York v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 23 September 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 87229
• Citation: 475 N.W.2d 346,438 Mich. 744
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Ruthie Mae YORK, Personal Representative of the Estate of William York, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. (After Remand)

Page 346

475 N.W.2d 346

438 Mich. 744

Ruthie Mae YORK, Personal Representative of the Estate of William York, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellant. (After Remand)

Docket No. 87229

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 4, 1990.

Decided Sept. 23, 1991.

[438 Mich. 747] Horace D. Cotton, Charlie C. Taylor, P.C., Ralph H. Richardson, Stone & Richardson, P.C., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

City of Detroit Law Dept., Donald Pailen, Corp. Counsel, Joanne Stafford, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION AFTER REMAND

BOYLE, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

We granted leave in this case to determine whether the trial court erred by refusing instructions requested by the plaintiff concerning the standard for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We hold that because the requested instructions were erroneous, the trial court correctly refused to give them. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in finding the refusal to give the instructions erroneous and in reversing the jury's verdict of no cause of action with respect to plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the jury's verdict with respect to the Sec. 1983 claim.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff, Ruthie Mae York, initiated this action in 1982 against the City of Detroit for the suicide death of her husband, William York, Jr. The plaintiff alleged that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the City of Detroit was liable because it had deprived York of his constitutional rights by "adopt[ing] customs, policies and practices in violation of applicable law, ordinances, regulations and court orders"; by being "deliberately indifferent to the fact that its jail facilities were not in accordance with recognized standards"; and by being deliberately indifferent to suicide prevention. The plaintiff also alleged that the city was liable for failure to repair a defective condition existing in the jail. The specific defects alleged by the plaintiff were the bars across the ceiling of the cell in which the decedent was detained, and the lack of visual monitoring equipment.

After a four-day trial, the jury found no cause of action with respect to the plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim. The jury did find the city liable with respect to the defective building claim and found the amount of plaintiff's damages to be $650,000, reduced by eighty-two percent because of the decedent's comparative negligence.

The City of Detroit appealed the verdict for the plaintiff regarding the defective building claim; the plaintiff cross appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by repeatedly telling the jury that the rules promulgated by the Department of Corrections with respect to jails, lockups, and security camps were not mandatory or binding on the city with respect to its operation of precinct lockups, and by refusing to instruct the jury that the city was charged with knowing and enforcing those rules. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict regarding the defective building claim, but reversed its verdict of no cause of action regarding the Sec. 1983 claim. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided July 10, 1987 (Docket No. 87529). The City of Detroit appealed to this Court. We vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of our recent decisions relating to the defective building issue. ¹ 430 Mich. 881, 423 N.W.2d 216 (1988). On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the public building exception to governmental immunity did not apply, and reversed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff with regard to that claim. The panel then reviewed the city's argument that it should not have granted a new trial regarding the plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim because any instructional error was harmless. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier conclusion and remanded the case for a new trial. 182 Mich.App. 92, 452 N.W.2d 641 (1989). The defendant again appealed to this Court. We granted leave to appeal in an order issued July 10, 1990. 435 Mich. 861 (1990).

At approximately 1:30 a.m. on January 13, 1981, the police were dispatched to the York family residence with a report of "family trouble." When the police arrived, the decedent's widow, Ruthie Mae York, reported a physical altercation with her husband in which he had pulled a knife and swung it at her. Ruthie Mae York's son intervened in the fight and was cut on the neck, arm, and hand.

According to Ruthie Mae York, the decedent had been drinking heavily that night. Officer George Lapum could smell alcohol on the decedent's breath, but, according to Lapum, the decedent could walk unassisted and Lapum did not recall any staggering. Ruthie York testified, however, that at one point her husband was sitting on the floor with his back against a wall, so drunk he could not get up. A police officer helped him up, and the decedent began swinging at the officer.

The decedent was arrested for felonious assault and transported to the 16th Precinct of the Detroit Police Department. According to Lapum, the decedent went quietly and showed no sign of being suicidal. At the precinct, the decedent was placed in a cell.

Officer Timothy Bar was the "doorman" at the precinct that night. His duties included the processing of incoming prisoners. Bar checked on York at 7:15 a.m., at which time York yelled at him. Bar did not recall what York had said, but described it as an angry yell. According to Bar, there was nothing at all unusual about a detainee yelling at the doorman. Bar noticed nothing that would indicate that the decedent was suicidal. At about 7:30 a.m., a maintenance person discovered the decedent hanging from the bars across the top of the cell in a noose fashioned from his shirt.

The doorman and another officer took the decedent down and called an emergency medical service unit. The decedent was taken to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. The coroner's report indicated that the decedent had a blood alcohol level of 0.16 percent, and a urine alcohol level of 0.21 percent.

Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude any reference to rules promulgated by the Department of Corrections. Counsel for the plaintiff responded that the city's callous indifference to these rules would be evidence of deliberate indifference to decedent's constitutional rights. The court ruled that the department rules did not apply to police station lockups used for the detention of persons not convicted of a crime. Although the rules were held not to be binding, the court ruled that it would allow expert testimony with regard to those rules.

Frank Donley, employed by the Department of Corrections, testified as an expert for the plaintiff. Donley testified regarding the department's rules for jails, lockups, and security camps which were in effect in 1981. He referred to rule 791.555(1), which provides, "A jail or lockup shall provide 1 or more detoxification cells which shall be designed for detention of chemically impaired persons during the detoxification process only," 1979 AC, R 791.555(1), noting that during an inspection of the 16th precinct in 1979, he notified the precinct commander that there was no detoxification cell at the precinct. He also made reference to rule 791.553 regarding visual or electronic surveillance in the area occupied by detainees. ² 1979 AC, R 791.553.

Donley stated that in his opinion, when the decedent was brought to the station, a routine receiving screening form should have been filled out. He further opined that a visibly intoxicated person should be placed in a detoxification cell and should remain under continuous visual observation by one of the precinct staff.

The plaintiff also introduced a 1980 letter from the Department of Corrections to sheriffs and chiefs of police regarding suicides in Michigan jails and lockups. According to the letter, eleven people had committed suicide in Michigan jails and lockups as of June 4, 1980. Seven of those eleven suicides were alcohol related; two were drug related. Most occurred in the Wayne County area, and most in lockups. The letter contained a profile of the person most likely to attempt suicide in detention: a white male, in his twenties, arrested on a minor charge such as driving under the influence of liquor or disorderly conduct. According to the profile, such a person usually attempts or commits suicide within an hour or two of incarceration. The letter described alcohol and drugs as "critical factors," and recommended a number of precautionary actions, including becoming aware of available detoxification or substance abuse programs in the community, reviewing policies on detention practices, particularly where the person is detained on substance-related charges, doing more screening during intake, using detoxification facilities, using detoxification cells or placing the intoxicated person in the cell closest to the officer's station, increasing cell supervision, and being prepared to respond to suicide attempts.

Frank Donley testified that he became involved with the training of Detroit precinct doormen in November, 1978, at the request of the Detroit Police Department training division. Detroit Police Inspector and Director of Training James Jackson testified that training is required for precinct doormen and detention officers. This program, consisting of 160 hours of training, began in 1979. The training program included the subjects of mental illness and suicide. Inspector Jackson testified generally that under these subjects, doormen would be trained to take action upon observing overt symptoms of mental illness or potential suicide. He said that violent behavior by itself would not necessarily fall within the rubric of abnormal behavior and that depression "perhaps" would fall in the category of...