York v. Huerta-Garcia, 98-CV-0733 (LSP).
| Decision Date | 05 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-CV-0733 (LSP).,98-CV-0733 (LSP). |
| Citation | 36 F.Supp.2d 1231 |
| Parties | Patrick YORK, Plaintiff, v. S. HUERTA-GARCIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Patrick York, Soledad, CA, pro se.
Attorney General, State of California Office of the Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (11-1)
On April 17, 1998 Patrick York ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his due process rights by officials at Calipatria State Prison ("CSP"). Plaintiff named as defendants S. Huerta-Garcia, Chief Deputy Warden, G. Ochs, Associate Warden, A. Tutt, Facility Captain, D. Dexter, Correctional Counselor, G. Stanford, Lieutenant, and L. Albert, Correctional Officer (collectively, the "Defendants"), all employed at CSP. (Compl. p. 1, Def.Mem. p. 2.)
On July 30, 1998 Defendants, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On August 11, 1998 Plaintiff filed a Motion in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff alleges the following in his Complaint:
On 5-16-97 I had a 115 hearing held by Lieutenant G. Standford [sic] without having all my paperwork. The 115 was written by L. Albert who withheld my statement. G. Ochs was the chief disciplinary officer who didn't check for mistakes. A. Tutt and D. Dexter are on the committee that confirm [sic] the 115 that violated my due process Miranda rights.1 S.H. Garcia is held responsible for the committee.
(Compl. p. 3.)
In his prayer for relief Plaintiff requests that he "be compensated $400 a day for each day that I was held in administrative segregation (lock up) after the fact finding of the 115." (Compl. p. 3.)
Exhibits filed with the Complaint shed light on the facts leading to Plaintiff's action.2 An Order and Hearing for Placement in Segregated Housing ("Hr'g") states that on April 17, 1997 officers discovered "an Exacto Blade ... secreted in a Buglar Tobacco Can" in the cell of Plaintiff and his cellmate.3 The tobacco can that hid the Exacto blade was "being utilized as a pen/pencil container" and "a television knob was discovered that appeared to be fashioned into a handle for the blade." (Hr'g.) After discovery of the Exacto blade in Plaintiff's cell, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation "pending the adjudication of disciplinary charges, and an appearance before the Institutional Classification Committee for appropriate program and housing needs." (Id.)
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on two separate grounds. Defendants contend Plaintiff's claim for the allegedly wrongful discipline is not cognizable as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. (Def.Mem. p. 2.) Defendants further contend Plaintiff's claim is barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Id. p. 4.)
In his Opposition Plaintiff contends that (a) the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) do not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court; (b) presentation of Plaintiff's claims to the "State Board of Control" is not a "necessary prerequisite" to maintain an action for the remedy Plaintiff seeks, (c) there are no administrative remedies available under Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations for Plaintiff's damage claims, and (d) Plaintiff has "exhausted C.D.C. 602 remedies to it's [sic] highest available level." (Pl. Opp'n p. 2.) Further, Plaintiff argues that articles 1, 2 and 3 of 15 C.C.R. § 3312 "clearly grant Plaintiff an [sic] legal presidence [sic] to be provided and produce such evidence in the affor [sic] stipulated proceedings the above referenced legal right simultaneously evokes the protections of the United States Constitution Due Process Clause ...." (Pl. Opp'n p. 3.)
Generally under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim for relief. Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1984). In applying this standard, the court must treat all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. Experimental Eng'g, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 614 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir.1980). Pursuant to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir.1996).
The court is not, however, bound to assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are stated in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S.Ct. 567, 70 L.Ed.2d 474 (1981).
Dismissal is proper if a complaint is vague, conclusory, and fails to set forth any material facts in support of the allegation. North Star Intern. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir.1983). To dismiss with prejudice, it must appear to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proven. Reddy v. Litton Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 293 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 332, 116 L.Ed.2d 272 (1991).
Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading sufficient facts to state a claim; courts will not supply essential elements of a claim that were not initially pled — even in the context of a pro se plaintiff. Richards v. Harper, 864 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir.1988); Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are very liberal as to pleading where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, even a pro se complaint is subject to dismissal if the pleading fails to reasonably inform the adverse party of the asserted cause of action. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).
Defendants first contend that Plaintiff's claim is not cognizable as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to damages for being wrongfully disciplined by prison staff." (Def.'s Mem. p. 3.) "[I]n order for Plaintiff to prevail in this action, the Court would necessarily have to determine that Plaintiff's due process rights were violated and that he was wrongly placed in administrative segregation." (Id. p. 4.)
In response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss on the ground that this action is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff argues that articles 1, 2 and 3 of "C.C.R. SEC 3312" [sic] clearly grant "Plaintiff an [sic] legal presidence [sic] to be provided and produce such evidence in the affor [sic] stipulated proceedings the above referenced legal right simultaneously evokes the protections of the United States Constitution Due Process Clause ...." (Pl. Opp'n p. 3.)
Plaintiff's Opposition misconstrues Defendants' argument when Plaintiff says "Defendant further contends Plaintiff's action is not cognizable as in civil rights violation [sic] because of the misconception Plaintiff had no right to produce evidence in his favor at a disciplinary proceeding." (Pl. Opp'n p. 3.) Defendants contend the action is not cognizable because the disciplinary finding has not been invalidated. (Def.'s Mem. p. 4.)
Defendants do not, as Plaintiff maintains, allege Plaintiff had "no right to produce evidence in his favor." Nor does the Opposition's incomplete legal citation to the California Code of Regulations render Plaintiff's Complaint valid.4 15 C.C.R. section 3312 discusses how inmate misconduct should be "handled." Plaintiff argues this section allows him to be provided with and to produce evidence in his disciplinary proceeding. (Pl. Opp'n p. 3.)
15 C.C.R. section 3312, however, has no bearing on Defendants' Motion. Defendants seek dismissal for a reason unconnected to evidentiary concerns. Stated differently, Defendants do not seek dismissal, as Plaintiff contends, because they had a "misconception" that Plaintiff was barred from producing evidence at his disciplinary hearing. (Pl. Opp'n p. 3.) Rather, Defendants seek Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal for Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate in any way his disciplinary proceeding or his placement in administrative segregation has been called into question by a federal habeas corpus court or otherwise reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.
The Court will now turn to the substance of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The Heck Court also stated, however, "if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.
In Edwards v. Balisok the Supreme Court made clear Heck's reasoning...
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