Youakim v. Miller, 73 C 635.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 73 C 635.,73 C 635.
• Citation: 431 F. Supp. 40
• Parties: Marcel YOUAKIM et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jerome MILLER, Individually and as Director of the Department of Children and Family Services and the Department of Children and Family Services, of the State of Illinois, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

431 F. Supp. 40

Marcel YOUAKIM et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jerome MILLER, Individually and as Director of the Department of Children and Family Services and the Department of Children and Family Services, of the State of Illinois, Defendants.

No. 73 C 635.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

July 27, 1976.

Patrick A. Keenan, Detroit, Mich., Kenneth Kandaras, Robert E. Lehrer and James D. Weill, Legal Assistance Foundation, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Wm. J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KIRKLAND, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court for consideration of plaintiffs' claim that the statutory scheme of the Illinois foster care program, specifically Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23 §§ 2212.05, 2212.17, and 5005, is in conflict with Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.

This suit was commenced as a class action to enjoin the operation of the Illinois foster care payment scheme. Because the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of a scheme established by state statute, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. Under the Illinois scheme foster parents who provide homes for unrelated children receive monthly foster care payments (AFDC-FC) of $105.00 per child from the Department of Children and Family Services, while foster parents who provide homes for related children do not receive such payments. Related foster parents, instead, are eligible for smaller AFDC payments from the Illinois Department of Public Aid.

The three-judge court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Illinois scheme "does not deny plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws." 374 F.Supp. 1204, 1210 (N.D.Ill.1974). The Supreme Court, in vacating the three-judge court judgment and remanding, noted that

"the circumstances justify . . . our dealing with the issue of conflict between state and federal statute at least to the extent of vacating the judgment below and remanding the case for consideration of the claim that the Illinois foster care program is in conflict with the Social Security Act." Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234, 96 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 47 L.Ed.2d 701 (1976).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs are Marcel and Linda Youakim, husband and wife, and Linda's four minor brothers and sisters. All four minors were adjudged wards of the State in 1969. Two of the children have been living with their related foster parents, the Youakims since 1972; the other two children have been living in two separate unrelated foster care facilities since 1969. Because plaintiff Linda Youakim is related to her two foster children, the Youakims are ineligible for foster care payments (AFDC-FC) under the Illinois Child Care Act. Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23 § 2212.17.¹ The Youakims did apply for and are receiving the smaller AFDC payments for both children. Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23 §§ 4-1 et seq.²

Plaintiffs allege injury resulting in the financial inability to provide adequate care for their foster children and to bring the remaining two children into their foster home. Plaintiffs argue that the Illinois scheme violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Youakims also contend that the Illinois scheme denies related foster families equal protection of the laws by discriminating against wards of the State and their relatives who are financially unable to provide foster homes for the wards without full foster care payments.

On remand from the Supreme Court, plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin enforcement of the State statutes involved pursuant to Rule 65(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, to grant summary judgment against defendants pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants ask that this Court deny plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and grant summary judgment in their favor.

THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Plaintiffs contend that Illinois attempts to add an additional eligibility requirement to the federal scheme regulating AFDC-FC foster care payments. In support of their position, plaintiffs note that in the Social Security Act (the "Act"), Section 601 evidences a clear national policy favoring placement of dependent children in their own homes or the homes of certain close relatives,³ while Section 608 provides that federal funds are to be paid for the foster care of dependent children in the home of any individual. Section 608 defines the foster family home of any individual as:

A foster family home for children which is licensed by the state in which it is situated or has been approved, by the agency of such state responsible for licensing homes of this type as meeting the standards established for such licensing . . ..

Plaintiffs allege that in contrast to the federal scheme, the Illinois scheme requiring that foster parents be unrelated pulls families apart by prohibiting receipt of AFDC-FC payments by related foster parents. Section 5 of the Department of Children and Family Services Act, Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23, § 5005, empowers the Department and its Director to establish rules and regulations concerning foster care, while the other challenged sections provide in pertinent part:

"Facility for child care" or "child care facility" means any person . . . who or which receives or arranges for care or placement of one or more children unrelated to the operator of the facility. Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23 §§ 2212.05, 2212.17 (emphasis added).

The plaintiffs note further that while Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23, § 4-1.2 provides for foster care payment, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services Placement Manual states that "the Department has no statutory authority to pay relatives for the care of children." Manual at 97.

Defendants argue, conversely, that the Illinois foster care program parallels the federal scheme since parents and close relatives are treated separately from foster parents. Defendants note that Sections 601-606 of the Act provide for aid to needy children living with their parents or certain close relatives (AFDC), while Section 608 provides aid to children removed by court order from the homes of parents or close relatives and placed in foster care facilities (AFDC-FC). They argue that Illinois, likewise, provides aid for children living with their parents or close relatives under the AFDC program, Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23 §§ 4-1 to 4-11, and aid to children living with unrelated foster parents under the AFDC-FC program, Illinois Revised Statutes ch. 23 § 4-1.2. Defendants note that Section 603(a)(1)(B) of the Act, as construed by the court in Ramos v. Montgomery, 313 F.Supp. 1179 (S.D.Cal.1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 1003, 91 S.Ct. 572, 27 L.Ed.2d 618 (1971), authorizes higher payments to recipients of AFDC-FC benefits than to AFDC recipients. Finally, defendants argue that the two categories, parents and relatives of needy children and foster parents, are mutually exclusive under a correct interpretation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") regulations contained in 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (1975).

CONCLUSIONS

The Constitution and the laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). Because of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, states may not enact laws or regulations which are contrary to federal law. If the challenged Illinois statutes are in conflict with Article IV of the Social Security Act, such statutes are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971). Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352 (1972); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338, 95 S.Ct. 1741, 44 L.Ed.2d 208 (1975); and Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975).

As the basic question is one of statutory construction, this Court looks to three sources to determine whether the Illinois scheme violates the provisions of Title IV of the Act: (1) the plain words and meaning of the Act; (2) the interpretation and advice of the administering agency, HEW; and (3) the legislative history and the overall purpose of the Act.

1. PLAIN MEANING OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

Plaintiffs argue that the plain meaning of the Act is that all wards of the state placed in approved foster homes are eligible for full AFDC-FC payments under Section 608. In contrast, defendants contend that the plain meaning of the Act indicates that Congress intended to provide assistance to needy children living with close relatives through the AFDC program under Section 606 of the Act rather than through the Section 608 foster care program. This Court agrees with plaintiffs' contention.

The four minor plaintiffs were removed from their own home and declared wards of the State in 1969. While all four lived in unrelated foster care facilities, those facilities received the full $105.00 per child per month AFDC-FC allotment. In order to effectuate the policy that wards of the State be placed in the best home possible, two of the four children were moved to a related home in 1972 and AFDC-FC payments on behalf of those children were terminated.

Plaintiffs Youakims' home has been approved as a foster care home by the State as required by Section 608 of the Act.⁴ The Youakims were required to sign the same Illinois Foster Home Placement Agreement⁵ and incurred identical obligations as all other foster parents in Illinois.

This Court finds, therefore, that under the plain words and meaning of Section 608 of the Act, the four minor plaintiffs meet all the...