York v. State

Decision Date29 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. PD–0088–10.,PD–0088–10.
Citation342 S.W.3d 528
PartiesRickie Dawson YORK, Appellant,v.The STATE of Texas.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Austin Reeve Jackson, Tyler, for Appellant.Michael J. West, Asst. D.A., Tyler, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.KELLER, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which MEYERS, PRICE, KEASLER, HERVEY, and ALCALA, JJ., joined.

We must resolve two issues in this case. First, did a police officer have reasonable suspicion to detain appellant, who was asleep in a car, with the lights on and the engine running, parked on a sidewalk in front of a gas station during the early morning hours? Second, does the doctrine of collateral estoppel require the suppression of evidence in a subsequent prosecution when that evidence was suppressed in an earlier prosecution arising from the same facts? The answer to the first question is relatively straightforward. But to answer the second question, we must deconstruct earlier opinions from this Court and re-analyze the question from scratch.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Criminal Investigation

Leland Shawn Johnson was a patrol officer for the City of Bullard, in Smith County. On his way to Tyler 1 at around 3:00 a.m. on October 16, 2007, he passed an Exxon gas station that was outside the city limits of Bullard but still in Smith County.

Officer Johnson was personally aware that this particular Exxon station had been burglarized at least once during the previous two years, and he had been advised by deputies that other burglaries had occurred there. The Exxon station was closed for the night, but a car was parked partially on the sidewalk immediately in front of the Exxon store, with the headlights shining on the store window. The headlights were shining into the business. From Officer Johnson's vantage point on the road, the car appeared to be almost touching the front door glass. The light from the headlights was being reflected back into the vehicle, and the car did not appear to be occupied. Officer Johnson parked behind the vehicle, turned his headlights off, and approached on foot.

He saw that the car's engine was running, the driver's rear window was down, and appellant was in the car asleep with the seat laid back. Officer Johnson did not smell any alcohol, nor did he see any items in the car that might have been taken in a burglary. He watched appellant for a few minutes and looked around for weapons before waking appellant up. Appellant expressed surprise upon being awakened.

Officer Johnson asked appellant for identification, and appellant said that he had left it at home. Officer Johnson then asked appellant to step outside the vehicle. In the ensuing conversation, appellant expressed confusion regarding where he was, saying that he was in the Chapel Hill area, when he was not even close to there. Officer Johnson then asked if appellant had any weapons. Appellant said that he did not, and he gave Officer Johnson consent to search his person. The search revealed that appellant possessed marijuana and methamphetamine, and he was arrested. Appellant gave Officer Johnson a false name after the arrest.2

B. First Prosecution: Failure to Identify

The criminal district attorney's office first prosecuted appellant in a county court at law for the misdemeanor offense of failure to identify.3 The case was tried to a jury, with the sole evidence being Officer Johnson's testimony. In addition to facts outlined above, Officer Johnson testified during cross-examination about whether he had seen appellant committing certain offenses:

Q. Would you say that in those couple of minutes [of watching appellant sleeping], you were able to determine that there was not a burglary at that location going on?

A. Well, I couldn't say that there was one occurring at that time, yes.

Q. Okay. And you didn't see any kind of property or anything in the car, did you?

A. Not from standing outside, no. Q. Nothing that would give you reason to believe that he had burglarized that store?

A. No.

* * *

Q. Officer, at that time when you asked for consent to search and continued your investigation, Mr. York hadn't committed any type of felony offense within your view at that time, had he?

A. No, he had not.

Q. He had not committed any type of offense that would be considered a breach of the peace; is that correct?

A. No, he had not.

Q. He hadn't committed any type of public order crime, such as a riot or something to that effect?

A. No, he had not.

Q. He had not committed, in your view, an offense under Chapter 49 of the Penal Code, which is DWI, intoxication manslaughter, that type of offense. He had not committed any, correct?

A. No, he had not.

Officer Johnson also testified that a video of the incident existed, but he did not have it.

