Young-Bey v. Unity Med. Healthcare
| Decision Date | 21 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-1032 (CKK) |
| Parties | Jeffrey M. YOUNG-BEY, Plaintiff, v. UNITY MEDICAL HEALTHCARE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jeffrey M. Young-Bey, Hagerstown, MD, pro se.
Rhonda Lisa Campbell, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6.1 For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.
At all times relevant to the Complaint, Unity Health Care, Inc. ("Unity") was "a grantee of the Department of Health & Human Services (‘HHS') by operation of the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act," Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 6-1 ( ) at 1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 233(g) -(n) ), and provided medical care for detainees at the D.C. Jail, see Compl. ¶ 3; Decl. of Meredith Torres, ECF No. 9 ("Torres Decl.") ¶ 6. Unity "was deemed eligible for Federal Tort Claims Act malpractice coverage effective January 1, 2014, and ... its coverage has continued without interruption since that time." Torres Decl. ¶ 5. Henry D. Marshall, M.D., Leslie Keck, M.D., and Genet Desta, M.D., were Unity employees, id. ¶ 6, who acted "within the scope of their respective employment as deemed employees of the Public Health Service at the time of the ... incidents" alleged in the complaint, Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, Ex. A (Certification).2
On September 2, 2015, the United States Marshals Service ("USMS") transported plaintiff to the D.C. Jail "pursuant to a ‘writ ad test’ issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia." Compl. ¶ 8; see id. ¶¶ 2, 9. He remained in the District's custody until October 6, 2015, when the USMS transported him to a correctional facility in Jessup, Maryland, where he was "held pending resolution of a criminal matter in the ... Superior Court." Defs.' Mem. at 2.
According to plaintiff, he was experiencing "severe muscle spasms in [his] left pelvic and thigh areas," and treatment of his condition "with minor analgesic pain medicines and muscle relaxers" was not successful. Compl. ¶ 9. When plaintiff arrived at the D.C. Jail, he advised a "triage Physician Assistant" of his symptoms. Id. "During the ensuing days, [p]laintiff repeatedly complained to [Unity staff] of severe pain and muscle spasms." Id. ¶ 10. He recounted an incident on September 4, 2015, when his "pain was so severe [he] was unable to walk for more than ten ... steps, could not sit up [ ]right for more than [two] minutes and could not stand for more than [two to three] minutes without experiencing muscle spasms in his left leg, groin area and lower back." Id. The pain allegedly caused plaintiff to collapse on his way to the visiting area, and he missed a meeting with his attorney. Id. ¶ 11. When plaintiff was taken to the infirmary, Dr. Desta allegedly "failed to physically examine [him], failed to order any diagnostic tests and failed to diagnose any cause for [his] severe muscle spasms[.]" Id. ¶ 13. Instead, Dr. Desta "prescribed ... [M]otrin," id. ¶ 14, which did not relieve the pain, see id. ¶ 15.
On September 8, 2015, Dr. Marshall "conducted a complete ... neurological examination of [p]laintiff's left leg, thigh as well as the range of motion in both legs." Id. ¶ 16. In addition to Motrin
, plaintiff was prescribed Toradol and Flexeril, id. , and x-rays were taken of his left hip, pelvic region and lumbar spine. Id. ¶ 17. At a follow-up clinic visit on September 15, 2015, Dr. Keck reported the results of plaintiff's x-rays, and prescribed Motrin, Flexeril, aspirin and a muscle rub. Id. ¶ 18. Although plaintiff continued to make requests for treatment, he allegedly received nothing more than ineffective pain relievers. See id. ¶¶ 19-20. On September 28, 2015, when plaintiff "suffered a muscle spasm in his left leg," id. ¶ 21, he was taken on a stretcher to the infirmary, was "given an ... intramuscular injection of some substance and ... Benadryl," and the spasms abated within the hour, id. ¶ 2. Dr. Desta "opined that the muscle spasms [p]laintiff was [experiencing] may [have been] due to an imbalance in [p]laintiff's serum [p]otassium levels[.]" Id. ¶ 23. No blood work was done, and despite Dr. Desta's "suggest[ion] that an ‘MRI’ might prove diagnostic [, no] other treatments were provided," and plaintiff instead was instructed "to place more sick-call requests ... as symptoms recur or persisted." Id.
Plaintiff has made a claim under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see id. ¶¶ 26-30, and a medical malpractice claim arising from the medical care and treatment he received (or did not receive) at the D.C. Jail, see id. ¶¶ 32-34, for which he demands compensatory and punitive damages totaling $7.5 million, id. ¶¶ 30, 34. He filed his complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on November 24, 2015, and defendants removed the action on June 1, 2016, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442(a)(l), 1446, 1346(b), 2401(b), and 2671 -80. See Notice of Removal at 1.
Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint.3 See generally Defs.' Mem. at 5-7.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution and by federal statute. See Wilson v. U.S. Dep't of Transp. , 759 F.Supp.2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2011). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true, and it "may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction." Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin. , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
"It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." United States v. Mitchell , 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States is immune from suit unless Congress expressly has waived the defense of sovereign immunity by statute. See id. The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 -2680, operates as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, rendering the United States amenable to suit for certain, but not all, tort claims. See, e.g., Richards v. United States , 369 U.S. 1, 6, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). For example, the United States has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to constitutional tort claims, see FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), and plaintiff's claim for money damages arising from an alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment must fail, see, e.g., Roman v. Nat'l Reconnaissance Office , 952 F.Supp.2d 159, 163–64 (D.D.C. 2013). However, the FTCA renders the "United States ... liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," 28 U.S.C. § 2674, for medical malpractice, see, e.g., Williams v. United States , 932 F.Supp. 357, 360 (D.D.C. 1996) ().
Plaintiff demands monetary damages for claims arising from medical treatment Unity and three of its employees provided while he was detained at the D.C. Jail. Defendants assert that Unity is a grantee of the Department of Health and Human Services by operation of the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 233(g) -(n), and Dr. Marshall, Dr. Keck and Dr. Desta were acting within the scope of their employment with Unity as if they were employees of the Public Health Service. See Torres Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Thus, defendants demonstrate that Unity is eligible for FTCA malpractice coverage, id. ¶ 5, such that the FTCA is plaintiff's sole route to recovery, see 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) -(b), (g) ; see also Edwards v. District of Columbia , 616 F.Supp.2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2009) ; Williams v. United States , No. 1:06–cv–1486, 2007 WL 1549182, at *1 .
The United States of America is the only proper defendant in a suit under the FTCA. See, e.g., Hall v. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts , 496 F.Supp.2d 203, 206 (D.D.C. 2007). Even though this pro se plaintiff has not named the United States as a party, the Court overlooks this pleading defect and instead treats plaintiff's claims as if they had been brought against the United States directly. See, e.g., Hui v. Castaneda , 559 U.S. 799, 810, 130 S.Ct. 1845, 176 L.Ed.2d 703 (2010).
The FTCA provides that a claimant may file a civil action suit for claims of "personal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). This is a waiver of sovereign immunity, see United States v. Mitchell , 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980), and "the terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit," id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood , 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941) ). Generally, a claimant must " ‘present [his] claim ‘in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues,’ and thereafter file [his] action in court within six months of agency's final denial of [his] claim.' "...
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...that . . . the FTCA is [P]laintiff's sole route to recovery” and “[t]he United States is the only proper defendant.” Young-Bey, 217 F.Supp.3d at 308. The United States is therefore substituted as the defendant in this case. See id. (treating pro se “plaintiff's claims as if they had been br......