Youmans v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 2893.
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Writing for the Court | GOOLSBY. |
Citation | 333 S.C. 195,508 S.E.2d 43 |
Parties | Willie YOUMANS, Claimant, Appellant, v. COASTAL PETROLEUM CO., Employer, and South Carolina Petroleum Marketers Association, Carrier, Respondents. |
Docket Number | No. 2893.,2893. |
Decision Date | 26 October 1998 |
333 S.C. 195
508 S.E.2d 43
v.
COASTAL PETROLEUM CO., Employer, and South Carolina Petroleum Marketers Association, Carrier, Respondents
No. 2893.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard October 6, 1998.
Decided October 26, 1998.
John W. Rabb, Jr., of Savage, Royall & Sheheen, of Camden, for respondent.
GOOLSBY, Judge:
Willie Youmans appeals a circuit court order barring him under S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-60 (1985) from recovering workers' compensation benefits. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
On April 9, 1996, while working as a clerk at the Georgetown Anglers Minimart, Youmans had an altercation with his supervisor, Glen Parsons. Youmans sustained injuries as a
The single commissioner ruled section 42-9-60 barred Youmans from benefits because "any injury he sustained occurred while in the commission of an assault by him on a co-employee with the willful intent to injure or kill the co-employee in a serious and aggravated manner."
On appeal, the commission reversed and awarded Youmans benefits, finding the altercation resulted from Youmans's spontaneous reaction to a racial slur by Parsons. Citing Kinsey v. Champion Am. Serv. Ctr., 268 S.C. 177, 232 S.E.2d 720 (1977), the commission concluded section 42-9-60 did not bar recovery because Youmans reacted spontaneously and without premeditation.
The circuit court reversed the commission and ruled Youmans was barred from recovery by section 42-9-60 because he "committed a one-sided brutal physical assault against his supervisor, which did not occur spontaneously, but rather occurred with a clear willful intention to injure."
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the circuit court err in ruling that Youmans was barred from receiving workers' compensation benefits under section 42-9-60?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Administrative Procedures Act establishes the standard of review for decisions by the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse if the decision is affected by an error of law. Lester v. South Carolina Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 328 S.C. 535, 493 S.E.2d 103 (Ct.App.1997). A reviewing court should affirm a decision by the commission unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307. Substantial evidence is evidence that, in viewing the record as a whole, would allow reasonable
DISCUSSION
Generally, neither the fault of the employer nor that of the employee is a critical factor in determining whether an employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Kinsey, 268 S.C. at 180, 232 S.E.2d at 721; Zeigler v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 250 S.C. 326, 157 S.E.2d 598 (1967); Reeves v. Carolina Foundry & Mach. Works, 194 S.C. 403, 9 S.E.2d 919 (1940). S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-60...
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Thompson ex rel. Harvey v. Cisson Const., 4339.
...lacking a deliberate or formed intention to do injury, it is not the result of willful intention. Youmans v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 333 S.C. 195, 198, 508 S.E.2d 43, 45 (Ct.App.1998) (citing Kinsey v. Champion Am. Serv. Ctr., 268 S.C. 177, 181, 232 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1977)). See also In re Sp......
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Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 3215.
...through regulations. -------- Notes: 1. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). 2. Youmans v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 333 S.C. 195, 508 S.E.2d 43 3. S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(6) (Supp.1999). 4. Id. § 42-15-80 (1976). 5. Id. § 42-15-95 (Supp.1999). 6. 25A S.C.Code Ann.Regs. 6......
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