York v. Massanari

• Decision Date: 23 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99 C 3609.,99 C 3609.
• Citation: 155 F.Supp.2d 973
• Parties: Kevin YORK, Plaintiff, v. Larry G. MASSANARI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

155 F.Supp.2d 973

Kevin YORK, Plaintiff, v. Larry G. MASSANARI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 99 C 3609.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

August 23, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Marcie E. Goldbloom, Frederick J. Daley, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.

Kathryn A. Kelly, Assistant United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois, Todd A. Duclos, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Chicago, IL, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MORTON DENLOW, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case comes before the Court for a review of the final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff, Kevin York ("Claimant" or "York"), disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act ("SSA"). 42 U.S.C. § 416(i), 423(d). York claims he has been disabled since July 11, 1991, after he injured his right knee at work carrying a 70 lb. motor down a flight of stairs.

York seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision finding that he was not disabled as of December 23, 1993. The matter comes before this Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The issue to be decided is whether substantial evidence in the record supports the finding of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") that York was not disabled under the SSA as of December 23, 1993. For the reasons set forth below, the Court reverses the ALJ's decision and remands the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

York filed his application for Title II DIB on March 10, 1994 alleging disability as of July 11, 1991 due to an injury to his right knee. (R. 66-67, 87). York's DIB application was denied on June 16, 1994 as the SSA determined that his condition did not keep him from working. (R. 72-76). On August 11, 1994, York filed a timely request for reconsideration which was subsequently denied on October 4, 1994. (R. 77-78, 80-82). Thereafter, York filed a request for a hearing. (R. 83-84). A hearing was held on September 12, 1995 before ALJ Maren Dougherty. (R. 27-65). The ALJ found York disabled from July 11, 1991 through December 23, 1993, but not thereafter. (R. 13-22).

York filed a timely request for review of the ALJ's finding that he was not disabled after December 23, 1993 with SSA's Appeals Council. (R. 12). On March 26 1999, the Appeals Council denied York's request making ALJ Dougherty's decision the final determination of the Commissioner. (R. 5-6). On May 28, 1999, York filed this action requesting judicial review of the ALJ's decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of a Commissioner's final decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) which provides that the "findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ..." An ALJ's decision becomes the Commissioner's final decision if the Appeals Council denies a request for review. Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir.1993). Under such circumstances, the decision reviewed by the district court is the decision of the ALJ. Eads v. Secretary of the Dept. Of Health & Human Serv., 983 F.2d 815, 816 (7th Cir.1993). A reviewing court may not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir.1995).

Judicial review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching its decision and whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support his findings. Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir.1992); 42 U.S .C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). The court may reverse the Commissioner's decision only if the evidence "compels" reversal, not merely because the evidence supports a contrary decision. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 815 n. 1, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). The SSA gives a court the power to enter a judgment "affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

III. THE DECISION OF THE ALJ

The ALJ found York was disabled from his date of onset, July 11, 1991, through December 23, 1993. (R. 13-22). She found York's impairment was severe precluding him from returning to past work and preventing him from working in the national economy in any capacity during that time period. (R. 19).

The ALJ determined the Claimant had a severe impairment, but that his impairment did not satisfy a listed impairment. (R. 18). Therefore, the ALJ was required to determine whether York could return to past work and if not, whether there was work for him in the national economy. (Id). The ALJ found the evidence was clear that from July 11, 1991 to December 23, 1993 the Claimant could not walk, or stand for two hours out of an eight hour day and he needed the assistance of crutches to walk. (Id). She found he was precluded from doing even sedentary work during that period. (Id). She concluded he could not perform his past work as a maintenance mechanic, and moreover could not perform any other work existing in the national economy because his limitations made even a sedentary job hard to find. (Id).

However, the ALJ found that as of December 23, 1993, the Claimant was experiencing medical improvement related to his ability to work because there was healing of his osteochondritis dissecans defect. (Id). She found he was "fully able to stand or walk two hours and sit for six hours out of an eight hour day as well as lift up to 10 pounds occasionally." (Id). Thus, as of that date, the ALJ concluded the Claimant could perform a full range of sedentary work and was not disabled. (Id).

The ALJ's first basis for finding York was not disabled as of December 23, 1993 is her reliance on the residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessments completed by State doctors. (R. 19). She says those opinions conflict with her RFC finding for the period from onset through December 23, 1993, but not for the period thereafter. (Id). Her rationale for concluding those opinions were not reliable during the period she found the Claimant disabled is that they were not supported by the medical evidence as a whole and they conflicted with the opinions of the treating physicians regarding the nature and severity of York's condition. (Id). But, she found the same treating physicians' opinions were no longer reliable after December 23, 1993 because they were based on York's "ongoing complaints of pain which were belied by his actual activities." (Id). Therefore, as of December 23, 1993, she found the Claimant could perform sedentary work because it was consistent with objective evidence of healing. (Id). The ALJ found York's complaints of pain and claims of inability to put weight on his leg, as well as his alleged limited ability to perform daily activities were contradicted by objective evidence of healing derived from the doctors' reports and surveillance conducted in July and August 1994, by insurance investigators hired by the worker's compensation carrier. (Id).

Second, the ALJ relied on the nonState doctors' reports in the record to support her finding of no disability as of December 23, 1993. Specifically, she remarked that "office notes from Dr. Sweeney show that by March 1993 the osteotomy had healed and the claimant's pain was diminishing even though he was still not weight bearing." (R. 18). The ALJ also considered Dr. Steven Stern's evaluation from November 1993, one month before the ALJ determined York was no longer disabled. She commented that in Dr. Stern's evaluation he wrote the Claimant reported pain on weight bearing and continued use of crutches. But, the ALJ also noted his report indicated x-rays showed clear preservation of the articular cartilage joint space that was not consistent with an end stage knee arthritis. (Id).

One month later, on December 23, 1993, Dr. James Hill examined the Claimant. The ALJ also relied on his report in making her findings. In her decision, the ALJ notes Dr. Hill found York had no effusion but marked crepitation of the right knee and that x-rays showed some medial joint space narrowing but a healed osteochondritis dissecans defect. (Id).

Dr. Goldstein examined Claimant in May 1994. He did so at the request of the worker's compensation insurance carrier. The ALJ commented the doctor noted that while the Claimant used crutches, he was placing weight on his knee. (R. 19-20). She also noted that his examination revealed some tenderness and soft tissue crepitance medially. (R. 20). Additionally, the ALJ commented Dr. Goldstein believed the x-rays showed a healed osteochondritis dissecans fragment that was in a satisfactory position and he thought there was some arthritic change on the medial compartment. (Id). However, she added that Dr. Goldstein did not recommend knee replacement surgery because of the Claimant's age. (Id). The ALJ addressed Dr. Sweeney's assessment from April of 1994, writing, "Claimant's doctor, Dr. Sweeney recommended a total knee replacement due to his ongoing complaints of pain and inability to ambulate." (R. 19). She did not however, explain why she did not find that report to be important.

The ALJ also gave great weight to the surveillance conducted in June and August 1994 by the insurance company defending the worker's compensation claim. She says the surveillance indicates, as Dr. Levin noted, the Claimant was seen in a parking lot behind his apartment popping the hood of one his cars and then taking a car to the gas station, filling the car with gas and checking the tire pressure. (R. 20). The ALJ contends he was seen during those...