You v. Japan
| Decision Date | 14 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. C 15-03257 WHA,C 15-03257 WHA |
| Citation | 150 F.Supp.3d 1140 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | He Nam You and Kyung Soon Kim, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Japan; Hirohito; Akihito ; Nobuske Kishi; Shinzo Abe; NYK Line (North America); Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha; Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.; Nissan North America, Inc.; Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Hitachi, Ltd.; Hitachi America, Ltd.; Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal U.S.A., Inc.; Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corporation; Mitsubishi Corporation (America); Mitsubishi Group; Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc.; Mitsui & Co. Ltd.; Okamoto Industries, Inc. ; Sankei Shimbun, Co., Ltd. ; and Does 1–1000, inclusive, Defendants. |
Hume Joseph Jung, Joseph Jung & Associates, Oakland, CA, Hyungjin Kim, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Thaddeus John Stauber, Jason P. Gonzalez, Jessica Nicole Walker, Sarah Erickson Andre, Nixon Peabody LLP, Perlette Michele Jura, Ryan Stephen Appleby, Gibson, Dunn Crutcher LLP, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, CA, Kimball Richard Anderson, Samuel Mendenhall, Sarah A. Krajewski, Winston and Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, Brendan P. Cullen, Nathaniel Lyon Green, Sullivan & Cromwell, Palo Alto, CA, Robert Allan Mittelstaedt, Caroline Nason Mitchell, David L. Wallach, Jones Day, Colin C. West, David M. Balabanian, Katie Rose Glynn, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Herman Joseph Hoying, Ad Astra Law Group, Krista M. Enns, Kimball R. Anderson, Winston & Strawn LLP, Joseph Anthony Meckes, Nathan Lane, III, Squire Patton Boggs LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.
, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
In this putative class action for personal injury and crimes against humanity during the Second World War, six of twenty defendants move to dismiss all claims against them. One defendant also moves for summary judgment. Plaintiffs seek leave to file a second amended complaint, following a prior order granting another defendant's motion to dismiss. To the extent stated below, defendants' motions to dismiss are Granted . The motion for summary judgment is Granted in part .
Plaintiffs He Nam You and Kyung Soon Kim are residents and citizens of the Republic of Korea. Plaintiffs allege that they were abducted by the Japanese government during the Second World War, forced into servitude, and exploited as sex slaves for the benefit of Japanese soldiers at “comfort stations” in Japan.
Plaintiffs bring claims against five overlapping categories of defendants, which they refer to as “wartime defendants,” “corporation defendants,” “headquarter defendants,” “subsidiary defendants,” and “individual defendants.” Defendants Mitsubishi Corporation (Americas), Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal U.S.A., Inc., Nissan North America, Inc., and NYK Line (North America), Inc., and Hitachi America, Inc. (collectively, “moving defendants”), are each identified as members of the wartime, corporation, and subsidiary categories. Each of these six defendants is the United States subsidiary of a parent company based in Japan. None of the parent companies has yet been served.1
Without specifying whether they are referring to the parent or the subsidiary, plaintiffs allege that each of the moving defendants provided war materiél to Japan during the Second World War and that each realized “huge profit” from such conduct. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Nissan and Toyota each provided motor vehicles and trucks, Nippon sold steel, NYK Line provided maritime shipping services, Mitsubishi provided financial support, vessels, trucks, ammunition, and arms, and Hitachi provided locomotives and engines (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 41–46). Such conduct, plaintiffs allege, aided and abetted the Japanese military in committing the atrocities that form the basis of their claims, both by facilitating plaintiffs' transportation throughout the campaign and by providing general support to the war effort.
Two defendants, Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., and Sankei Shimbun Co., Ltd., have already successfully moved to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 76, 122). Plaintiffs repeat the same claims against the moving defendants, and the relevant factual allegations overlap significantly. Specifically, plaintiffs assert the following claims against each of the moving defendants: (1) crimes against humanity in violation of the Alien Torts Statute, (2) cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in violation of the Alien Torts Statute, (3) conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity in violation of the Alien Torts Statute, (4) aiding and abetting torture, in violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) battery, and (7) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Mitsubishi, Nissan, Nippon, NYK, Toyota, and Hitachi all move to dismiss all claims against them. Nissan also moves for summary judgment, arguing that because it did not exist at the time of the Second World War, it cannot be liable for its parent company's conduct during the War (the other five defendants assert the same argument in their motions to dismiss).
This order follows full briefing and oral argument.
The order dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Mitsui held that this case presented a non-justiciable political question and plaintiffs' claims were time-barred (Dkt. No. 76). Each moving defendant now reasserts those arguments and further argues they cannot be held liable for the torts of their parent company. These issues are addressed in turn.
A case presents a non-justiciable political question if it “revolve[s] around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society , 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)
.
In 1951, Japan entered into a treaty of peace with the Allied Powers. 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490 (1951)
. Article 14 of the 1951 Treaty required Japan to pay certain reparations to the Allied Powers “for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war.” Additionally, the 1951 Treaty included a waiver of all “claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war.” Article 26 of the 1951 Treaty obligated Japan to enter into “bilateral” treaties with non-Allied states “on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present treaty.” In 1965, Japan entered into a treaty with the Republic of Korea. (The United States was not a party to the 1965 Treaty.) Section 1 of Article II of the 1965 Treaty “settled completely and finally” all claims between the parties and their nationals, including those addressed in the 1951 Treaty. 583 U.N.T.S. 258, 260 (1965).
In Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan , 413 F.3d 45 (D.C.Cir.2005)
, citizens of Korea, among others, brought claims against Japan based on allegations that they were kept as comfort women for Japanese soldiers during the Second World War, similar to our plaintiffs. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the case because it presented a non-justiciable political question. There, the plaintiffs argued that the 1951 Treaty with Japan only waived claims by Americans against Japan and its nationals, not claims by citizens of other non-party nations. They also argued that Korea believed its citizens' claims against Japan and its nationals survived the 1965 Treaty.
The United States submitted a statement of interest during the district court proceedings in Joo
, noting that “it manifestly was not the intent of the President and Congress to preclude Americans from bringing their war-related claims against Japan...while allowing federal or state courts to serve as a venue for the litigation of similar claims by non-U.S. nationals.” Id. at 50 (). Additionally, the decision in Joo noted that Article 26 of the 1951 Treaty made it “pellucidly clear” that the United States intended the claims of citizens of other nations to be resolved in bilateral treaties, not by domestic courts. As to the 1965 Treaty, it was “[d]ecidedly not” the “province of a court in the United States to decide whether Korea's or Japan's reading of the treaty between them is correct, when the Executive has determined that choosing between the interests of two foreign states would adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States....” Id. at 53
.2
In light of the 2001 statement of interest submitted by the United States, Joo
held as follows:
[A]djudication by a domestic court not only “would undo” a settled foreign policy of state-to-state negotiation with Japan, but also could disrupt Japan's “delicate” relations with China and Korea, thereby creating “serious implications for stability in the region.”
(quoting 2001 Statement of Interest at 34–35). Ultimately, because the plaintiffs' claims would have required the Joo court to resolve competing interpretations of a treaty between Korea and Japan, the case was dismissed as a non-justiciable political question.
Although the moving defendants are all American entities, plaintiffs' claims against them are based on the theory that they are alter egos of their respective parent companies, which are Japanese corporations. Even if plaintiffs could establish that the moving defendants can be liable for claims based on their parents' conduct, that begs the question whether those claims (against the parent) were extinguished by the 1965 Treaty between Japan and Korea. That was exactly the question resolved in Joo
. Although Joo is not binding in our circuit, it...
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