Outside the presence of the jury, the parties and the county court at law judge discussed two defense motions: a motion for directed verdict of acquittal and a motion to suppress evidence. Both motions were based on the idea that the State failed to prove that appellant's arrest or detention was lawful. The defense first raised these motions after the State's direct examination, but the judge denied the motions at that time. After defense counsel's cross-examination, the parties and the judge resumed discussion of these issues, which included remarks by the judge regarding the officer being outside of his jurisdiction. Ultimately, the judge granted the motion to suppress. Before bringing in the jury, the judge stated: “Well, the court will enter a directed verdict of acquittal, based on the fact there is no evidence to go before the jury.”

After the jurors were brought back into the courtroom, the judge explained to them:

Basically, what I did was grant the defendant's motion to suppress. I'm not necessarily finding the officer did anything wrong. He was outside of his jurisdiction, stopped to investigate what was going on. I don't think there is anything wrong with that. But with him being outside his jurisdiction and him not testifying to any articulable facts as to how he thinks an offense might have been committed, I think the law requires me to grant the motion to suppress, which means y'all have no evidence in front of you.

* * *

[Addressing appellant:] This officer did exactly what he was supposed to do. You're getting away on a technicality.

Expecting the State to appeal this decision because of his other cases, the judge told defense counsel that he could draft the findings of fact and conclusions of law. No written findings of fact and conclusions of law are contained in the record before us.

C. Second Prosecution: Possession of Methamphetamine

The criminal district attorney's office later prosecuted appellant in district court for possession of methamphetamine. The parties litigated the legality of Officer Johnson's conduct during a pretrial suppression hearing. At this hearing, the defense introduced the record of trial proceedings from the failure-to-identify prosecution. Officer Johnson also testified, and a video of the incident was played for the court. In addition to the facts outlined previously, Officer Johnson testified that, as he approached appellant's car, he believed that there was a [p]ossible burglary in progress.” Once he found appellant asleep in the car, Officer Johnson suspected possible offenses of burglary, DWI, public intoxication, or trespass. With respect to the testimony outlined in part IB of this opinion, Officer Johnson also explained that his testimony in the failure-to-identify prosecution reflected that he did not know particular offenses had been committed but that he was conducting an investigation.

Before the district judge, defense counsel argued that Officer Johnson lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain appellant, that Officer Johnson's investigation was prohibited under Article 14.03(d) 4 because he was outside of his jurisdiction, and that suppression should be granted under the doctrines of res judicata5 and collateral estoppel.

With respect to the Article 14.03(d) claim, defense counsel contended that Officer Johnson did not observe any of the offenses for which Article 14.03(d) allows an out-of-jurisdiction officer to perform an arrest.

With respect to the collateral-estoppel question, defense counsel first explained that the lawfulness of the arrest or detention is an element of the offense of failure to identify.6 He further argued, based upon Fifth Circuit cases, that collateral estoppel could involve two different scenarios: (1) barring the prosecution itself or (2) barring the relitigation of evidentiary facts.7 Defense counsel contended that appellant's case fell within the second scenario. He contended that Murphy v. State, 8 upon which the prosecutors heavily relied, involved only the first scenario.

Throughout the hearing, defense counsel referred to the fact that jeopardy had attached in the first prosecution when the suppression issue was decided. He also contended that the State had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue because (1) the State could have put into evidence, in the first prosecution, the additional evidence that was presented in the second prosecution, and (2) the State could have appealed the trial court's ruling in the first prosecution.

Finding that Officer Johnson had adequate justification to conduct an investigative detention, and relying upon Murphy to dispose of appellant's collateral-estoppel argument, the district judge denied the motion to suppress. Appellant pled guilty, and he pled true to two prior enhancement allegations. Punishment was tried to the jury, and the jury sentenced him to sixty years in prison.

D. Appeal

Appellant raised his suppression issues on appeal.9 With respect to the collateral- estoppel contention, he argued that the trial court in the failure-to-identify prosecution found two facts that should have been given preclusive effect in the methamphetamine prosecution: (1)...

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