Yorton v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1884
• Citation: 21 N.W. 516,62 Wis. 367
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: YORTON v. MILWAUKEE, L. S. & W. RY. CO.

62 Wis. 367

21 N.W. 516

YORTON

v.MILWAUKEE, L. S. & W. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed November 25, 1884.

Appeal from county court, Milwaukee county.Nath. Pereles & Sons and E. P. Smith, for appellant.

A. L. Cary, for respondent.

COLE, C. J.

The sole question in this case is, was the rule of damages which was laid down by the learned county court correct, in view of the facts disclosed on the trial? That rule was, in effect, that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover the additional fare he had to pay to get from Clintonville to Oshkosh, with interest. When the case was here on a former appeal (54 Wis. 234;S. C. 11 N. W. REP. 482) we thought the charge of the court as to the rule of damages incorrect, because it went upon the hypothesis that the plaintiff was unlawfully put off the train at the Bear Creek station. We held that the plaintiff was not entitled to ride on the second train upon the trip check which he had received from the conductor of the first train, and that, under the rules of the company, the second conductor might demand the additional fare to his place of destination, and, upon the plaintiff's refusal to pay, might eject him from the train at some usual stopping-place, using no unnecessary force for the purpose. We said the second conductor had the lawful right to do this, and was bound to do it, in obedience to a reasonable rule of the company which required a passenger to obtain from his conductor a stop-over check when he desired to stop before reaching the place to which he had purchased his ticket; and the mistake or fault of the first conductor in not giving him, on request, such a check, would not give him the lawful right to ride on the second train, though he might recover damages against the company for the wrongful act of the first conductor. The court below strictly adhered to this decision, and charged that the plaintiff was rightfully put off the train at the Bear Creek station by the second conductor. And the learned county court seemed to suppose it legally and logically resulted from that view that the plaintiff was confined in his recovery to the additional fare he had been compelled to pay, and interest thereon; but we do not think that conclusion correct when the other undisputed facts of the case are considered. The jury, in effect, found, in answer to the question submitted, that the plaintiff purchased a ticket for Oshkosh, which, of course, entitled him to passage to that place. Further, that Conductor Sherman, when he took up this ticket, was informed by the plaintiff that he wished to stop over at Clintonville, and requested the conductor to give him a stop-over check. Thereupon Conductor Sherman gave the plaintiff, doubtless through mistake, a trip check as and for a lay-over check. The plaintiff received this check believing it to be a stop-over check. When he entered upon the second train at Clintonville, the next morning, he had every reason to suppose that he had the proper voucher for a passage on that train to Oshkosh. But after the train started from Clintonville he was told by the second conductor, when his ticket was called for, that he could not ride on his train on the check which he had received from the first conductor, and that he must either pay his fare to Oshkosh or leave the train. He refused to pay his fare, and proceeded on his journey, but concluded to obey the order of the conductor and leave the train at Bear Creek. The question then is, had not the plaintiff the right to adopt this course,--leave the train as he was ordered to do, and hold the company responsible for the fault or mistake of the first conductor? We are clearly of the opinion that he had. And, choosing that alternative, what damages would he be entitled to recover? It seems to us he could recover all such damages as were the direct and natural result of the wrongful act complained of. It is not entirely clear from the complaint whether the action is for a breach of contract, or for a violation of duty as common carrier, though we assume that it is of the latter character. But it can make no...