Yoonessi v. State University of New York

• Decision Date: 26 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-CV-92A.,93-CV-92A.
• Citation: 862 F. Supp. 1005
• Parties: Mahmood M. YOONESSI, M.D., Plaintiff, v. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

862 F. Supp. 1005

Mahmood M. YOONESSI, M.D., Plaintiff, v. STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

No. 93-CV-92A.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

August 26, 1994.

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Albert Grande, West Seneca, NY, for plaintiff.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, Gail Y. Mitchell, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, Buffalo, NY, for State defendants.

Linda Callahan Laing, Saperston & Day, P.C., Buffalo, NY, for Children's Hosp. defendants. Mary K. Roach, Falk & Siemer, Buffalo, NY, for Millard Fillmore defendants.

Kenneth A. Schoetz, Erie County Atty., Timothy J. Trost, Asst. County Atty., of counsel, Buffalo, NY, for defendant Erie County Medical Center.

DECISION AND ORDER

ARCARA, District Judge.

This case is currently before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) and Rule 30(b)(2)(B) of the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, on an appeal by the plaintiff, Mahmood M. Yoonessi, from a judgment entered by order of United States Magistrate Judge Carol E. Heckman on November 30, 1993. The complaint in this action was filed on January 29, 1993. All the defendants in the case eventually moved to dismiss the complaint. On June 7, 1993, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Heckman for all pretrial matters, and to hear and report upon dispositive motions. On August 17, 1993 the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), consented to have Magistrate Judge Heckman conduct any and all proceedings in this matter and to order entry of judgment in the case. The parties reserved the right to appeal the judgment to this Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See Item No. 21. In a Decision and Order dated November 22, 1993, Magistrate Judge Heckman granted defendants summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. It is from Magistrate Judge Heckman's Decision and Order of November 22, 1993 and subsequent judgment that plaintiff now appeals. The parties have been given an opportunity to brief and argue their respective positions.¹

In an appeal from a judgment ordered entered by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the district court must consider the appeal in the same manner as an appeal from a judgment of the district court to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) and Rule 30(b)(2)(B)(v) of the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the court of appeals applies a de novo standard of review, assessing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and applying the same standard as that applied by the district court. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Milken, 17 F.3d 608, 611 (2d Cir.1994). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment shall be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

After reviewing the submissions of the parties, hearing oral argument, and reviewing the record in this case de novo, the Court affirms the Judgment ordered entered by Magistrate Judge Heckman on November 30, 1993 for the reasons articulated in her Decision and Order dated November 22, 1993.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DECISION AND ORDER

HECKMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

All defendants have moved for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 and/or for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The parties have consented to have the undersigned hear and decide these motions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (Item 21).

For the following reasons, defendants' motions are granted, and the case is dismissed in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a gynecological oncologist who became a member of the faculty of the School of Medicine at State University of New York at Buffalo "SUNY" on July 8, 1976. His complaint in this action alleges that on March 20, 1991, he was wrongfully terminated by SUNY from his position as tenured Associate Professor as a result of the decision of an arbitrator for the State Office of Employee Relations. He also alleges that, based on this same arbitrator's decision, he was denied staff privileges at Children's Hospital of Buffalo and was denied the opportunity to apply for staff privileges at Millard Fillmore Hospital.

Plaintiff asserts that his employment was terminated or denied because he is of Iranian ethnic origin, in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses and in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 2000e-2(a). He also alleges that he was deprived of substantial earnings by the faulty accounting and billing system employed by SUNY's Faculty Clinical Practice Management Plan. Named as defendants are SUNY and various of its officers (the "state defendants"), Children's Hospital and various of its officers ("Children's Hospital defendants"), Millard Fillmore Hospital and one of its officers, and Erie County Medical Center.

