P.2d 266.
We note that the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted by court order the rule that where there is a failure to particularize it would be presumed that the new trial was erroneously granted and shifted to the party beneficially favored the burden of supporting the trial court's ruling. Drake v. Hicks, Mo., 261 S.W.2d 45. In Moore v. Glasgow, 366 S.W.2d 475, the Missouri Court of Appeals examined extensively the Supreme Court rule, saying:
'(w)hen a trial court grants a new trial without specifying of record the ground or grounds on which the new trial is granted, the presumption shall be that the trial court erroneously granted the motion for new trial * * * the burden of supporting such action is placed on the respondent,' * * *.
366 S.W.2d 475, 477. (Emphases in original.)
In the instant case, it is apparent that both appellant and this Court are compelled to speculate as to the reasons for ordering a new trial. We consider the rule adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court an appropriate remedy and hence where, as here, the trial court does not specify with particularity we will presume that the verdict of the jury was correct, placing the burden upon the appellee to convince us that the trial court did not err in ordering a new trial. Any statements in our former decisions, such as in the recent case of State v. Ross, 97 Ariz. 51, 396 P.2d 619, inconsistent with our statements herein are expressly disapproved.
A cursory analysis of the posture of the case as it was submitted to the jury establishes that it is one remarkably free of complexity.
First, only Lim and Crespin testified as to the facts of the accident. Lim's version was:
'Q You don't know what caused the accident?
'A Soft shoulders, and I got too close to the curb.
'A Soft shoulders, and I got too close to the curb and hit some small rocks.
'Q You didn't see the rocks at all?
'A No, I didn't see them.
'A Just a little bit too close to the edge of the road.
'A Yes, just a little bit.
'A Yes, * * *.'
Crespin's version was:
'Q In other words you say he swayed to the left of the road?
'A Yes, sir.
'Q Did you get in the opposite lane of traffic?
'A He straddled the white line anyhow.
'Q And was it at this time that you told him to get back over?
'A That's right.
'Q And then what took place?
'A Well, he came over and just, I'd say about a half a minute or so he started going over to the left again and at that time I turned around and I was going to tell him to turn back or something--I don't recall.
* * *
* * *
'Q Do you recall the automobile striking anything at all?
'A No, I don't.
'Q That was the last thing you can recall?
'A The last thing I can recall.'
Second, on the evidence presented the court instructed the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur, charging that the jurors might infer negligence if Lim was not able to explain how the accident was caused or 'at least be able to show that no failure of...
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...obligated to search the record to determine whether there is any basis for the claims raised by the Department. See Yoo Thun Lim v. Crespin, 100 Ariz. 80, 411 P.2d 809 (1966); Milam v. Milam, 101 Ariz. 323, 419 P.2d 502 (1966). Accordingly we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge i......
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