Youlin Wang v. Kahn
| Decision Date | 04 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-08033-LHK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | YOULIN WANG, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD KAHN, et al., Defendants. |
Before the Court is Respondents' Richard Kahn and Forensic Professionals Group USA (collectively, “Kahn Respondents”) motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction subject matter jurisdiction and venue (hereafter “motion to vacate preliminary injunction and dismiss”). ECF No. 48 (“Mot.”).[1] Having considered the briefing, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Kahn Respondents' motion to vacate preliminary injunction and dismiss.
Petitioner Youlin Wang (“Wang”) retained Derek Longstaff (“Longstaff”) through Guohua “Greg” Xiong (“Xiong”), Wang's brother in law and authorized agent, to provide legal services in connection with tax refunds that Wang sought for the sale of two properties in Palo Alto, California in 2017 and 2018. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 4-5. Longstaff then allegedly entered into a scheme with Respondents Richard Kahn (“Kahn”) and Forensic Professionals Group USA (“FPG”) (collectively, “Kahn Respondents”) to defraud Wang through use of an illegal tax deferral vehicle. Id. at 5-6. Kahn Respondents also allegedly entered into an agreement with Longstaff that provided Kahn Respondents with a contingent fee interest in Wang's tax refunds, consisting of two separate documents, the Partially Deferred Retainer and Fee Agreement (“PDRF agreement”), and the Refund Disbursement Service Agreement (“RDS agreement”). Id. at 1, 3, 5-6. This was accomplished through an allegedly fraudulent power of attorney authorizing Longstaff to act on Wang's behalf. Id. at 5. Kahn Respondents also allegedly increased their contingency fees by inflating Wang's tax refunds. Id. at 6.
On November 6, 2019, Longstaff was terminated as counsel for Wang. Id. In late 2019, Longstaff and Kahn Respondents had a dispute related to their agreement and the amount Wang owed Kahn Respondents. Id. at 6-7. Wang was not informed of this dispute. Id. On November 20, 2019, Kahn Respondents initiated arbitration in Florida against Longstaff over unpaid fees. Id. at 7. The initial arbitration claim by Kahn Respondents was asserted against Longstaff, both individually and as purported “attorney-in-fact by way of power of attorney for Wang.” Id. On March 25, 2020, Kahn Respondents filed an amended arbitration claim seeking $10, 000, 000 in damages for tortious interference and libel claims against Wang. Id.
Wang alleges that he was never informed of these proceedings. Wang further alleges that Longstaff has continued to purport to act on Wang's behalf in the arbitration, despite the fact that Longstaff has no authority to represent Wang. Id. at 7-8. In mid-September 2020, Wang was made aware of the arbitration proceedings. Id. at 7-8. On October 31, 2020, Wang's counsel provided notice to the arbitrator and the parties in arbitration that Wang objected to arbitral jurisdiction and that Wang intended to file a petition to enjoin the arbitration. Id. at 8. On November 6, 2020, Bernard Beitch, the arbitrator, conducted a telephonic conference at which Wang's counsel made a limited appearance for the purpose of raising objections and answering any questions. Id.
On November 13, 2020, Wang filed a petition to enjoin the arbitration and prevent Longstaff from acting on behalf of Wang in the arbitration (“Petition”). ECF No. 1. On November 18, 2020, Wang filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the Petition. ECF No. 10.
On November 20, 2020, Wang filed against Kahn Respondents and Longstaff a motion for a temporary restraining order and to show cause re preliminary injunction. ECF No. 14. The Court denied this motion on November 24, 2020.
On December 7, 2020, Wang filed a motion for preliminary injunction (“motion for PI”) against Kahn Respondents. ECF No. 23. Opposition to the motion for PI was due by December 21, 2020. On December 24, 2020, Kahn, appearing pro se, requested an extension of time to January 29, 2021 to hire local counsel and respond to the motion for PI. ECF No. 26. On December 29, 2020, the Court granted Kahn's request to extend time. ECF No. 31.
On January 15, 2021, counsel Douglas Everett Klein made an appearance on behalf of Kahn Respondents. ECF No. 35. On January 25, 2021, the parties stipulated to an extension of time to February 12, 2021 for Kahn Respondents to oppose the motion for PI, which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 36, 37. Kahn Respondents failed to file an opposition by February 12, 2021. Wang filed a reply on the stipulated deadline of February 26, 2021. ECF No. 43.
On April 5, 2021, nearly four months after Wang filed the motion for PI, the Court granted the motion for PI against Kahn Respondents, who failed to oppose the motion despite two deadline extensions. ECF No. 45.
On April 28, 2021, Kahn Respondents filed the instant motion to vacate preliminary injunction and dismiss. ECF No. 48. On July 19, 2021, Wang filed an opposition. ECF No. 58 (“Opp'n”). Kahn Respondents failed to file a reply.
Kahn Respondents also sought judicial notice of three documents: (1) a California state court complaint filed, in part, against Kahn Respondents; (2) a California state court complaint filed against other alleged participants in the alleged scheme to defraud Wang; and (3) a document filed by Kahn in the Florida arbitration proceeding. ECF No. 49. The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either “generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). Public records, including judgments and other publicly filed documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). Each of these documents is a public court filing and is therefore the proper subject of judicial notice. Id; Global Inds. Investment Ltd. v. Chung, No. 19-CV-07670-LHK, 2020 WL 5355968, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2020) ()
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Kahn Respondents' unopposed request for judicial notice. However, the Court does not take judicial notice of disputed facts therein. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) () (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
Under Rule 60(b), the Court may grant a motion for relief from judgment only upon a showing of (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court's decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); see also School Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc, 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) .
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and its own inherent power, a district court may modify or set aside an interlocutory order prior to entry of a final judgement. See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court may also alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e). Id. To determine “whether a motion requesting the district court to reconsider its preliminary injunction should be treated as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59 or a motion for dissolution or modification under Rule 54” the district court “must look beyond the motion's caption to its substance.” Id. (citation omitted).
Under Civil Local Rule 7-9, “a litigant dissatisfied with an interlocutory ruling” must seek leave of the court before filing a motion for reconsideration. Meas, 681 F.Supp.2d at 1143.Civil Local Rule 7-9 specifies the requirements for such a motion. The moving party must show “reasonable diligence in bringing the motion” as well as one of the following:
(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or (2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order; or
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.
A defendant may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules...
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