York v. Tate

• Decision Date: 21 December 1988
• Docket Number: 87-3835,Nos. 87-3834,s. 87-3834
• Citation: 858 F.2d 322
• Parties: Jeffrey YORK, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Arthur TATE, Respondent-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 322

858 F.2d 322

Jeffrey YORK, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Arthur TATE, Respondent-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 87-3834, 87-3835.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued June 14, 1988.

Decided Sept. 28, 1988.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 10, 1988.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 21, 1988.

Thomas J. O'Connell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, Cordelia Glenn (argued), for respondent-appellant, cross-appellee.

Paul Mancino, Jr. (argued), Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner-appellee, cross-appellant.

Before MILBURN, GUY and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal from the district court's order granting habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, we are called upon to consider the proper application of the constitutional standard used for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a state court criminal prosecution resulting in a conviction. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Supreme Court instructed federal courts sitting in habeas to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (emphasis in original). In the instant case, the district court ruled that the Jackson standard must be applied in conjunction with the Ohio common law rule which provides that where "circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon to prove an element essential to a finding of guilt, it must be consistent only with the theory of guilt and irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence." State v. Kulig, 37 Ohio St.2d 157, 309 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1974). Applying the Kulig rule in the instant case, the district court decided upon reconsideration to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus since, according to the district court, the petitioner's theory of innocence was plausible and was not necessarily precluded by the circumstantial evidence.

Because we find that the constitutional standard of review established in Jackson v. Virginia is irreconcilable with the Ohio common law rules set forth in Kulig, we find that the district court erred in applying the Kulig rule in this habeas case. Under the established standard of review for determining the sufficiency of evidence, we find that there was ample evidence presented at petitioner's trial from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of committing the crime with which he was charged. We further find that the constitutional claims raised by the petitioner in his cross-appeal are without merit.

I.

Petitioner was convicted by an Ohio jury on one count of receiving stolen property in violation of Ohio Revised Code section 2913.51 and was sentenced to a term of three to five years in the state penitentiary. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear his appeal. After exhausting his state remedies, petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The case was referred to a magistrate who recommended that the petition be denied. In its first opinion, issued April 7, 1987, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied the petition. The court adopted the magistrate's report in toto with respect to eight of the nine constitutional claims alleged by the petitioner. The court, however, deemed it necessary to write a separate explanation regarding the sufficiency of evidence question. On April 17, 1987, petitioner filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. Respondent filed an opposing memorandum. On July 22, 1987, the district court issued another order granting the petitioner's motion to amend and reversing itself on the sufficiency of the evidence issue. On August 5, 1987, respondent filed its own motion to alter or amend the judgment of July 22, 1987. This motion was denied by a marginal entry of the court dated August 13, 1987. Respondent filed its notice of appeal to this court on August 24 1987. Petitioner filed a cross-appeal on the same date.

The following evidence was presented at petitioner's trial. Detective Roger Kimble testified that on the afternoon of March 2, 1984, he and his partner responded to a complaint about pickpockets who were operating in the area. When the detectives arrived at the scene, the man who had called in the complaint informed the officers that the suspects had left and indicated the direction in which they were heading. The man described the suspects as three black males wearing trench coats.

The officers followed the man's directions and soon came upon two black men in trench coats standing among a group of people at a bus stop. Detective Kimble testified that he observed the petitioner, whom he later identified as Jeffrey York, bump into a group of people and then back off without boarding the bus.

After York bumped into the crowd for a second time, Detective Kimble observed York and his companion retreat into an entrance of a department store where they exchanged some money between themselves. Detective Kimble approached the pair, identified himself as a police officer, and asked York for some identification. York responded that his name was Robert Gray but claimed that he did not have any identification. Detective Kimble then inquired about the driver's license which was protruding out of a glove which York held in his hand. York threw the glove down and tried to flee into the department store but was quickly apprehended by Detective Kimble. Detective Kimble also testified that he found a second glove, similar to the one York threw down, in York's coat pocket after he was arrested.

The glove which York threw down was recovered by the officers. It contained a driver's license belonging to a woman named Shui Yin Kwan along with her social security card and other personal papers. Shui Yin Kwan testified that she had been waiting for a bus on the day in question at the same stop where Detective Kimble had observed York bumping into people. Ms. Kwan stated that someone "punched her" while she was waiting for the bus. After she boarded the bus, Ms. Kwan noticed that her purse had been opened and that her wallet was missing. Ms. Kwan identified all of the items retrieved from York as belonging to her.

The sole witness for the defense was York's girlfriend, Wanda Martin. She testified that she was with York when he was arrested by Detective Kimble. According to Martin, she and York had been shopping in the department store when York found the glove on the floor. She testified that York had asked several people if the glove had belonged to them. She also testified that Detective Kimble did not identify himself as a police officer when he demanded identification from York. Martin further stated that Kimble "snatched" the glove from York's hand and "shoved" him against a wall before handcuffing him and leading him away. The petitioner did not testify in his own defense. Based on this evidence, Jeffrey York was convicted of receiving stolen property.

II.

Before we address the merits of the claims raised by each of the parties, there are two procedural issues raised by the petitioner in his cross-appeal which we must first consider.

Petitioner claims that the respondent's appeal from the district court's judgment granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is moot because the petitioner is no longer in custody. The petitioner was released on July 31, 1987, pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued by the district court on July 27, 1987.

In Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968), the Supreme Court unanimously held that a habeas corpus action is not mooted by the petitioner's unconditional release from custody so long as the prisoner was in custody at the time of the filing of the habeas corpus petition. In so ruling, the Court concluded "that under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of the proceedings on such application." Id. at 238, 88 S.Ct. at 1560.

In Carafas, the Court emphasized the adverse collateral consequences resulting from a criminal conviction which persist even after the prisoner has been released. Id. at 239, 88 S.Ct. at 1560. The Court concluded that the habeas statute did not preclude the petitioner from pursuing his suit to achieve complete vindication even after he was released.

Under the principles set forth in Carafas, it is clear that the claims brought by the petitioner himself in his cross-appeal are not moot. Likewise, we conclude that the claims brought by the respondent contesting the validity of petitioner's release also remain viable. Just as the former prisoner has a continued interest in clearing his name, so too the state maintains an interest in assuring that a state prisoner is not improperly released prior to the completion of his allotted sentence. Moreover, we note that the Supreme Court has relied on Carafas in rejecting claims of mootness in cases where the prisoner was released during the pendency of an appeal brought by the state penal institution superintendent. See e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 830, 833 n. 4, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 415 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 2438 n. 6, 69 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981).

Accordingly, we conclude that the instant case is not moot.

In his second procedural argument, petitioner contends that the respondent's appeal was untimely. Specifically, petitioner argues that the respondent's appeal was not filed within thirty days of the district court's judgment as required by Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of...