York v. Isabella Bank & Trust, Docket No. 73023

• Decision Date: 22 January 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 73023
• Citation: 146 Mich.App. 1,379 N.W.2d 448
• Parties: Belva YORK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ISABELLA BANK & TRUST and Harold O. Wallace, Jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. 146 Mich.App. 1, 379 N.W.2d 448
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 448

379 N.W.2d 448

Belva YORK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ISABELLA BANK & TRUST and Harold O. Wallace, Jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 73023.

146 Mich.App. 1, 379 N.W.2d 448

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 10, 1985.

Decided Oct. 7, 1985.

Released for Publication Jan. 22, 1986.

[146 MICHAPP 2] Gerisch & Bourne, P.C. by Mary E. Gerisch, Midland, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Paul Janes, Mount Pleasant, for defendants-appellees.

Before WAHLS, P.J., and ALLEN and RAVITZ, ^* JJ.

ALLEN, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from an order of the Isabella County Circuit Court which granted accelerated judgment to defendants on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claims. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

[146 MICHAPP 3] Robert York, the husband of the plaintiff herein, died on June 14, 1979. His intestate estate was probated in the Isabella County Probate Court and closed on February 12, 1982. On September 9, 1982, plaintiff filed a complaint in Isabella County Circuit Court against Isabella Bank & Trust, the personal representative of the estate, and Harold O. Wallace, who had been appointed by the bank to act as a fiduciary. The complaint set forth three causes of action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty, based on allegations that defendants did not respond to complaints regarding administration of the estate and the opening of a safety deposit box, that other heirs were consulted regarding the value of estate property while plaintiff was excluded from such discussions, and that certain real estate was improperly advertised; (2) negligence, based on allegations that optimal prices were not secured for certain assets and that certain assets which rightfully should have been included in the estate were not recovered; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on allegations that the mishandling of the estate by defendants caused plaintiff emotional distress and that defendants failed to reimburse plaintiff after instructing her to pay certain bills with assurances that she would be reimbursed.

In its opinion of February 11, 1983, the circuit court granted defendants' motion for accelerated judgment. It found that these matters should have been raised in the probate court, which it believed had exclusive jurisdiction. Further, it held that the circuit court was not an appropriate forum to collaterally attack such matters and that plaintiff's remedy, if any, was to reopen the probate proceedings. The opinion specifically referred only to the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims. However, at the hearing on plaintiff's motion[146 MICHAPP 4] for reconsideration, the circuit court clarified that its opinion was intended to dispose of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as well. On appeal, we are asked to decide whether the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any or all of plaintiff's causes of action.

M.C.L. Sec. 600.605; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.605 vests the circuit courts with original jurisdiction over all civil claims and remedies "except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court * * *.". M.C.L. Sec. 700.21; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5021, a provision of the Revised Probate Code, delineates matters exclusively within the probate court's jurisdiction and provides in pertinent part:

"The court has exclusive jurisdiction of all of the following:

"(a) Matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, whether testate or intestate, who was at the time of death domiciled in the county or was at the time of death domiciled without the state leaving an estate within the county to be administered." (Emphasis added.)

These two provisions indicate that if any of the plaintiff's causes of action involve "matters relating to the settlement of the estate" accelerated judgment was properly granted, as the circuit court would be divested of jurisdiction by the exclusive grant to the probate court.

Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges that defendants owed her a fiduciary duty and that the duty was breached. However, the factual allegations in support of this claim all pertain to injuries which would run to the estate. In other words, poor estate administration, a failure to investigate and/or recover missing assets, and undervaluation or improper advertising of estate property constitute [146 MICHAPP 5] injuries which directly affect the estate and are integral to the settlement of the estate. Accordingly we believe that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction and that accelerated judgment was properly granted with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Similarly, we believe that the negligence cause of action was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. The sale and recovery of estate assets are clearly matters which relate to the settlement of the estate. Thus, accelerated judgment on this cause of action was also properly granted. ¹

The circuit court indicated that plaintiff's remedy, if any, was to petition for a reopening of the probate estate. Such a procedure is governed by M.C.L. Sec. 700.593(2); M.S.A. Sec. 27.5593(2), which provides:

"Upon filing a petition after the closing of an estate, the court may cause the estate to be reopened for the purpose of administering after-discovery assets or any other assets belonging to the estate or to complete the administration of the estate in case the estate was closed without being fully administered by the fiduciary or court, or for the correction of typographical errors, omissions, or misdescription of property contained in any order or record in the estate, and for any of these purposes may appoint successor fiduciary. The failure of a claimant to file a claim against the...