York Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 October 2015
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1:10–CV–0692
• Citation: 140 F.Supp.3d 357
• Parties: York International Corporation, Plaintiff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

140 F.Supp.3d 357

York International Corporation, Plaintiff

v.Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant.

Civ. No. 1:10–CV–0692

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed October 13, 2015

Lee M. Epstein, Flaster/Greenbeg P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

John C. Sullivan, Kathleen K. Kerns, Christie Sullivan & Young, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Sylvia H. Rambo, United States District Judge

In this civil action, Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that Defendant, its former insurer, owes a duty to defend and indemnify Plaintiff against underlying asbestos-related actions. On July 9, 2015, the court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff as to a choice of law issue and struck certain portions of an affidavit submitted by Defendant in support of its motion for partial summary judgment. Presently before the court is Defendant's motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), wherein it asserts that the court made an error of law in striking portions of the affidavit and granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

The court presumes the parties' familiarity with the background of this litigation, and a detailed account has been set forth at length in the court's memorandum accompanying its order granting Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety and its motion to strike in part. See generally York Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 10–cv–0692, 2015 WL 4162981 (M.D.Pa. July 9, 2015). Accordingly, the court will set forth only the most pertinent portions of the factual and procedural history that justify its decision to grant in part and deny in part the instant motion for reconsideration.

A. Relevant Factual Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff, a manufacturer and seller of products that formerly contained asbestos, is subject to over a thousand products liability claims in multiple jurisdictions throughout the United States for injuries caused by its asbestos-containing products.¹ Defendant is one of several former products liability insurers for Plaintiff, with its policies (the "York Policies") covering Plaintiff's general products liability risk from October 1, 1952 through October 1, 1956. During the time period covered by the York Policies, as well as the negotiation and consummation of the policies, Plaintiff resided in York, Pennsylvania. At all relevant times, Defendant was, and is, a Massachusetts mutual insurance company with a principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. After Defendant denied Plaintiff's claim for defense and indemnification of the underlying asbestos claims pursuant to the York Policies, Plaintiff initiated this action seeking a declaration that Defendant was indeed obligated to defend and indemnify Plaintiff. In a May 26, 2011 memorandum and order, the court held that Plaintiff was not barred from submitting claims for defense and indemnification to Defendant for the asbestos-related litigation that Plaintiff was facing, but limited the scope of the claims to those alleging injury that occurred during the effective period of the York Policies.

A dispute subsequently arose as to whether Pennsylvania or New York law would apply to Defendant's duties to defend and indemnify Plaintiff for those claims arising under the York Policies, and the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to choice of law. Due to the passage of more than fifty years between the period covered by the York Policies and the initiation of the instant action, no party with firsthand knowledge of the negotiation or consummation of the policies could be identified, and complete copies of the York Policies could not be located. Declarations pages were located for the York Policies, however, listing "c/o Henry E. Wood & Associates Inc., 45 John Street, New York 38, New York" as the address for Plaintiff.

Significantly, in support of its motion for partial summary judgment, Defendant submitted an affidavit of a consultant and former longtime employee, Jerry McCullough (the "McCullough Affidavit"). (Doc. 83–1.) Although Mr. McCullough did not begin his employment with Defendant until several years after the period covered by the York Policies, he nonetheless testified, based on the listed address on the declarations pages and his familiarity with Defendant's standard practices during the 1950s, as to Henry E. Wood's role in negotiating and acquiring the York Policies. Plaintiff moved to strike portions of the McCullough Affidavit due to Mr. McCullough's lack of personal knowledge as to some of the facts contained therein, the inclusion of improper legal conclusions, and contradictions with his own prior deposition testimony. On July 9, 2015, the court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Pennsylvania law applied to Defendant's duties of defense and indemnification, and denied Defendant's motion. In so ruling, the court granted Plaintiff's motion to strike the following portions of the McCullough Affidavit:

14. Based on this standard practice, when Liberty Mutual Insurance issued the policies at issue, they would have been sent to Henry E. Wood in New York.

...

17. Based on the above, the policies issued to York Corporation would have been negotiated in New York between a salesperson in Liberty Mutual Insurance's New York office and Henry E. Wood.

...

19. Based on this standard practice, Henry E. Wood would have sent the premium payment to Liberty Mutual Insurance in New York.

York Int'l Corp., 2015 WL 4162981, at *5–6.

On July 23, 2015, Defendant filed the instant motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (Doc. 108), and a brief in support thereof (Doc. 109). In its supporting brief, Defendant argues that the court erred in striking Paragraphs 14, 17, and 19 of the McCullough Affidavit because the testimony contained therein was based on Mr. McCullough's knowledge of Defendant's routine organizational practices, which is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 406. (Id. , pp. 1–4 of 10.) Defendant further argues that because the court can properly rely on Paragraphs 14, 17, and 19 of the McCullough Affidavit, the court should reverse its decision on choice of law and find that New York law applies to Defendant's defense and indemnification obligations, or, in the alternative, find that the McCullough Affidavit raises a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment as to choice of law. (Id. , p. 10 of 10.) Plaintiff filed its response on August 6, 2015 (Doc. 110), and Defendant replied on August 20, 2015 (Doc. 111). Thus, the motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for consideration.

II. Legal Standard

Motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) serve primarily to correct manifest errors of law or fact in a prior decision of the court. See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir.2003). Under Rule 59(e), "a judgment may be altered or amended if the party seeking reconsideration establishes at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice." Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou–Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999). Motions for reconsideration may also be appropriate in instances "where, for example, the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension." Reaves v. Pa. State Police, Civ. No. 09–cv–2549, 2014 WL 486741, *3 (M.D.Pa. Feb. 6, 2014) (quoting Rohrbach v. AT & T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F.Supp. 523, 527 (M.D.Pa.1995) ). "A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant." Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D.Pa.2002). "Likewise, reconsideration motions may not be used to raise new arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Hill v. Tammac Corp., Civ. No., 2006 WL 529044, *2 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 3, 2006) (citing McDowell Oil Serv., Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 817 F.Supp. 538, 541 (M.D.Pa.1993) ). Reconsideration of a judgment is an extraordinary remedy, and courts should grant such motions sparingly. D'Angio v. Borough of Nescopeck, 56 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (M.D.Pa.1999).

It follows from the remedial purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion that the standard of review relates back to the standard applicable in the underlying decision. See Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 288. Accordingly, when a motion for reconsideration challenges the court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment, the standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 guides the analysis. Relief may be granted if the materials related to the summary judgment motion—including the pleadings, discovery materials, and affidavits—"show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must consider all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; Int'l Raw Materials Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir.1990). It is through this lens that the court must address Defendant's instant motion.

III. Discussion

Defendant's sole argument in support of its motion for reconsideration is...