The factual background of the dispute is set forth at length in the arbitrator's decision, which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit A (Item 1). In 1984, during plaintiff's employment at SUNY, the medical school implemented its Clinical Practice Management Plan (the "Plan") under which full-time medical faculty were required to turn over earnings from clinical services performed at affiliated hospitals to help defray medical school overhead costs. The earnings were then distributed to the faculty member who performed the services, in accordance with a pre-arranged formula (Item 1, Exh. A, p. 4).

Shortly after the Plan was implemented, plaintiff began to complain about the way funds were disbursed and earnings were reported. Unsatisfied with the responses to his complaints, plaintiff adopted a billing system for his clinical practice independent of the Plan's billing methods. This action resulted in a letter to plaintiff dated June 22, 1988 from defendant Dr. Myroslaw M. Hreshchyshyn, Chair of SUNY at Buffalo's Department of OB/GYN, and Dr. Donald Larson (not a defendant), SUNY at Buffalo's Associate Vice President for Clinical Affairs, which directed plaintiff to comply with the Plan billing practices within 30 days or face disciplinary action (id., pp. 9-10).

Plaintiff responded by letter from his attorney dated August 3, 1988, which purported to explain plaintiff's reasons for refusing to bill his clinical work through the Plan billing system (id., pp. 11-13). By letter dated August 15, 1988 from Clifford B. Wilson (SUNY's Vice President for Human Resources), plaintiff was given an additional 5 days to comply with the Plan billing practices (id., pp. 13-15).

Plaintiff's continued refusal to comply resulted in a Notice of Discipline pursuant to the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between SUNY and the United University Professions, Inc. (see Item 23, Attachment D). The notice, dated August 30, 1988, and signed by defendant Steven B. Sample, President of SUNY at Buffalo, charged plaintiff with misconduct for failure to resume billing for patient services through the approved Plan billing agency, as previously directed. The penalty imposed was termination of employment within ten days of receipt of the notice. The five reasons for termination set forth in the notice were as follows:

1. failure to resume billing for patient services through the approved Faculty Practice Plan billing agency;

2. failure to abide by Plan and departmental rules for receiving payments for patient services, and for banking and disbursement of Plan money;

3. failure to submit to the Plan billing agency all monies collected from patient billing since January 1, 1988;

4. failure to provide the Plan billing agency with documentation necessary to maintain his accounts from January 1, 1988; and,

5. failure to cease performance of medical procedures in non-University affiliated hospitals.

(Item 23, Exh. A).

On September 8, 1988, plaintiff filed a grievance with his union based on this Notice of Discipline. Pursuant to the grievance procedures in the collective bargaining agreement, hearings were held before a designated arbitrator in July and September, 1990. The union appeared on plaintiff's behalf.

In an award dated February 1, 1991, Arbitrator Thomas N. Rinaldo found that plaintiff had engaged in a persistent course of insubordination, but that immediate termination was not appropriate because the insubordination did not affect his primary duties as an instructor. Plaintiff was given thirty days from the date of the union's receipt of the award to comply with SUNY's directives, as set forth in the Notice of Discipline. The arbitrator also found that if plaintiff did not comply within 30 days, SUNY could terminate him (id. pp. 21-28).

Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to comply with the conditions set forth in the award (see Item 16, Exh. J), but was terminated anyway on March 20, 1991. On May 19, 1992, the union denied plaintiff's request to arbitrate the compliance issue (Item 1, Exh. C).

Plaintiff filed this action on January 29, 1993. The complaint sets forth five claims. First, plaintiff claims that he was discriminated and retaliated against on account of his ethnic origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 2000e et seq. (Title VII) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Second, plaintiff claims that SUNY terminated his appointment, Children's Hospital terminated his staff privileges, and Millard Fillmore denied his application for staff privileges without giving him the opportunity to be heard, in violation of his due process rights. Third, plaintiff claims that SUNY terminated his continuing appointment, and that Children's and Millard denied his staff privileges because of his ethnic origin, in violation of the equal protection clause. Fourth, plaintiff claims that he has suffered damages due to the...